[Fis] Gordana's Agency Note

[Gordana Dodig Crnkovic]

Thanks, Marcus!
I will do more reading and answer in the coming days.

One important thing: five points are Stuarts, not mine! Sorry for not making it clear.
I changed the formatting and made a list, but the five points are Stuart's, from:
[1] Kauffman, S., Clayton, P. On emergence, agency, and organization. Biol Philos 21, 501–521 (2006). https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-9003-9__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!Rg3c69Y8KRVdTd87uGEnNrmoIiH-ZANNiLaH-Faqh8MsU4Obfr45ZxS2G1IKXFiBGIFZ47CtfnGVZGJEAnnEKgXBjr8uDaq9$ 

Mine is the observation that information plays a fundamental role in the background.
I was trying to say that (2) corresponds to „no information without physical implementation“*,
and (1, 3, 4, 5) describe the dynamics of a physical system that implements information processing.

All the best,
Gordana

* From: Floridi, Luciano, "Semantic Conceptions of Information", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/information-semantic/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!Rg3c69Y8KRVdTd87uGEnNrmoIiH-ZANNiLaH-Faqh8MsU4Obfr45ZxS2G1IKXFiBGIFZ47CtfnGVZGJEAnnEKgXBjj2SJM05$  :

”Following Landauer and Bennett [1985], and Landauer [1987]; [1991]; [1996], (ON) is often interpreted materialistically, as advocating the impossibility of physically disembodied information, through the equation “representation = physical implementation”, that is:
(ON.1) There can be no information without physical implementation.”

From: Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com>
Date: Tuesday, 9 January 2024 at 10:05
To: fis <fis at listas.unizar.es>, Gordana CHALMERS <gordana.dodig-crnkovic at chalmers.se>
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chandler at icloud.com>, Jorge Navarro <jnavarrol at unizar.es>
Subject: Gordana's Agency Note


Dear Gordana, et al,

< But then one may ask: what must a physical system be such that it can act on its own behalf? . . . minimal molecular autonomous agent: such a system . . . >

Indeed!
Interestingly, this ties my 1 January post, just beforee this FIS session – in response to Jerry’s 31 December note, which oddly does not show in the FIS archive (but is now copied below, in addition to Jorge’s note).

To me, your five points seem to define 'agency’, where the language of your post may suggest something more-reductive (molecular): ’proto-agency’ – is THAT your meaning?!

Forgive me if I seem to 'twist’ your meaning (not intended) . . . but such proto-agency is what I tried to evoke as most-base 'adaptive logic’ . . . where simple mechanical preservation of base molecular form would initiate adaptive logic. That base molecular/mechanical self-preserved 'form’ might then serve as *one* constituent in fully realized agency. Following Jorge’s note, my view was more 'engineering’ in nature, as a most-base mechanical Life/agent precursor.

Regardless, our interests may be parallel, alongside Stuart and Andrea’s argued-for 'transition in science' . . . where I have raised related points (re function, and selection) in another post. But I see all here as related . . . in targeting a 'New Kind of Science' (with apologies to S. Wolfram).

Marcus

==
Dear colleagues,

Allow me to propose one more facet of life that adds to the central theme of Kantian Wholes: autonomous agency. Living organisms are "agential" materials, as Michael Levin puts it. They possess cognition, have agendas, and act purposefully.
This is how agency is explained by Stu in [1], and similarly in [2]:

"It is a stunning fact that the universe has given rise to entities that daily modify the universe to suit their own ends. We call this capacity 'agency' — the ability to act on one's own behalf."

But then one may ask: what must a physical system be such that it can act on its own behalf?
We propose a tentative five-part definition of a minimal molecular autonomous agent: such a system
should be capable of reproduction with heritable variation,
should perform at least one work cycle and have boundaries such that it
can be naturally individuated,
should engage in self-propagating work and constraint construction, and
should be able to choose between at least two alternatives.

(I reformatted the sentence into the numbered list).

References:
[1] Kauffman, S., Clayton, P. On emergence, agency, and organization. Biol Philos 21, 501–521 (2006). https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-005-9003-9__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!Rg3c69Y8KRVdTd87uGEnNrmoIiH-ZANNiLaH-Faqh8MsU4Obfr45ZxS2G1IKXFiBGIFZ47CtfnGVZGJEAnnEKgXBjr8uDaq9$ 
[2] Kauffman, S.A. The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in evolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

To the above definition of agency of a minimal molecular autonomous agent, I would propose to add information processing which enables learning and adaptation.

It appears to me that points 1, 3, 4, and 5 above derive from the information processing capacity of these systems.
Goal-directedness, or agency, can be seen as based on information processing, which is enabled by memory and the mechanism of anticipation that is contingent on memory.

Evolutionarily, all cognitive (agential) mechanisms derive from material characteristics. As an illustration, see a very short account in the video The Biophysics of a Brainless Animal.
More extended explanation can be found at:
https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1VAIwcn7z8__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!Rg3c69Y8KRVdTd87uGEnNrmoIiH-ZANNiLaH-Faqh8MsU4Obfr45ZxS2G1IKXFiBGIFZ47CtfnGVZGJEAnnEKgXBjvxrk4wq$  Manu Prakash: The physics of biology, which addresses several of Stu’s questions.

Gordana

==
from Jerry –

Marcus, List:

After reading your post, it is unclear what question you are asking.  Three questions come to mind.
Is the issue the existence of a dividing line or threshold between the atomic sciences and the life sciences?
Or, is the question about the organization of matter such that intelligence (life) a consequence entailed by structural information?
Or, does the question refer to the cognitive structures of “intelligent objects” ascribed to internal forms?

Recalling the recent FIS discussions on the virus, TMV, tobacco mosaic virus, a crystalline form of biological organized atoms, I am wondering if that distinction would provide some guidance on the intended meaning of “adaptive logic”.

Also, it would be informative if one knew what form of logic you are referring to - classical, intuitive, modal, etc which are abstractions without direct reference to scientific terms or natural logics (deployed by Mother Nature to get the job done.)

I think your questions are most appropriate here, given the history of the discussions grasping for a semantic/syntactical thread to tie the various hypotheses together.  (As if the inquiry is seeking some form of “modus operandi” to match or pair with “modus ponens”. :-). )

CheersJerryHappy New Year to All!!!

==
from Jorge–

Hi Marcus,I am an engineer by training. The “reverse engineering” of both kind of systems would help.Greetings,Jorge

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