[Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.

Francesco Rizzo 13francesco.rizzo at gmail.com
Sun Oct 18 05:47:06 CEST 2015

Caro Johnson Cari Tutti,
il 3 agosto ho inviato un messaggio in-centrato sulla inter-soggettività e
il 2 ottobre un messaggio in-centrato sulla necessità di adottare il
paradigma della musica o della poesia per comprendere quello che non si
 arriva a conoscere mediante la sola matematica, per quanto la funzione
d'onda di Riemann sia una matematica onnicomprensiva. Naturalmente, il mio
interesse per questi argomenti è motivato dalla mia "Nuova economia",
scienza mediatrice o ancella di tutte le altre scienze.Tenete conto, se
Francesco Rizzo.

2015-10-17 19:39 GMT+02:00 Mark Johnson <johnsonmwj1 en gmail.com>:

> Dear Loet, Joseph and Fis colleagues,
> Some thoughts:
> Pascal: "the heart has its reasons [the constraints of the body] which the
> reason cannot perceive [because it is abstract]" and yet... we do come to
> know the reasons of the heart - we know them long before we know reason. In
> language as Joseph says "Less is more" precisely, in my experience at
> least, because ambiguities reveal the reasons of the heart. Poetic language
> lifts the veil of everyday language to expose the raw, embodied, uncodified
> constraints which underpin it. Music is more powerful still (Alfred Schutz
> wrote about this wonderfully)
> Can we fashion a description of how this works with existing theory? (I
> don't believe we should surrender the territory to psychologists!)
> Parsons's idea of 'double-contingency' of communication presents an
> interaction between ego and alter where communication emerges through
> selections of meaning and utterance of each party. Schutz, whose theory of
> intersubjectivity was important for Parsons (they had an significant and
> difficult correspondence about these matters which is well-documented in
> Richard Grathoff's "The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of
> Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons") found Parsons's model too
> functionalist. Parsons and Schutz have a different understanding of how
> people 'tune-in' to one another: I see Parsons's model as effectively
> 'digital': a set of multi-level interacting selections; Schutz's concept is
> more 'analogue', involving sharing a sense of 'inner time' between people.
> I prefer to think of this as a shared constraint.
> Loet's redescription of double-contingency in terms of mutual redundancies
> loosens the determinism in both Parsons and Luhmann (who followed him). I
> think this is important, and opens a space for reconsidering Schutz's
> understanding of how 'tuning-in' might work.
> It's best to start with 'selection' (of utterance, meaning and
> understanding in Luhmann). Shannon selections are constrained by redundancy
> as we know, so to turn the spotlight on the redundancies rather than what
> is selected allows us to differentiate the intersubjective communication
> between two people talking face-to-face as one of higher mutual
> constraint/redundancy than the intersubjective situation of writing an
> email or a listserve post to Fis. Locality makes a difference in increasing
> mutual constraint.
> Returning to Pascal, my body constrains my thoughts in ways which cannot
> be abstractly modelled, and yet I can apprehend my own constraints and
> those of others, whilst not necessarily being able to articulate them in
> language. I could however make music, wave my arms around, pull an angry
> face, or cry. Isn't inference of constraints by observing such behaviour
> essential to communication? How could double contingency work were we not
> able to grasp and physically feel what constrains the other? Babies
> wouldn't survive otherwise!
> Just to extend the speculation a bit further, we should ask about the
> process of knowledge construction itself in the light of mutual redundancy.
> Since Hume, many believe that the agreement of scientists in the light of
> event regularities is a factor in the development of knowledge. What do
> those scientists 'tune into' when they do this? In what way might an
> empirical event regularity be a mutual constraint? How are physical
> constraints separable from personal, biological or psychological
> constraints?
> Might apparently 'woolly' (but, IMO, valuable) sociomaterial accounts of
> science be reframed as analytical accounts of interacting constraints?
> just some thoughts...
> Mark
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2015 at 1:38 PM, Loet Leydesdorff <loet en leydesdorff.net>
> wrote:
>> Dear Marcus, Mark, Bob, and colleagues,
>> My ambition was a bit more modest: the paper does not contain a theory of
>> meaning or a theory of everything. It is an attempt to solve a problem in
>> the relation between sociology (i.c. Luhmann) focusing on meaning
>> processing (and autopoiesis) and (Shannon-type) information theory. Luhmann
>> left this problem behind by defining information as a selection, while in
>> my opinion entropy is a measure of diversity and therefore variation. I was
>> very happy to find the clues in Weaver’s contributions; Katherine Hayles
>> has signaled this previously.
>> Another author important in the background is Herbert Simon who specified
>> the model of vertical differentiation (1973), but without having Maturana &
>> Varela’s theory of autopoiesis for specification of the dynamics. I agree
>> with Luhmann that one has to incorporate ideas from Husserl about horizons
>> of meaning and Parsons’ symbolically generalize media as structuring these
>> horizons for understanding the differentia specifica of the social as
>> non-biological.
>> Mark more or less answers his own questions, don’t you? The constraints
>> of the body provide the contingency. The options are not given, but
>> constructed and need thus to be perceived, either by individuals or at the
>> organizational (that is, social) level. The contingency also positions (as
>> different from others) with whom we can then entertain “double
>> contingencies” as the basis for generating variation in the communication.
>> How this works and feeds back on the persons involved seems to me the
>> subject of other disciplines like psychology and neurology. The subject of
>> study is then no longer (or no longer exclusively) *res cogitans*.
>> For example, if a deaf person is provided with a cochlear implant, s/he
>> may enter other domains of perception and be able to provide other
>> contributions to the communication. The double contingencies between
>> him/her and others can be expected to change.
>> Bob and his colleagues define information (2008; p. 28) as “natural
>> selection assembling the very constraints on the release of energy that
>> then constitutes work and the propagation of organization.” This may have
>> meaning in a biological framework, in which selection is considered
>> “natural” resulting in organization(s). In the cultural domain,
>> organization (of meaning) remains constructed and contingent; selection is
>> never “natural”, but based on codified expectations. The codes steer the
>> system from above. Differently from biological and engineered systems, this
>> next-order level does not have to be slower than the systems level (Simon).
>> Expectations can proliferate intersubjectively at higher speeds than we can
>> follow. For example, we have to catch up with the literature. Stock
>> exchanges operate faster than local markets because of the more
>> sophisticated codes that mediate the financial exchanges.
>> Maturana (1978, at p. 56) introduced the biologist as super-observer who
>> does not participate in the biological phenomena under study, but
>> constructs them: “Thus, talking human beings dwell in two
>> *non-intersecting* phenomenal domains.” (italic added). Systems which
>> operate exclusively in terms of expectations and anticipations of future
>> states cannot be found in nature; they can only be considered reflexively.
>> They allow us to de- and reconstruct in terms of improving the models, and
>> thus sometimes find new options for technological intervention.
>> Paradoxically, biology as a science is itself part of this cultural domain.
>> For example, we have access to our body only in terms of perceptions (that
>> are steered by expectations) and at the other end by knowledge-based
>> interventions.
>> This is my second posting for this week.
>> Best,
>> Loet
>> ------------------------------
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>> *Professor Emeritus,* University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>> loet en leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
>> Sussex;
>> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
>> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
>> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
>> London;
>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en
>> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-bounces en listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Marcus
>> Abundis
>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 15, 2015 7:11 AM
>> *To:* fis en listas.unizar.es
>> *Subject:* [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.
>> Hey Mark,
>>     Sorry if I confused things by commenting on Bateson AND THEN
>> Shannon-Weaver. In my mind those were two different matters, and did not
>> merit my calling them out as such.
>> In general . . .
>>     I too never saw Shanon-Weaver's Levels A, B, C as complete. In fact,
>> I thought that portrayal as barely (oddly) half-hearted, in contrast to the
>> allusion to a needed "theory of meaning." Still, I will dig into the work
>> Loet and Bob reference . . . and see if I can find some personal
>> satisfaction.
>>     ALSO, I found myself wondering if I should somehow try to tie
>> Steven's sense of locality in with the notion of Levels A, B, C. Perhaps
>> they are not specific enough in order to do so – not sure.
>> *Marcus Abundis*
>> about.me/marcus.abundis
>> _______________________________________________
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis en listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> --
> Dr. Mark William Johnson
> Associate,
> Leeds University Business School
> Visiting Professor
> Far Eastern Federal University, Russia
> Phone: 07786 064505
> Email: johnsonmwj1 en gmail.com
> Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com
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