[Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 49

Thu Jan 16 01:16:35 CET 2025

Dear Kate, Lou, and Everyone, especially Pedro,

What Pedro's eloquent and interesting response to Kate fails to recognize
is that these kind of organism responses are Not, repeat Not, the usual
kind of 'mechanical response' delivered by ordinary physical systems.

Physical systems are normally mechanically stable, and sequences of
responses to identical stimuli are distributed according to the laws of
thermodynamics, i.e. effectively identical.

Organisms, on the other hand, obey the laws of Fractal Physiology, where
sequences of responses are characteristic of critical instabilities from
the field of phase transitions.
(A switching process, On / Off, is analogous to a phase transition, with
little fine control.)

Critical Instabilities, however, offer extremely delicate control with the
opportunity to regulate the magnitude of response as a continous variable,
i.e. smoothly. 'Upregulation' and 'Downregulation' are the terms commonly
used to describe this kind of continuous, finely attuned control.

Not surprisingly, all organisms now found on earth obey the laws of Fractal
Physiology when they are in Good Health. (Health in this context can be
defined as Optimal Regulation, i.e. capable of being continuously
regulated.)

The physics of Critical Instabilities adds a completely new dimension to
biology, removing it from the suppositions of mechanics. It is fairly easy
to show that the highly complex system of interacting feedback loops
involved in system regulation possess the property of Perfect
Self-Observation, and thus a Subjective Sense of Self -- Self Awareness,
Consciousness.

The supposedly 'inanimate' systems responding to external stimuli, as
discussed in Pedro's contribution, are totally different from what he
supposed. They are not mere mechanisms, as science has always considered;
rather, they exhibit the very different behaviour described above. They are
thus more closely related to manifestly conscious, purposeful beings like
ourselves.

The brilliant book on single cell intelligence, Sensitive Souls, by
Cambridge's Brian Ford, provides a more empirical perspective on these
radical conclusions.

As I think all those following this thread will appreciate, these facts
entirely alter the way we should evaluate organisms and biology -- Life
itself, and thus, the science and scientific models, which we invoke when
describing their various behaviours.

All best wishes to all,

Alex

On Thu, 16 Jan, 2025, 04:15 Katherine Peil, <ktpeil at outlook.com> wrote:

> Hi Lou, Pedro et al,
>
>
>
> *Lou:*  Thank you for your clarifications as it concerns probability: Let
> me see if I’ve got you right: So Bayesian probability concerns *frequencies
> that come from counting*, while Quantum probabilities reflect *the
> predictive frequency of certain events*. If so, in terms of cybernetics,
> would Quantum probability qualify as more of a
>
> *feedforward process (before the fact)? Bayesian, more (after the fact)
> feedback? *
>
> As for self-reference, I’m fully on board with the circle as “a sign that
> that distinguishes itself as well as other distinctions” (and there is far
> more to say here). But my curiosity concerns the “distinctions” themselves,
> how they relate to boundary conditions that distinguish a system from its
> “external” environment, which are fluid, dynamic, interpenetrating, and
> interactive. And how they relate to the idea of an Umwelt that is part
> perception (requiring an internal mental model) and part sensation (the
> registration of changes in the immediate external environment). Many thanks
> in advance. To find words that can sufficiently transcend interdisciplinary
> boundaries is no small task, and I greatly appreciate your patience and
> flexibility. I look forward to your Zoom session this Friday.
>
>
>
> Pedro: We are in hearty agreement about the primacy of action – behavior –
> in the conceptualization of Perception, and the enactive nature of
> Cognition. Indeed, that is a central point of my emotion work. But when we
> look away from complex brains and focus upon the sensory-motor control
> chemistry of the lowly bacterium, the primacy of self-directed animation
> becomes clear. (Specifically, an environmental affordance, say a chemical
> gradient, is sensed via receptor complexes on the outside of cell membrane
> which initiates a signal transduction cascade on the inside. This begins
> with the placing of Phosphorylation mark of the inside tails of that
> receptor, which triggers a specific (either/or) rotational direction of the
> flagellum: Either Counterclockwise which moves the creature toward the
> gradient, or Clockwise creating a little tumble away in a different
> direction). Please not that this self-directed animation is *hedonic
> animation*, movement toward that which is beneficial and away from that
> which is harmful*.*
>
> But when you say…”*cognition does not produce models of the world”, *this
> is where I disagree and offer more to the story. The above is only one half
> of the process, the direct stimulus-response, the “registration” of sensory
> stimulus upon the organism and its hardwired motor response. This happens
> in the immediacy of *real time*. The second half of the story begins with
> the placement of a second chemical signal, a *methylation mark* (on the
> inside tails of those same receptor complexes), coincidental to the
> specific direction of the flagella, a mechanism that *serves as an
> evaluative memory trace on a longer time scale. *Counterclockwise motion
> is associated with approach behavior, and while clockwise is associated
> with avoidance, hence the *innate informative* *Pavlovian logic *of “good
> for me” (reward), or “bad for me” (punishment).
>
>
>
> In short, via its duration in time, the methylation process forges a crack
> between the registered sensory stimulus and hardwired response, arguably
> opening a space for what we mean by “cognition” and “perception” and the
> emergence of the enactive mind. This is why I have added the 5th E to the
> 4E enactive mind model (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and *emotion
> driven*). Moreover, the methylation signaling process works in concert
> with bioelectric signaling, in the form of membrane depolarization and ion
> fluxes, those that Mike Levin’s work suggests inform morphogenic
> development. The role of methylation marks is central to what we are
> learning about Epigenetics, which I would argue may have predated Genetics
> proper, highlighting the active evolutionary role of the agent in response
> to its immediate environment.
>
>
>
> I hope this helps clarify my position and look forward to your upcoming
> criticisms on autopoiesis.
>
> Kate Kauffman
>
>
>
>
>
> On 1/15/25, 10:48 AM, "Fis" <fis-bounces at listas.unizar.es> wrote:
> Katherine Peil Kauffman
>
>
>
> Send Fis mailing list submissions to
>         fis at listas.unizar.es
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899277694%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=PcXzyBDB27jGXHMyMsvZdhDUcUuxT6qMPCp8WV223Lo%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>         fis-request at listas.unizar.es
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>         fis-owner at listas.unizar.es
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    1. Re: Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38 (Louis Kauffman)
>    2. Re: Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38 (Pedro C. Mariju?n)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 10:42:33 -0600
> From: Louis Kauffman <loukau at gmail.com>
> To: Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com>
> Cc: fis <fis at listas.unizar.es>, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38
> Message-ID: <D98184CD-067B-43E1-89ED-389280CA2911 at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> See my previous email. I assert that human consciousness cannot be
> encompassed by any single formal system.
> This goes beyond set theory. I assert the validity of arguments such as
> those given in Penrose books Emporer?s New Mind, but state these arguments
> in my way
> And without speculation about what kind of physics goes beyond Turing.
>
> As I said before, such arguments are hard for some people to take. The
> assertion really is that if you accept the original Goedelian argument,
> then it tells you that a human cognizer reasoning about
> a formal system can do more than the formal system on its own. If you
> accept this, then you cannot be such a formal system without being
> inconsistent. I do think that people find this annoying.
> But there it is. And maybe you find it annoying because it is proving what
> you already knew.
>
> NotTuring
> LK
>
> 1. We prove Goedel?s Theorem as follows:
> Let T be a formal system that is consistent
> and contains at least the Peano axioms for number theory.
> I examine T as a mathematical object and produce (via Goedel coding)
> a sentence G that declares its own unprovability in T.
> This declaration has an external meaning and it is
> devised so that a proof of G in T would lead to a contradiction.
>
> Thus, since T is consistent, G cannot be proved in T.
> But G states the non-provability of G in T.
> Thus G is true but not provable in T.
> We have proved, from outside T, that G is true.
> This proof is a mathematical proof of the statement G
> and it does not contradict T?s unprovability inside T,
> since we work in the larger system of
> reasoning about formal systems, including T.
>
> 2. Could I be identical with T as above?
> Certainly not.
> For I have proved G.
> So if I = T, then T has proved G.
> I have shown that T cannot prove G.
> Thus if I = T, then T is inconsistent.
> We have assumed that T is consistent.
> Therefore I am not identical with T as a mathematical reasoner.
>
> 3. Could I be a Turing machine T,
> consistent and rich enough to contain Peano Arithmetic?
> Suppose it is so and
> go to 1. and 2. above
> to arrive at the conclusion that
> this is not possible.
>
> 4. Go back to 1.
> and note that I have the capacity to take T as an object of study.
> The discussion in 2. and 3. leads to the
> ancient questions about whether a person can know themselves.
>
> In the mathematical context,
> if I do stand outside my own processes of reasoning
> and then reason about these processes,
> this is a practical capacity that I have.
>
> The history of mathematics and logic is
> a long spiral of such self-examination.
> In order for it to spiral as it does,
> the whole process can not be encompassed in a single formal system.
>
> This is the import of Goedel?s theorem
> and it actually applies to the entities
> that we call persons,
> individual reasoners with understanding.
> The individual reasoners are not single formal systems
> (to the extent that they are consistent).
>
>
> > On Jan 15, 2025, at 7:09 AM, Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Hello to All,
> >
> > in support of Lou, I attach two references that say the becoming of the
> world, including, presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any
> mathematical formulation based on set theory.
> >
> > Kind wishes,
> >
> > Stu
> >
> > Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World Is Not A Theorem? Entropy vol
> 23, issue 11
> >
> > Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness? Biological
> Journal of the Linnean Society,_ _2022
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >> On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38?AM, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> <  I am sympathetic with mathematical and formal modeling of ?cognitive
> processes? but feel that it should be clear that formal models will not
> capture the whole phenomenon. >
> >>
> >> For *myself*, while I accept an essential truth lies in this statement
> . . . I am ALSO inclined to think 'surrendering' prematurely is a lack of
> scientific imagination ('heavy lifting') ? where 'science' is SUPPOSED to
> be in the business of continually reinventing itself. That said, I also
> accept that many do not see science as an actual/active creative process.
> For me, it is different. I think the core issue here is ?cognitive
> processes = psychology?, a notoriously . . . .uhhh, I am not sure of the
> best word to use here, so I will just say 'difficult topic'.
> >>
> >> And thanks for the lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being the last
> word in Natural Psychology.
> >>
> >> Marcus
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> >>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899293606%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=fjd4SUfnIx4JvBE%2B4obKAqatB5G86lzgozolpVhERD0%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >> ----------
> >> INFORMACI?N SOBRE PROTECCI?N DE DATOS DE CAR?CTER PERSONAL
> >>
> >> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo gestionada
> por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
> >> Puede encontrar toda la informaci?n sobre como tratamos sus datos en el
> siguiente enlace:
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsicuz.unizar.es%2Finformacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899301754%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=7Tnws6ELVMX6uVo3Esotr02oMmC%2BzPjo%2F8eyilg3M%2BU%3D&reserved=0
> <https://sicuz.unizar.es/informacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas>
> >> Recuerde que si est? suscrito a una lista voluntaria Ud. puede darse de
> baja desde la propia aplicaci?n en el momento en que lo desee.
> >>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2F&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899308433%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=7EA7aS74Y1mryKhwHEHuAuO8s%2B6guLB%2BLB7AO%2Fb4FIQ%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/>
> >> ----------
> >
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fpipermail%2Ffis%2Fattachments%2F20250115%2F4d41fae6%2Fattachment-0001.html&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899315000%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=yDWOc0H7s3UHrGMu1xyHg2vKRaRutrk3%2FvykGTgLBRc%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/20250115/4d41fae6/attachment-0001.html>
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:47:31 +0100
> From: Pedro C. Mariju?n <pedroc.marijuan at gmail.com>
> To: fis at listas.unizar.es
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38
> Message-ID: <102f3b64-2ab4-43bc-baa2-62a65c124045 at gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
>
> Dear Lou and List,
>
> May I enter some dissonance? Human cognition, not necessarily being
> "neurocentric" as Kate says, is well grounded (partially) by following
> the Action-Perception Cycle, or perception-action cycle.
> Starting with an interesting abstract (/The Pragmatic Turn: Toward
> Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science, /MIT Press 2016--with
> several editors, and a bunch of brilliant contributors):
> /"Experts from a range of disciplines assess the foundations and
> implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Cognitive
> science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional
> representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on
> understanding cognition as ?enactive.? This enactive view holds that
> cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves
> action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts
> from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and
> philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel
> action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting
> experimental evidence show that an enactive approach to cognitive
> science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key
> concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the
> implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development;
> action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented
> understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying
> paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics,
> and psychology..."/
>
> Nowadays there is plenty of literature along these lines, starting with
> Gibson's ecological approach to vision. The basic claim is that the
> perceiver's ability to perceive is constituted (in a fundamental part)
> by sensorimotor knowledge. Even in our own languages we would find a
> sort of mirror image of the underlying cognizing engine: in a sentence,
> for instance, there is a subject/object (perception or meta-perception
> of an entity) that connects with a verb (action, or meta-motor
> transformation) forming a minimal cognitive episode, which is extended
> to connect with further episodes.? I dare say that maths themselves may
> participate of this scheme: various entities or objects (variables)
> experiment actions (operations) that transform the expression in an =
> one, with renewed variables and operations. Maths somehow externalize
> our inner processes of thought in world observation-action and make them
> more universal and abstract, though far more schematic and deprived of
> the intrinsic far richer "cognit" connectivity. But the result is an
> uncanny efficiency (as Eddington put: "The Unreasonable /Effectiveness/
> of /Mathematics/ in the Natural Sciences").
>
> Better if I leave my further criticisms on autopoiesis for a next occasion.
> Best--Pedro
>
> El 15/01/2025 a las 17:42, Louis Kauffman escribi?:
> > See my previous email. I assert that human consciousness cannot be
> > encompassed by any single formal system.
> > This goes beyond set theory. I assert the validity of arguments such
> > as those given in Penrose books Emporer?s New Mind, but state these
> > arguments in my way
> > And without speculation about what kind of physics goes beyond Turing.
> >
> > As I said before, such arguments are hard for some people to take. The
> > assertion really is that if you accept the original Goedelian
> > argument, then it tells you that a human cognizer reasoning about
> > a formal system can do more than the formal system on its own. If you
> > accept this, then you cannot be such a formal system without being
> > inconsistent. I do think that people find this annoying.
> > But there it is. And maybe you find it annoying because it is proving
> > what you already knew.
> >
> > NotTuring
> > LK
> >
> > 1. We prove Goedel?s Theorem as follows:
> > Let T be a formal system that is consistent
> > and contains at least the Peano axioms for number theory.
> > I examine T as a mathematical object and produce (via Goedel coding)
> > a sentence G that declares its own unprovability in T.
> > This declaration has an external meaning and it is
> > devised so that a proof of G in T would lead to a contradiction.
> >
> > Thus, since T is consistent, G cannot be proved in T.
> > But G states the non-provability of G in T.
> > Thus G is true but not provable in T.
> > We have proved, from outside T, that G is true.
> > This proof is a mathematical proof of the statement G
> > and it does not contradict T?s unprovability inside T,
> > since we work in the larger system of
> > reasoning about formal systems, including T.
> >
> > 2. Could I be identical with T as above?
> > Certainly not.
> > For I have proved G.
> > So if I = T, then T has proved G.
> > I have shown that T cannot prove G.
> > Thus if I = T, then T is inconsistent.
> > We have assumed that T is consistent.
> > Therefore I am not identical with T as a mathematical reasoner.
> >
> > 3. Could I be a Turing machine T,
> > consistent and rich enough to contain Peano Arithmetic?
> > Suppose it is so and
> > go to 1. and 2. above
> > to arrive at the conclusion that
> > this is not possible.
> >
> > 4. Go back to 1.
> > and note that I have the capacity to take T as an object of study.
> > The discussion in 2. and 3. leads to the
> > ancient questions about whether a person can know themselves.
> >
> > In the mathematical context,
> > if I do stand outside my own processes of reasoning
> > and then reason about these processes,
> > this is a practical capacity that I have.
> >
> > The history of mathematics and logic is
> > a long spiral of such self-examination.
> > In order for it to spiral as it does,
> > the whole process can not be encompassed in a single formal system.
> >
> > This is the import of Goedel?s theorem
> > and it actually applies to the entities
> > that we call persons,
> > individual reasoners with understanding.
> > The individual reasoners are not single formal systems
> > (to the extent that they are consistent).
> >
> >
> >> On Jan 15, 2025, at 7:09 AM, Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> Hello to All,
> >>
> >> in support of Lou, I attach two references that say the becoming of
> >> the world, including, presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any
> >> mathematical formulation based on set theory.
> >>
> >> Kind wishes,
> >>
> >> Stu
> >>
> >> Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World Is Not A Theorem? Entropy
> >> vol 23, issue 11
> >>
> >> _Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness?
> >> _/Biological Journal of the Linnean Society/,_ _2022
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38?AM, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> <??I am sympathetic with mathematical and formal modeling of
> >>> ?cognitive processes? but feel that it should be clear that formal
> >>> models will not capture the whole phenomenon. >
> >>>
> >>> For *myself*, while I accept an essential truth lies in this
> >>> statement . . . I am ALSO inclined to think 'surrendering'
> >>> prematurely is a lack of scientific imagination ('heavy lifting') ?
> >>> where 'science' is SUPPOSED to be in the business of continually
> >>> reinventing itself. That said, I also accept that many do not see
> >>> science as an actual/active creative process. For me, it is
> >>> different. I think the core issue here is ?cognitive processes?=
> >>> psychology?, a notoriously . . . .uhhh, I am not sure of the best
> >>> word to use here, so I will just say 'difficult topic'.
> >>>
> >>> And thanks for the lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being the last
> >>> word in Natural Psychology.
> >>>
> >>> Marcus
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Fis mailing list
> >>> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> >>>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899321420%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=PL2BSRYoOlpxxGs0VHfqX53h5k0oM6587nvYT%2BzeVyM%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>> ----------
> >>> INFORMACI?N SOBRE PROTECCI?N DE DATOS DE CAR?CTER PERSONAL
> >>>
> >>> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo
> >>> gestionada por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
> >>> Puede encontrar toda la informaci?n sobre como tratamos sus datos en
> >>> el siguiente enlace:
> >>>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsicuz.unizar.es%2Finformacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899328193%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=DL0hZ6TBa7D6oZerKanfDX3qEFV%2B%2BtN5lclctNZ4%2FxM%3D&reserved=0
> <https://sicuz.unizar.es/informacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas>
> >>> Recuerde que si est? suscrito a una lista voluntaria Ud. puede darse
> >>> de baja desde la propia aplicaci?n en el momento en que lo desee.
> >>>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2F&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899334885%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=BUksu6D6EdZcx8wRJP%2FojBgOdrGehJAA9fRxJhDObKU%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/>
> >>> ----------
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Fis mailing list
> > Fis at listas.unizar.es
> >
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899341339%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=PbvlTLcHXmD6VbjB0ech%2BJjWFLELFYUGiycAGJJCfhQ%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> > ----------
> > INFORMACI?N SOBRE PROTECCI?N DE DATOS DE CAR?CTER PERSONAL
> >
> > Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo gestionada
> por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
> > Puede encontrar toda la informaci?n sobre como tratamos sus datos en el
> siguiente enlace:
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsicuz.unizar.es%2Finformacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899347768%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=qOIwyLxri99mlQqjq%2Bami%2Bwrk7MzmByB1FEk5b6bY7c%3D&reserved=0
> > Recuerde que si est? suscrito a una lista voluntaria Ud. puede darse de
> baja desde la propia aplicaci?n en el momento en que lo desee.
> >
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2F&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899354059%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=foDXWwYfzolRVkokFjNS09AupSY%2Bp%2F2R7tFxtBQHvAg%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/>
> > ----------
>
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL: <
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fpipermail%2Ffis%2Fattachments%2F20250115%2Fd352f78b%2Fattachment.html&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899361043%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=yIWKMbLKZKtPtHYLptd2OQxoNFcNPfI8%2FGQH5eVNNeY%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/20250115/d352f78b/attachment.html>
> >
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Subject: Digest Footer
>
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing list
> Fis at listas.unizar.es
>
> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899367662%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=%2FXukIR3IrEhm7plpij60kqzvPZclIXQCDsVUIVKyEes%3D&reserved=0
> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> End of Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 49
> ************************************
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing list
> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> ----------
> INFORMACIÓN SOBRE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS DE CARÁCTER PERSONAL
>
> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo gestionada por
> la Universidad de Zaragoza.
> Puede encontrar toda la información sobre como tratamos sus datos en el
> siguiente enlace:
> https://sicuz.unizar.es/informacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas
> Recuerde que si está suscrito a una lista voluntaria Ud. puede darse de
> baja desde la propia aplicación en el momento en que lo desee.
> http://listas.unizar.es
> ----------
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/20250116/11db95ec/attachment-0001.html>