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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Dear Lou and List,</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">May I enter some dissonance? Human
cognition, not necessarily being "neurocentric" as Kate says, is
well grounded (partially) by following the Action-Perception
Cycle, or perception-action cycle.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Starting with an interesting abstract (<i>The
Pragmatic Turn: Toward Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive
Science, </i>MIT Press 2016--with several editors, and a bunch
of brilliant contributors):<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><i>"Experts from a range of disciplines
assess the foundations and implications of a novel
action-oriented view of cognition.
Cognitive science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the
traditional representation-centered framework toward a view that
focuses on understanding cognition as “enactive.” This enactive
view holds that cognition does not produce models of the world
but rather subserves action as it is grounded in sensorimotor
skills. In this volume, experts from cognitive science,
neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and philosophy of mind
assess the foundations and implications of a novel
action-oriented view of cognition.
Their contributions and supporting experimental evidence show
that an enactive approach to cognitive science enables strong
conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key concepts for
this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the
implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development;
action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented
understandings of consciousness and experience; and the
accompanying paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain
science, robotics, and psychology..."</i></div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Nowadays there is plenty of literature
along these lines, starting with Gibson's ecological approach to
vision. <span class="BxUVEf ILfuVd" lang="en"><span
class="hgKElc">The basic claim is that the perceiver's ability
to perceive is constituted (in a fundamental part) by
sensorimotor knowledge. Even </span></span>in our own
languages we would find a sort of mirror image of the underlying
cognizing engine: in a sentence, for instance, there is a
subject/object (perception or meta-perception of an entity) that
connects with a verb (action, or meta-motor transformation)
forming a minimal cognitive episode, which is extended to connect
with further episodes. I dare say that maths themselves may
participate of this scheme: various entities or objects
(variables) experiment actions (operations) that transform the
expression in an = one, with renewed variables and operations.
Maths somehow externalize our inner processes of thought in world
observation-action and make them more universal and abstract,
though far more schematic and deprived of the intrinsic far richer
"cognit" connectivity. But the result is an uncanny efficiency (as
Eddington put: <span>"The Unreasonable <em>Effectiveness</em> of
<em>Mathematics</em> in the Natural Sciences").</span></div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Better if I leave my further criticisms
on autopoiesis for a next occasion.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Best--Pedro</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">El 15/01/2025 a las 17:42, Louis
Kauffman escribió:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:D98184CD-067B-43E1-89ED-389280CA2911@gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
See my previous email. I assert that human consciousness cannot be
encompassed by any single formal system.
<div class="">This goes beyond set theory. I assert the validity
of arguments such as those given in Penrose books Emporer’s New
Mind, but state these arguments in my way</div>
<div class="">And without speculation about what kind of physics
goes beyond Turing.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">As I said before, such arguments are hard for some
people to take. The assertion really is that if you accept the
original Goedelian argument, then it tells you that a human
cognizer reasoning about </div>
<div class="">a formal system can do more than the formal system
on its own. If you accept this, then you cannot be such a formal
system without being inconsistent. I do think that people find
this annoying.</div>
<div class="">But there it is. And maybe you find it annoying
because it is proving what you already knew.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">
<div>
<div>NotTuring</div>
<div>LK</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>1. We prove Goedel’s Theorem as follows: </div>
<div>Let T be a formal system that is consistent </div>
<div>and contains at least the Peano axioms for number theory.</div>
<div>I examine T as a mathematical object and produce (via
Goedel coding) </div>
<div>a sentence G that declares its own unprovability in T. </div>
<div>This declaration has an external meaning and it is </div>
<div>devised so that a proof of G in T would lead to a
contradiction. </div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>Thus, since T is consistent, G cannot be proved in T. </div>
<div>But G states the non-provability of G in T. </div>
<div>Thus G is true but not provable in T. </div>
<div>We have proved, from outside T, that G is true. </div>
<div>This proof is a mathematical proof of the statement G </div>
<div>and it does not contradict T’s unprovability inside T, </div>
<div>since we work in the larger system of </div>
<div>reasoning about formal systems, including T.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>2. Could I be identical with T as above? </div>
<div>Certainly not. </div>
<div>For I have proved G. </div>
<div>So if I = T, then T has proved G. </div>
<div>I have shown that T cannot prove G.</div>
<div>Thus if I = T, then T is inconsistent. </div>
<div>We have assumed that T is consistent. </div>
<div>Therefore I am not identical with T as a mathematical
reasoner.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>3. Could I be a Turing machine T, </div>
<div>consistent and rich enough to contain Peano Arithmetic? </div>
<div>Suppose it is so and </div>
<div>go to 1. and 2. above </div>
<div>to arrive at the conclusion that </div>
<div>this is not possible.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>4. Go back to 1. </div>
<div>and note that I have the capacity to take T as an object
of study. </div>
<div>The discussion in 2. and 3. leads to the </div>
<div>ancient questions about whether a person can know
themselves. </div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>In the mathematical context, </div>
<div>if I do stand outside my own processes of reasoning </div>
<div>and then reason about these processes, </div>
<div>this is a practical capacity that I have.</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>The history of mathematics and logic is </div>
<div>a long spiral of such self-examination. </div>
<div>In order for it to spiral as it does, </div>
<div>the whole process can not be encompassed in a single
formal system. </div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div>This is the import of Goedel’s theorem </div>
<div>and it actually applies to the entities </div>
<div>that we call persons, </div>
<div>individual reasoners with understanding. </div>
<div>The individual reasoners are not single formal systems </div>
<div>(to the extent that they are consistent).</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<div><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On Jan 15, 2025, at 7:09 AM, Stuart Kauffman
<<a href="mailto:stukauffman@gmail.com"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext" moz-do-not-send="true">stukauffman@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class="">
<meta http-equiv="content-type"
content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" class="">
<div
style="overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"
class="">Hello to All,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">in support of Lou, I attach two references
that say the becoming of the world, including,
presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any
mathematical formulation based on set theory.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Kind wishes, </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Stu</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">
<div
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"
class="">Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World
Is Not A Theorem” Entropy vol 23, issue 11 <o:p
class=""></o:p></div>
<div
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"
class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"
class=""><u class=""><span
style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: Helvetica; color: blue;" class="">Kauffman,
S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness? </span></u><i
class=""><span
style="font-size: 8pt; color: rgb(33, 29, 30);"
class="">Biological Journal of the Linnean
Society</span></i><span
style="font-size: 8pt; color: rgb(33, 29, 30);"
class="">,_ _2022<o:p class=""></o:p></span></div>
<p class="MsoNormal"
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"><span
style="font-size: 8pt; color: rgb(33, 29, 30);"
class=""> </span></p>
<div
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"
class=""><span
style="font-size: 8pt; color: rgb(33, 29, 30);"
class=""><br class="">
</span></div>
<div
style="margin: 0in; font-size: inherit; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;"
class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38 AM, Marcus
Abundis <<a href="mailto:55mrcs@gmail.com"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
moz-do-not-send="true">55mrcs@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class="">
<div dir="ltr" class="">
<div dir="ltr" class="">
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default">< I am
sympathetic with mathematical and formal
modeling of “cognitive processes” but feel
that it should be clear that formal models
will not capture the whole phenomenon.
></div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default"><br class="">
</div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default">For *myself*, while
I accept an essential truth lies in this
statement . . . I am ALSO inclined to
think 'surrendering' prematurely is a lack
of scientific imagination ('heavy
lifting') – where 'science' is SUPPOSED to
be in the business of continually
reinventing itself. That said, I also
accept that many do not see science as an
actual/active creative process. For me, it
is different. I think the core issue here
is “cognitive processes<span
class="gmail-Apple-converted-space"> =
psychology</span>”, a notoriously . . .
.uhhh, I am not sure of the best word to
use here, so I will just say 'difficult
topic'.</div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default"><br class="">
</div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default">And thanks for the
lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being
the last word in Natural Psychology.</div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default"><br class="">
</div>
<div style="font-size:large"
class="gmail_default">Marcus</div>
</div>
</div>
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