[Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 49

Wed Jan 15 23:44:51 CET 2025

Hi Lou, Pedro et al,

Lou:  Thank you for your clarifications as it concerns probability: Let me see if I’ve got you right: So Bayesian probability concerns frequencies that come from counting, while Quantum probabilities reflect the predictive frequency of certain events. If so, in terms of cybernetics, would Quantum probability qualify as more of a feedforward process (before the fact)? Bayesian, more (after the fact) feedback?

As for self-reference, I’m fully on board with the circle as “a sign that that distinguishes itself as well as other distinctions” (and there is far more to say here). But my curiosity concerns the “distinctions” themselves, how they relate to boundary conditions that distinguish a system from its “external” environment, which are fluid, dynamic, interpenetrating, and interactive. And how they relate to the idea of an Umwelt that is part perception (requiring an internal mental model) and part sensation (the registration of changes in the immediate external environment). Many thanks in advance. To find words that can sufficiently transcend interdisciplinary boundaries is no small task, and I greatly appreciate your patience and flexibility. I look forward to your Zoom session this Friday.

Pedro: We are in hearty agreement about the primacy of action – behavior – in the conceptualization of Perception, and the enactive nature of Cognition. Indeed, that is a central point of my emotion work. But when we look away from complex brains and focus upon the sensory-motor control chemistry of the lowly bacterium, the primacy of self-directed animation becomes clear. (Specifically, an environmental affordance, say a chemical gradient, is sensed via receptor complexes on the outside of cell membrane which initiates a signal transduction cascade on the inside. This begins with the placing of Phosphorylation mark of the inside tails of that receptor, which triggers a specific (either/or) rotational direction of the flagellum: Either Counterclockwise which moves the creature toward the gradient, or Clockwise creating a little tumble away in a different direction). Please not that this self-directed animation is hedonic animation, movement toward that which is beneficial and away from that which is harmful.

But when you say…”cognition does not produce models of the world”, this is where I disagree and offer more to the story. The above is only one half of the process, the direct stimulus-response, the “registration” of sensory stimulus upon the organism and its hardwired motor response. This happens in the immediacy of real time. The second half of the story begins with the placement of a second chemical signal, a methylation mark (on the inside tails of those same receptor complexes), coincidental to the specific direction of the flagella, a mechanism that serves as an evaluative memory trace on a longer time scale. Counterclockwise motion is associated with approach behavior, and while clockwise is associated with avoidance, hence the innate informative Pavlovian logic of “good for me” (reward), or “bad for me” (punishment).

In short, via its duration in time, the methylation process forges a crack between the registered sensory stimulus and hardwired response, arguably opening a space for what we mean by “cognition” and “perception” and the emergence of the enactive mind. This is why I have added the 5th E to the 4E enactive mind model (embodied, embedded, enactive, extended, and emotion driven). Moreover, the methylation signaling process works in concert with bioelectric signaling, in the form of membrane depolarization and ion fluxes, those that Mike Levin’s work suggests inform morphogenic development. The role of methylation marks is central to what we are learning about Epigenetics, which I would argue may have predated Genetics proper, highlighting the active evolutionary role of the agent in response to its immediate environment.

I hope this helps clarify my position and look forward to your upcoming criticisms on autopoiesis.
Kate Kauffman

On 1/15/25, 10:48 AM, "Fis" <fis-bounces at listas.unizar.es> wrote: Katherine Peil Kauffman

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Today's Topics:

   1. Re: Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38 (Louis Kauffman)
   2. Re: Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38 (Pedro C. Mariju?n)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Message: 1
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 10:42:33 -0600
From: Louis Kauffman <loukau at gmail.com>
To: Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com>
Cc: fis <fis at listas.unizar.es>, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38
Message-ID: <D98184CD-067B-43E1-89ED-389280CA2911 at gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

See my previous email. I assert that human consciousness cannot be encompassed by any single formal system.
This goes beyond set theory. I assert the validity of arguments such as those given in Penrose books Emporer?s New Mind, but state these arguments in my way
And without speculation about what kind of physics goes beyond Turing.

As I said before, such arguments are hard for some people to take. The assertion really is that if you accept the original Goedelian argument, then it tells you that a human cognizer reasoning about
a formal system can do more than the formal system on its own. If you accept this, then you cannot be such a formal system without being inconsistent. I do think that people find this annoying.
But there it is. And maybe you find it annoying because it is proving what you already knew.

NotTuring
LK

1. We prove Goedel?s Theorem as follows:
Let T be a formal system that is consistent
and contains at least the Peano axioms for number theory.
I examine T as a mathematical object and produce (via Goedel coding)
a sentence G that declares its own unprovability in T.
This declaration has an external meaning and it is
devised so that a proof of G in T would lead to a contradiction.

Thus, since T is consistent, G cannot be proved in T.
But G states the non-provability of G in T.
Thus G is true but not provable in T.
We have proved, from outside T, that G is true.
This proof is a mathematical proof of the statement G
and it does not contradict T?s unprovability inside T,
since we work in the larger system of
reasoning about formal systems, including T.

2. Could I be identical with T as above?
Certainly not.
For I have proved G.
So if I = T, then T has proved G.
I have shown that T cannot prove G.
Thus if I = T, then T is inconsistent.
We have assumed that T is consistent.
Therefore I am not identical with T as a mathematical reasoner.

3. Could I be a Turing machine T,
consistent and rich enough to contain Peano Arithmetic?
Suppose it is so and
go to 1. and 2. above
to arrive at the conclusion that
this is not possible.

4. Go back to 1.
and note that I have the capacity to take T as an object of study.
The discussion in 2. and 3. leads to the
ancient questions about whether a person can know themselves.

In the mathematical context,
if I do stand outside my own processes of reasoning
and then reason about these processes,
this is a practical capacity that I have.

The history of mathematics and logic is
a long spiral of such self-examination.
In order for it to spiral as it does,
the whole process can not be encompassed in a single formal system.

This is the import of Goedel?s theorem
and it actually applies to the entities
that we call persons,
individual reasoners with understanding.
The individual reasoners are not single formal systems
(to the extent that they are consistent).

> On Jan 15, 2025, at 7:09 AM, Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hello to All,
>
> in support of Lou, I attach two references that say the becoming of the world, including, presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any mathematical formulation based on set theory.
>
> Kind wishes,
>
> Stu
>
> Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World Is Not A Theorem? Entropy vol 23, issue 11
>
> Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness? Biological Journal of the Linnean Society,_ _2022
>
>
>
>
>> On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38?AM, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> <  I am sympathetic with mathematical and formal modeling of ?cognitive processes? but feel that it should be clear that formal models will not capture the whole phenomenon. >
>>
>> For *myself*, while I accept an essential truth lies in this statement . . . I am ALSO inclined to think 'surrendering' prematurely is a lack of scientific imagination ('heavy lifting') ? where 'science' is SUPPOSED to be in the business of continually reinventing itself. That said, I also accept that many do not see science as an actual/active creative process. For me, it is different. I think the core issue here is ?cognitive processes = psychology?, a notoriously . . . .uhhh, I am not sure of the best word to use here, so I will just say 'difficult topic'.
>>
>> And thanks for the lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being the last word in Natural Psychology.
>>
>> Marcus
>> _______________________________________________
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis at listas.unizar.es
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>> ----------
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>>
>> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo gestionada por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
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------------------------------

Message: 2
Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:47:31 +0100
From: Pedro C. Mariju?n <pedroc.marijuan at gmail.com>
To: fis at listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38
Message-ID: <102f3b64-2ab4-43bc-baa2-62a65c124045 at gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"

Dear Lou and List,

May I enter some dissonance? Human cognition, not necessarily being
"neurocentric" as Kate says, is well grounded (partially) by following
the Action-Perception Cycle, or perception-action cycle.
Starting with an interesting abstract (/The Pragmatic Turn: Toward
Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science, /MIT Press 2016--with
several editors, and a bunch of brilliant contributors):
/"Experts from a range of disciplines assess the foundations and
implications of a novel action-oriented view of cognition. Cognitive
science is experiencing a pragmatic turn away from the traditional
representation-centered framework toward a view that focuses on
understanding cognition as ?enactive.? This enactive view holds that
cognition does not produce models of the world but rather subserves
action as it is grounded in sensorimotor skills. In this volume, experts
from cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, robotics, and
philosophy of mind assess the foundations and implications of a novel
action-oriented view of cognition. Their contributions and supporting
experimental evidence show that an enactive approach to cognitive
science enables strong conceptual advances, and the chapters explore key
concepts for this new model of cognition. The contributors discuss the
implications of an enactive approach for cognitive development;
action-oriented models of cognitive processing; action-oriented
understandings of consciousness and experience; and the accompanying
paradigm shifts in the fields of philosophy, brain science, robotics,
and psychology..."/

Nowadays there is plenty of literature along these lines, starting with
Gibson's ecological approach to vision. The basic claim is that the
perceiver's ability to perceive is constituted (in a fundamental part)
by sensorimotor knowledge. Even in our own languages we would find a
sort of mirror image of the underlying cognizing engine: in a sentence,
for instance, there is a subject/object (perception or meta-perception
of an entity) that connects with a verb (action, or meta-motor
transformation) forming a minimal cognitive episode, which is extended
to connect with further episodes.? I dare say that maths themselves may
participate of this scheme: various entities or objects (variables)
experiment actions (operations) that transform the expression in an =
one, with renewed variables and operations. Maths somehow externalize
our inner processes of thought in world observation-action and make them
more universal and abstract, though far more schematic and deprived of
the intrinsic far richer "cognit" connectivity. But the result is an
uncanny efficiency (as Eddington put: "The Unreasonable /Effectiveness/
of /Mathematics/ in the Natural Sciences").

Better if I leave my further criticisms on autopoiesis for a next occasion.
Best--Pedro

El 15/01/2025 a las 17:42, Louis Kauffman escribi?:
> See my previous email. I assert that human consciousness cannot be
> encompassed by any single formal system.
> This goes beyond set theory. I assert the validity of arguments such
> as those given in Penrose books Emporer?s New Mind, but state these
> arguments in my way
> And without speculation about what kind of physics goes beyond Turing.
>
> As I said before, such arguments are hard for some people to take. The
> assertion really is that if you accept the original Goedelian
> argument, then it tells you that a human cognizer reasoning about
> a formal system can do more than the formal system on its own. If you
> accept this, then you cannot be such a formal system without being
> inconsistent. I do think that people find this annoying.
> But there it is. And maybe you find it annoying because it is proving
> what you already knew.
>
> NotTuring
> LK
>
> 1. We prove Goedel?s Theorem as follows:
> Let T be a formal system that is consistent
> and contains at least the Peano axioms for number theory.
> I examine T as a mathematical object and produce (via Goedel coding)
> a sentence G that declares its own unprovability in T.
> This declaration has an external meaning and it is
> devised so that a proof of G in T would lead to a contradiction.
>
> Thus, since T is consistent, G cannot be proved in T.
> But G states the non-provability of G in T.
> Thus G is true but not provable in T.
> We have proved, from outside T, that G is true.
> This proof is a mathematical proof of the statement G
> and it does not contradict T?s unprovability inside T,
> since we work in the larger system of
> reasoning about formal systems, including T.
>
> 2. Could I be identical with T as above?
> Certainly not.
> For I have proved G.
> So if I = T, then T has proved G.
> I have shown that T cannot prove G.
> Thus if I = T, then T is inconsistent.
> We have assumed that T is consistent.
> Therefore I am not identical with T as a mathematical reasoner.
>
> 3. Could I be a Turing machine T,
> consistent and rich enough to contain Peano Arithmetic?
> Suppose it is so and
> go to 1. and 2. above
> to arrive at the conclusion that
> this is not possible.
>
> 4. Go back to 1.
> and note that I have the capacity to take T as an object of study.
> The discussion in 2. and 3. leads to the
> ancient questions about whether a person can know themselves.
>
> In the mathematical context,
> if I do stand outside my own processes of reasoning
> and then reason about these processes,
> this is a practical capacity that I have.
>
> The history of mathematics and logic is
> a long spiral of such self-examination.
> In order for it to spiral as it does,
> the whole process can not be encompassed in a single formal system.
>
> This is the import of Goedel?s theorem
> and it actually applies to the entities
> that we call persons,
> individual reasoners with understanding.
> The individual reasoners are not single formal systems
> (to the extent that they are consistent).
>
>
>> On Jan 15, 2025, at 7:09 AM, Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Hello to All,
>>
>> in support of Lou, I attach two references that say the becoming of
>> the world, including, presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any
>> mathematical formulation based on set theory.
>>
>> Kind wishes,
>>
>> Stu
>>
>> Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World Is Not A Theorem? Entropy
>> vol 23, issue 11
>>
>> _Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness?
>> _/Biological Journal of the Linnean Society/,_ _2022
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38?AM, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> <??I am sympathetic with mathematical and formal modeling of
>>> ?cognitive processes? but feel that it should be clear that formal
>>> models will not capture the whole phenomenon. >
>>>
>>> For *myself*, while I accept an essential truth lies in this
>>> statement . . . I am ALSO inclined to think 'surrendering'
>>> prematurely is a lack of scientific imagination ('heavy lifting') ?
>>> where 'science' is SUPPOSED to be in the business of continually
>>> reinventing itself. That said, I also accept that many do not see
>>> science as an actual/active creative process. For me, it is
>>> different. I think the core issue here is ?cognitive processes?=
>>> psychology?, a notoriously . . . .uhhh, I am not sure of the best
>>> word to use here, so I will just say 'difficult topic'.
>>>
>>> And thanks for the lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being the last
>>> word in Natural Psychology.
>>>
>>> Marcus
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Fis mailing list
>>> Fis at listas.unizar.es
>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2Fcgi-bin%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ffis&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899321420%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=PL2BSRYoOlpxxGs0VHfqX53h5k0oM6587nvYT%2BzeVyM%3D&reserved=0<http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
>>> ----------
>>> INFORMACI?N SOBRE PROTECCI?N DE DATOS DE CAR?CTER PERSONAL
>>>
>>> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo
>>> gestionada por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
>>> Puede encontrar toda la informaci?n sobre como tratamos sus datos en
>>> el siguiente enlace:
>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fsicuz.unizar.es%2Finformacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899328193%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=DL0hZ6TBa7D6oZerKanfDX3qEFV%2B%2BtN5lclctNZ4%2FxM%3D&reserved=0<https://sicuz.unizar.es/informacion-sobre-proteccion-de-datos-de-caracter-personal-en-listas>
>>> Recuerde que si est? suscrito a una lista voluntaria Ud. puede darse
>>> de baja desde la propia aplicaci?n en el momento en que lo desee.
>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flistas.unizar.es%2F&data=05%7C02%7C%7C3fc9a7aafd0842fd1df508dd358cc54a%7C84df9e7fe9f640afb435aaaaaaaaaaaa%7C1%7C0%7C638725600899334885%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=BUksu6D6EdZcx8wRJP%2FojBgOdrGehJAA9fRxJhDObKU%3D&reserved=0<http://listas.unizar.es/>
>>> ----------
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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> Fis at listas.unizar.es
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> ----------
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>
> Ud. recibe este correo por pertenecer a una lista de correo gestionada por la Universidad de Zaragoza.
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End of Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 49
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