[Fis] [External Email] Re: entropy

Karl Javorszky karl.javorszky at gmail.com
Sun Jan 10 16:53:03 CET 2021


Without adding any opinion to the subject of entropy, let me ask the point
by Marcus about the 16 accepted forms of energy.
Is this actually so? That there are 16 (sixteen) conceptually and/or
empirically different types of the mental construct energy?
If that would be the case, the forceful prophecy of oeis.org/A242615 would
be proved to be a correctly calculated idea.
Pray tell that you were not just throwing a rhetorical embellishment.
Thanks
Karl


Stanley N Salthe <ssalthe en binghamton.edu> schrieb am So., 10. Jän. 2021,
16:35:

> Marcus -- Here I reply to your latest contribution to this discussion of
> entropy:
>
> M: Stan – What you are now suggesting
>
> > It is a formal matching only is far different from your earlier
>
> > Entropy applies everywhere, and always in the same way.<
>
>       S: Wrong! The entropy concept is a formal intellectual construct. It
> happens
>
>            that it is so generally applicable in the world that one could
> assert that it
>
>           ‘it applies everywhere’
>
> M: Base differences between formal (conceptual) and practical
>
> (empiric) roles, I believe, are equally well-known to careful
>
> readers in physics. For example, *theoretical* physics uses
>
> ‘E’ as a generic expression of energy, with no reference to
>
> any of the 16 accepted forms of energy, as in E = mc^2 . . .
>
> ‘F’ for a generic expression of force with no reference to any
>
> of the four fundamental forces as in F = ma.
>
>        S:  OK....
>
> M: As such, these conceptual views are wholly removed from
>
> classic *empiric* concepts. It is due to this imprecision in
>
> any theoretical view that things must be *empirically*
>
> verified – which then makes it a ‘science’. Yes, I can understand
>
> why you would wish to pass on commenting further on physics.
>
>       S: ?
>
> M: That said, the same applies to vague formal references to
>
> *everything* everywhere having a statistical (entropic) nature.
>
> I am not sure this comment has much ‘meaning’ (pun wholly
>
> intended) – as Shannon and Weaver plainly saw.
>
>       S: I'm afraid I cannot fathom what point(?s) you are trying to make
> here.
>
> STAN
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 10, 2021 at 4:02 AM Marcus Abundis <55mrcs en gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Stan – What you are now suggesting
>> > It is a formal matching only.<
>> is far different from your earlier
>> > Entropy applies everywhere, and always in the same way.<
>>
>> Base differences between formal (conceptual) and practical
>> (empiric) roles, I believe, are equally well-known to careful
>> readers in physics. For example, *theoretical* physics uses
>> ‘E’ as a generic expression of energy, with no reference to
>> any of the 16 acdepted forms of energy, as in E = mc^2 . . .
>> ‘F’ for a generic expression of force with no reference to any
>> of the four fundamental forces as in F = ma.
>>
>> As such, these conceptual views are wholly removed from
>> classic *empiric* concepts. It is due to this imprecision in
>> any theoretical view that things must be *empirically*
>> verified – which then makes it a ‘science’. Yes, I can understand
>> why you would wish to pass on commenting further on physics.
>>
>> That said, the same applies to vague formal references to
>> *everything* everywhere having a statistical (entropic) nature.
>> I am not sure this comment has much ‘meaning’ (pun wholly
>> intended) – as Shannon and Weaver plainly saw.
>>
>> Marcus
>>
>> _______________________________________________
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