[Fis] Call for papers: Synthese Topical Collection "Artificial Intelligence, Cognition and Embodiment"

[Marcus Abundis]

*CFP Synthese Topical Collection:*

*Artificial intelligence, Cognition and Embodiment*



Turing deemed the question “can machines think?” to be meaningless and,
consequently, unworthy of philosophical discussion. Yet we now find
ourselves in an era that researchers increasingly and unabashedly describe
as the age of AI, and philosophers are taking seriously the possibility
that certain current AI systems are capable of thinking, reasoning and
other forms of cognitive activity—or that near-future AI systems plausibly
will be. Indeed, some among their number argue that in developing powerful
large language models such as Claude and ChatGPT, humanity has successfully
created artificial minds. Others emphatically deny that such systems are
minded—often arguing that cognition requires a capacity for engagement with
worldly offerings that such systems, due to their disembodied nature, do
not possess. For example, advocates of embodied-enactive approaches to
cognitive science have argued that cognition is characterised by a form of
adaptive autonomy that is, at least at present, the preserve of living
organisms and is not exhibited by current AI systems—despite their
impressive success on an ever-widening range of benchmarks and other
canonical measures of intelligence.

            This Topical Collection brings together a world leading group
of philosophers in order to shed light on whether AI systems are plausibly
cognitive (or whether they soon will be) and related questions concerning
the profound ramifications of taking different forms of AI mindedness
seriously. Suitable topics include the following:



   - Are certain AI systems minded? Can we plausibly ascribe to them mental
   states such as belief and desire? Do they perform intentional actions? If
   not, how should we interpret our intentional descriptions of their complex
   behaviours?
   - Do embodied-enactive approaches to cognition—or other views within the
   so-called ‘4E’ cognition family—offer good reasons for constraining
   cognition to living agents? Can they provide a principled reason to limit
   cognition to biological life? Are large language models or other generative
   AI systems plausibly cognitive in a philosophically interesting minimal
   sense? How might 4E approaches to social cognition help in characterising
   our interactions with LLMs?
   - What are the implications of AI mindedness for understanding the
   epistemic status of AI systems? Do they plausibly have the mental
   capacities required to count as epistemic agents? Do they qualify as
   knowers? Do human-AI systems plausibly constitute hybrid epistemic agents?
   - What can an embodied understanding of human intelligence tell us about
   the limitations of AI and the potential for AGI? Can embodied approaches to
   the mind shed light on the requirements for AGI status?





*Deadline for submission* : Jan 30, 2027



Submissions should be made Synthese’s Editorial Manager. Please ensure that
papers are submitted under the “Artificial Intelligence, Cognition and
Embodiment" Topical Collection.



For any questions, please contact the guest editor, Ian Robertson:
ian.george.robertson at fau.de

Marcus
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