[Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 118, Issue 38

Karl Javorszky karl.javorszky at gmail.com
Wed Jan 15 14:38:58 CET 2025


Ever the adversary, I am nebbich of the opinion, that the number of
distinguishable sentences about the world is a finite one.

The variants of all possible worlds that we can describe number a finite
extent.

Thank Sir Eddington for that. The slight slippage between two number lines
gives rise to manifold interference patterns (what we call the world). The
interference - interplay ceases to work above 137.03 (in integer, Eddington
reading = 136). Too much slippage.

With a limited number of whatever that can be related to two number lines
(inf=delta(n?, n !)) the whole spectacle made by the differences f(time,
place, amount, type, centrality, etc...) has certainly a finite number of
combinations.

Spoiler alert : a heroic reading of the numbers whispered to me a range of
10**96... 10**232 for the number of variants of how the world can be
assembled of parts (in dependence of what one counts as a part).


Stuart Kauffman <stukauffman at gmail.com> schrieb am Mi., 15. Jän. 2025,
14:10:

> Hello to All,
>
> in support of Lou, I attach two references that say the becoming of the
> world, including, presumably, human consciousness, is beyond any
> mathematical formulation based on set theory.
>
> Kind wishes,
>
> Stu
>
> Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2021) The World Is Not A Theorem” Entropy vol
> 23, issue 11
>
>
> *Kauffman, S. and Roli, A. (2022), What is Consciousness? **Biological
> Journal of the Linnean Society*,_ _2022
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Jan 15, 2025, at 3:38 AM, Marcus Abundis <55mrcs at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> <  I am sympathetic with mathematical and formal modeling of “cognitive
> processes” but feel that it should be clear that formal models will not
> capture the whole phenomenon. >
>
> For *myself*, while I accept an essential truth lies in this statement . .
> . I am ALSO inclined to think 'surrendering' prematurely is a lack of
> scientific imagination ('heavy lifting') – where 'science' is SUPPOSED to
> be in the business of continually reinventing itself. That said, I also
> accept that many do not see science as an actual/active creative process.
> For me, it is different. I think the core issue here is “cognitive processes =
> psychology”, a notoriously . . . .uhhh, I am not sure of the best word to
> use here, so I will just say 'difficult topic'.
>
> And thanks for the lovely taoist imagery . . . taoism being the last word
> in Natural Psychology.
>
> Marcus
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