[Fis] AI Discussion--Part 2 (by Eric Werner)

[Marcus Abundis]

Dear Eric,


— In your FIS submission I see a series of rhetorical questions introducing
your position, I paraphrase:


> What would a minimal model of an agent's neural network-mind-brain such
as human be like? . . . the global architecture? . . . Can a purely
linguistic interaction between a human and a computational device capture
the mental capacities, the network, the network state and information
states of the human agent's brain? <


— This seems to perhaps subtly confuse humans for GENERAL agents, where
myriad agent-types actually exist, with widely varied environs, needs, and
behaviors. I am unsure of your intent, but despite humanity’s clear gains
no true GENERAL agents exist on Earth (that I know of). Also, using a
linguistic-social base imposes a large measure of ambiguity (as you note),
that must be resolved. Lastly, I feel you should be clear in your use of
neural as figurative, alternatively one must detail a specific

> map [of] the agent's neural network to our abstract model <

which I do not see in this essay. Given neuronal densities in the human
brain of some 100,000 neurons per cubic mm, and 10’s of types of neurons,
all of which is poorly grasped, we cannot yet claim to understand the human
brain.


— I find your framing of entropy as ambiguity useful for Shannon signal
entropy AND thermodynamic entropy; but I do not see a YOUR specific
definition of entropy. Both entropies can be viewed ambiguously, but this
is also confusing as signal entropy holds a type of order and thermodynamic
entropy typifies disorder. That opposition must somehow be addressed.
Lastly, alluding to the human mind as an ambiguous (entropic) processing
engine is on point, but which must also be detailed.


— I like that you note functionalism (Wittgenstein) and a minimal
architecture (von Neumann) as these both track with my own view.
‘Arcihtecture‘ also echoes an argument of Wolfram’s A New Kind of Science.
I take your numerous reference to intentional states to point to
functionalism – is that correct?


> Chomsky theories of syntax were just that with no semantics, no
pragmatics, no theory of communication. <


— Well, this is not true is it? Does not syntax hold its own type of
meaning, is a Theory of Syntax NOT meaningful? This repeats the mistake
Shannon (and many others make), but that Shannon and Weaver highlight as a
'missing theory of meaning’. I cover this issue in the paper I noted in my
other post to Krassimir and Yixin. All such claims (despite being common)
confuse levels of abstraction. But then I also see:

> This work [of mine in 1991] unified the logics of information <

which means you developed a formal theory of meaning, which would be very
useful. Can you provide a link to that paper? I could not find one.


> . . . to include intention-strategic-based communication and cooperation
theory. On my view communication involves linguistic intentional states
formalized as linguistic strategic states linked to the world via semantics
and pragmatic meaning. <


— Okay, so you in fact pose a Theory of Meaning, vis-a-vis

> . . . formalization of utility and you get the foundational bedrock of
the minimal architecture of mental states of communicating social agents
whether they be human, animal or robotic. <

— This also ties to my own work.


> . . . R = ( S, I, V ) . . . <


— I find this part of your discussion interesting, but not especially
compelling mostly due to the fact that I do not see that actual mechanism
used to resolve prior-noted ambiguity in language use, and ambiguity
innately encountered in Nature’s own (open system) role. I think such thing
would be covered in a theory of meaning (your 1991 work?) but as I do not
have that essay at hand I cannot comment specifically.


— Thank you for your submission and for your work!!


Marcus
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/20231024/c69581fc/attachment.html>