[Fis] How Molecules Became Signs

[Marcus Abundis]

Dear Terry,

Again, I want to amplify Christophe's note on meaning, but from a
different angle.

First, I think Christophe's question echoes my 22 Feb post, which has not
been answered yet on FIS by you:
> #1 In reading your material over the years I am never sure if you
> believe/assert information *always* requires an interpreter. You seem to
> take different positions at different times, which feels inconsistent to
> me. This same issue often arises in [many] FIS posts as (paraphrasing):
> 'Information ONLY occurs in the presence of Life', versus 'Information
> exists independent of Life (or interpreters)'.

Second, on the broad matter of 'meaning', semantics, about-ness, etc., it
is
worth seeing 'from where' this issue arose. You note this issue in your
paper, but in a way that still feels mixed (as per above), where you mark
Shannon:

> “Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are
> correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
> entities. THESE semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the
> engineering problem.” . . . [my emphasis]
But one can fairly say *all* 'engineering problems' are loaded with their
own
semantic needs/challenges, not that 'semantics issues are wholly irrelevant
to engineering problems'. Shannon's use of a definite article THESE marks
a limited case, one type. He does not use an indefinite article 'ALL
semantic aspects . . . '
Of course, one might see THESE intended as – 'Well, he really meant ALL'
which better represents a rush to materialism, more than anything else.
But we have no real way of knowing what *exactly* Shannon intended. So
we proceed with the 'safer'(?) less-wholesome *meaning* (pun wholly
intended), onto today.

You also assert:
> [p 2] In this way the concept of biological information lost its
about-ness
> but became safe for use in a materialistic science that had no place for
> what seemed like a non-physical property. . . .
Also,
> Notice the near identity with Dawkins’ conception of replication [with
that
> of Shannon's].
I challenge this idea, even if it is 'mainstream'(?) – Does ANYTHING *ever*
lose its about-ness (meaning)?! Even the presence of something like Pure
Noise conveys useful information: 'There is no useful information here.' In
a
similar way, the numeral Zero, 'late to the game' in developing number
systems and mathematics, became an core concept to further gains.

– I ask you 'What exactly does information lacking *about-ness* look like?'
I
do not think such a thing exists. Sure, I see there is a popular view (as
you
note), but from a TRUE *information science* vista, is that view accurate
and useful? Should we not hope to correct this view?

Beyond this, I particularly enjoyed your note:
> [p 2-3] For this structure to be about something there must be a process
> that interprets it. And not just any process will do.
> So, is replication such a process?
This seems a particularly useful framing, but it also leads to other
questions that I do not take up here. Perhaps this ties more closely to
Christophe's latest post.

Next, I also see:
> Often the semiotically relevant property of a sign vehicle is only one of
its
> many attributes, and not necessarily the one most salient. What matters
> is how the relevant property is incorporated into an interpretive
process,
> because being interpreted is what matters. <
This points to a kindred issue around meaning . . .

– I recall a brief conversation at IS4SI 2005, Vienna where we strongly
agreed one must be clear about ‘informatic levels’ in discussions – which
goes back to Korzybiski’s ‘orders of abstraction’ (or even Kant’s ‘das Ding
an Sich’, if you want).
(
http://korzybskiinstitute.blogspot.com/2016/01/consciousness-of-abstraction.html)

I never found more detail on what A.K. meant (beyond the link above), and
anything else I saw was unsatisfying for purposes of a whole ‘information
science’. In some ways your note above seems to echo Korzybski. Also,
your original FIS post points ‘generally accepted‘ informatic types as:
> physical-statistical sense, a relational-referential sense, and a
pragmatic-
> functional sense.
I asked you for a reference for these three informatic types, as I disagree
with this view and am hoping for more detail. The main reason I disagree is
the way these base types are phrased seem imprecise and confused.
I saw a better framing in the Hierarchic Nature of Information draft you
shared with me where you refer to ‘structural, referential, and normative’
roles. In essence, this view feels like it heads in the right direction but
remains incomplete and imprecise (well, okay – it's a rough draft).

As before, thank you for your work in this area . . . and I look forward to
your response.

Marcus
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