[Fis] [External Email] Re: defining information - The fate of new concepts. Better examples

Sat Mar 7 21:21:51 CET 2020

Josephe -
regarding:  Information in progress/as process has too many non-linear,
partly *a-*logical characteristics, partly irrational and contradictory, to
be imprisoned in this way.
  S: "This way" includes the specification hierarchy {constraint
{information {eaning}}}.  I would assert that frequently constraints would
have hese characteristics.
st

On Sat, Mar 7, 2020 at 4:18 AM Joseph Brenner <joe.brenner en bluewin.ch>
wrote:

>
>
> Dear Krassimir, Dear All,
>
>
>
> With due respect to colleagues who have collated former concepts of
> information, I continue to feel they have been inadequate. This is why
> Krassimir’s call for new concepts and theories, even if it has been made
> before, is more valuable and should be followed-up.
>
>
>
> I myself have presented, again, a new concept which has not yet received
> discussion: it is that views of information as constituted by a certain of
> numerical and/or semantic ‘particles’ does not reflect either its structure
> or its function. If this is not tenable, then at least I think I, as would
> everyone on this list, have a right to know why.
>
>
>
> Terry and Gordana, as well as Stan, have attempted to ‘capture’
> information within the stiff, formal brackets of the subsumption hierarchy,
> investigated most thoroughly by Stan.
>
>
>
> I have claimed and will continue to claim that this is impossible.
> Information in progress/as process has too many non-linear, partly *a-*logical
> characteristics, partly irrational and contradictory, to be imprisoned in
> this way.
>
>
>
> I would like to ask Krassimir, if information is defined as I have above,
> if he would still consider it ‘secondary’? Or, rather, whether the use of
> something like my concepts, if improved of course, would enable recovery of
> the concept of information for more serious use? One of the signs of such
> additional seriousness would be the use of examples for analysis and
> discussion that are not the simplest predicate-object sentences.
>
>
>
> Thank you and best regards,
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-bounces en listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Krassimir
> Markov
> *Sent:* vendredi, 6 mars 2020 19:26
> *To:* FIS
> *Subject:* [Fis] defining information - Goal, Methodology, Steps ...
>
>
>
> *Spring Season Greetings !*
>
> *С Наступающей Весной !*
>
> *Честита Баба Марта!*
>
>
>
> [image: clip_image002]
>
>
>
>
>
> Dear Pedro and Colleagues,
>
>
>
> First of all, I apologize again to Yixin for asking postponing this
> discussion and to Joseph for my silence in January.
>
> As you all see now, this one is very intensive and it was possible to
> interrupt the New Year Lecture of Joseph.
>
> In addition, Joseph had moderated it very nice and we receive very good
> collection of examples of disinformation, misinformation and etc.
>
> From my point of view, it is just what we need now.
>
>
>
> Well, let’s go further.
>
>
>
> *1. What is our goal* - to give one or more definitions of concept
> “information” or to establish useful information theories to be applied to
> practical domains to understand and solve real problems?
>
> From my point of view - the last is our goal.
>
> Because of this it doesn’t matter how much definitions we will have.
>
> It is important to see that the concrete definition may be applied to a
> concrete domain to explain a concrete phenomenon.
>
> In other words, I expect to see examples as more as possible.
>
>
>
> *2. We need methodological* *knowledge* to establish new concepts and
> theories.
>
> First of all, we need to clear what kind is our new concept - primary or
> secondary.
>
> Concerning the concept “information”, it may be introduced as a primary,
> as well as, as a secondary concept.
>
> If it is a primary concept, it has to be introduces by series of well
> known examples.
>
> If it is a secondary concept, the primary concepts, which will define it,
> need to be chosen precisely and again to be introduced by corresponded
> series of examples.
>
>
>
> For me, the “information” is a secondary concept!
>
>
>
> If we assume it as a primary concept, it will be direct way to well known
> concepts of “God” and modern variants, such as “Information-space-time
> continuum”.
>
> If one believes in “Information”, he/she may explain many of real
> phenomena.
>
> But in the same time, he/she will fall down in some kind of dogma. (Dear
> Gordana, elections are the same case!).
>
>
>
> *3. I propose to follow the next steps* when we propose definitions of
> “information”:
>
> 1) to point clearly if it is a primary or a secondary concept;
>
> 2) if it is a primary concept, to stop further discussion and to try to
> understand the examples given by the author(s);
>
> 3) in the second case, to introduce clearly the primary concepts and step
> by step to present the theory.
>
>
>
> *4. No problems if we will have many theories* for the same phenomenon.
>
> It is well known that, for instance, the Geometry is not a single theory.
>
> You may know at least several geometries:
>
> - Euclidean (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclidean_geometry);
>
> - Non-Euclidean: hyperbolic or elliptic (
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Euclidean_geometry);
>
> - Spherical geometry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_geometry),
>
> etc.
>
> This point of view, in 1993, I had included in the name of the first ITHEA
> ® International Journal calling it “Information Theories and
> Applications” .
>
>
>
> Friendly greetings
>
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
> PS: *The situation with many definitions we have now is not new*.
>
> For instance, in a letter written to Philip Jourdain in *1914*, Gottlob
> Frege had written:
>
> “Let us suppose an explorer travelling in an unexplored country sees a
> high snow-capped mountain on the northern horizon.
>
> By making inquiries among the natives he learns that its name is *'Aphla'*.
>
>
> By sighting it from different points he determines its position as exactly
> as possible, enters it in a map, and writes in his diary: 'Aphla is at
> least 5000 meters high'.
>
> Another explorer sees a snow-capped mountain on the southern horizon and
> learns that it is called *Ateb*. He enters it in his map under this name.
>
> Later comparison shows that both explorers saw the same mountain. Now the
> content of the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is far from being a mere
> consequence of the principle of identity, but contains a valuable piece of
> geographical knowledge.
>
> What is stated in the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is certainly not the
> same thing as the content of the proposition 'Ateb is Ateb'.
>
> Now if what corresponded to the name 'Aphla' as part of the thought was
> the reference of the name and hence the mountain itself, then this would be
> the same in both thoughts.
>
> The thought expressed in the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' would have to
> coincide with the one in 'Ateb is Ateb', which is far from being the case.
> What corresponds to the name 'Ateb' as part of the thought must therefore
> be different from what corresponds to the name 'Aphla' as part of the
> thought. This cannot therefore be the reference which is the same for both
> names, but must be something which is different in the two cases, and I say
> accordingly that the sense of the name 'Ateb' is different from the sense
> of the name 'Aphla'.
>
> Accordingly, the sense of the proposition 'Ateb is at least 5000 meters
> high' is also different from the sense of the proposition 'Aphla is at
> least 5000 meters high'. Someone who takes the latter to be true need not
> therefore take the former to be true. An object can be determined in
> different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it can give rise
> to a special name, and these different names then have different senses;
> for it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is being
> determined in different ways.
>
> We find this in astronomy in the case of planetoids and comets. Now if the
> sense of a name was something subjective, then the sense of the proposition
> in which the name occurs, and hence the thought, would also be something
> subjective, and the thought one man connects with this proposition would be
> different from the thought another man connects with it; a common store of
> thoughts, a common science would be impossible.
>
> It would be impossible for something one man said to contradict what
> another man said, because the two would not express the same thought at
> all, but each his owns.
>
> For these reasons I believe that the sense of a name is not something
> subjective (crossed out: in one's mental life), that it does not therefore
> belong to psychology, and that it is indispensable” [Frege, 1980].
>
>
>
> *What is important in this example* is [Ivanova et al, 2013c]:
>
> ―     The names Ateb and Aphla refer different parts of the same natural
> object (mountain, let call it *Pirrin*);
>
> ―     The position of the referred object (mountain) is fixed by any
> artificial system (geographical co-ordinates, address) which is another
> name of the same object;
>
> ―     The names and the address correspond one to another and both to the
> real object but without the explorer’s map, respectively – the explorer’s diary,
> it is impossible to restore the correspondence;
>
> ―     At the end, the names Ateb and Aphla are connected hierarchically
> to the name Pirrin and the relations are:
>
> o   Aphla *is_a_South_Side_of* Pirrin;
>
> o   Ateb *is_a_North_Side_of *Pirrin.
>
> The last case forms a simple vocabulary:
>
> *name*
>
> *definition*
>
> *Aphla*
>
> The South Side of Pirrin mountain
>
> *Ateb *
>
> The North Side of Pirrin mountain
>
> *Pirrin*
>
> A mountain in the unexplored country with co-ordinates (x,y)
>
>
>
> In addition, all cases given above form a simple *ontology* with four
> concepts which may be represented by a graph diagram:
>
>
>
> [image: image]
>
>
>
>
>
> For those who are familiar with Theory of categories, it is clear that *this
> diagram is commutative and represents a Category*.
>
>
>
> This gives us the idea that *the concept “information” could be defined
> using the Category theory*.
>
>
>
> *Yep, one more definition!!!*
>
>
>
> Dear Gordana and Christophe, please don’t worry - of course it takes in
> account the agent’s mind.
>
> But this is for another letter J ...
>
>
>
> *References*
>
> [Frege, 1980] Frege G., “An extract from an undated letter”, published in
> Frege's Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (ed.) Gottfried
> Gabriel, Hans Hermes. Friedrich Kanbartel. Christian Thiel, and Albert
> Veraart, Abridged for the English (edn.), by Brian MeGuinness, and Trans.
> Hans Kaal (Oxford: Blackwell. 1980),
> http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/00-01/phil235/a_readings/frege_jourdain.html
> (accessed: 15.11.2012).
>
> [Ivanova et al, 2013c] Krassimira B. Ivanova, Koen Vanhoof, Krassimir
> Markov, Vitalii Velychko, “*Storing Dictionaries and Thesauruses Using
> NL-Addressing*”, International Journal "Information Models and Analyses"
> Vol.2, Number 3, 2013, ISSN 1314-6416 (printed), 1314-6432(online), pp. 239
> - 251.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
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