[Fis] DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Karl Javorszky]

not in Italian but in full concordance with what Rico ha dito:
information as a concept lies behind all and each of the ways of looking at
the world. Whatever the picture, it has a background to it.
Could it be that a description of the background is common to each and all
of the pictures one makes of the world?

Rational thinking has always been cautious and only permitted speaking
about what is clearly delineated. All other is art.
Now we see that Nature is not that well educated in rhetoric, and makes
allusions also to that what is the background in our imagination. She
simply does not use our perspectives and our bifurcations. She uses
background and foreground concurrently and plays with interferences between
the two.

The general answer to "and relative to what?" is non-existence as such, the
background sui generis. That, to which everything else is different, just
like the thing as such has something common with everything else. The
general idea of how different a background is to the foreground shown/known
could well be the root for the concept of information. That what we know,
what is the case, is no information. Information is how that what is the
case differs from what is not the case.
Karl
On 9 Apr 2016 16:56, "Francesco Rizzo" <13francesco.rizzo at gmail.com> wrote:

> Cari Tutti,
> il concetto o significato di informazione è unico, quel che varia è il
> modo di qualificarlo o quantificarlo in ragione dei diversi tipi o
> categorie di informazione: naturale o termodinamica, genetica, semantica e
> matematica. E questo lo dico da studioso di economia della scienza o
> dell'esistenza, non da studioso di esistenza o  della scienza economica.
> Un abbraccio, non solo fisico, ma anche emo-ra-zionale.
> Francesco
>
> 2016-04-09 12:21 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff <loet at leydesdorff.net>:
>
>> Dear Pedro,
>>
>>
>>
>> I disagree about putting "meaning" outside the scope of natural sciences.
>>
>>
>>
>> I doubt that anybody on this list would disagree about using the metaphor
>> of meaning in the natural sciences.
>>
>>
>>
>> Maturana (1978, p. 49): “In still other words, if an organism is
>> observed in its operation within a second-order consensual domain, it
>> appears to the observer as if its nervous system interacted with internal
>> representations of the circumstances of its interactions, and as if the
>> changes of state of the organism were determined by the semantic value of
>> these representations. Yet all that takes place in the operation of the
>> nervous system is the structure-determined dynamics of changing relations
>> of relative neuronal activity proper to a closed neuronal network.”
>>
>> http://www.enolagaia.com/M78BoL.html#Descriptions
>>
>>
>>
>> In other context, Maturana used the concept of “languaging”.
>>
>>
>>
>> My point is about the *differentia specifica* of inter-human
>> communication which assumes a next-order contingency of expectations
>> structured by “horizons of meaning” (Husserl). One needs a specific
>> (social-science) set of theories and methods to access this domain, in my
>> opinion. In concrete projects, one can try to operationalize in terms of
>> the information sciences / information theory. One can also collaborate
>> “interdisciplinarily” at the relevant interface, notably with the computer
>> sciences. The use of metaphors in other disciplines, however,  cannot be
>> denied.
>>
>>
>>
>> This is just a reaction; I had one penny left this week. J
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Loet
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>
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