[Fis] Art and the Cognitive (Is art a human phenomenon?)
Krassimir Markov
itheaiss at gmail.com
Tue Jan 13 23:42:37 CET 2026
Dear László,
Thanks for your reply.
My comments were mainly to express my very positive attitude towards your
work and results.
As far as you are interested in some of my articles, perhaps the closest
and most useful in this case would be an article from about twenty years
ago, which precedes what I wrote to you.
Its name is "Cultural Aspects of Infraction":
https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://www.foibg.com/ijitk/ijitk-vol02/ijitk02-4-p06.pdf__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!Xx1Ctx9i6vfojq5LOcsOIU5WybDCKRYObEVHLjuf3sLqXDdB8NSIl4Wq-hnnJ3SWlOwVGolN_La4b76MJE4$
Since then, some details have been clarified a little, for example, it is
now clear that in addition to mental models, there are a number of other
mental structures. But in general, the ideas presented in this article are
still relevant, and some turned out to be at least 15 years ahead of their
time. I mean AI and the artificial information objects created by it today.
For convenience, I will recall that in order to avoid misunderstandings
with concepts Subject, agent, cell, animal, human, society, humanity,
living creatures, etc., we use the abstract concept “INFOS” to denote each
of them as well as all of the artificial creatures which has features
similar to the former ones. In the article, this concept is defined
formally and may not be understood correctly.
Dear Kate,
Thank you very much for the graphic interpretation. But here is a direct
example that artificial information objects can be wrong. In the diagram,
the dimensions "Creativity" and "Communication" start at 0 and end at 0,
which is not correct. And as László noted, it might be interesting to try
to train AI to generate a correct diagram.
As for emotions, since I am currently working with my cognitive scientists
on the systematization and mathematical modeling of mental structures, in
the near future I will be able to show that emotions are types of mental
structures and fully fall within the scope of cognitive science.
With respect,
Krassimir
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На вт, 13.01.2026 г. в 23:23 Csáji László Koppány <csaji.koppany at gmail.com>
написа:
> Dear Krassimir,
> I am overwhelmed by your contribution, thank you really very much. I see
> that some of yourprevious works have already dealt with art (digital art,
> paintings), and I think that you not only deeply understood my vectorial
> model and the role of its vectors' triadic interaction, but you added a
> complete new article in your letter. General Information Theory was not in
> my mind when I set up my 3D model of art, but it seems that you could apply
> it to this field by adding new approaches. You probably saw Kate's letter
> with that picture produced with the help of AI. What do you think of it? I
> think AI could not "understand" the point and role of the "spark", and
> "animal behaviour" was also put as a "lower zone" into the space of the
> triadic interaction.
>
> Dear Kate,
> What do you think of that AI-generated model? It is undoubtedly fancy :-)
> But I have some differences in my original image of this model. The 3D
> vectors are clear, I think. Nevertheless, in my mind, I would try to set up
> a fourth dimension (the "spark") to extend it into a 4D cube - a cube in a
> 4D space, where "the spark" would be this fourth vector (co-ordinate). This
> spark should be more adequately explained in my next article, and you gave
> many inspiring apsects, especially with thinking more on the role and
> nature of emotions, but Krassimir was very right to underline the
> importance of "metaphorical thinking" from my paper. That is rather a
> cognitive ability than emotional - but I think cognitive functions can also
> have at least a broader comprehension that also includes emotions. As I
> suppose (correct me if I am wrong) that emotions are also brain processes
> (even if their localization is not obvious), consequently, they are part of
> the cognitive activity. I understand that you stressed that cognition is
> different from emotions, but there is a common denominator, which is the
> activity of the cortex in both cases - thus, they are all cognitive in
> nature.
>
> Pedro,
> Would you please add some comments on how the Locus of Broca relates to
> emotions? Do you also divide emotions from cognitive functions?
> Cheers,
> Laszlo
>
> Krassimir Markov <itheaiss at gmail.com> ezt írta (időpont: 2026. jan. 12.,
> H, 2:03):
>
>> Dear László,
>>
>> I hope this message finds you well. I recently had the pleasure of
>> reading your article "Toward a Multidimensional Definition of Art from the
>> Perspective of Cognitive Sciences" (Csáji, 2026), and I wanted to express
>> my deep appreciation for your work. I do not usually write long letters,
>> but your article left a remarkably deep impression on me and genuinely
>> moved my curiosity. This is why I have taken the liberty of writing to you
>> at greater length than I normally would.
>>
>> Your three-dimensional vectorial model—creativity, communication, and
>> experience—offers a genuinely refreshing and cognitively grounded approach
>> to understanding art. I particularly appreciate how you avoid binary
>> classifications and Eurocentric aesthetic biases, instead proposing a
>> universal framework that can accommodate diverse cultural expressions. The
>> case studies you present (from Nepal, Bali, Sami culture, Japan, and
>> beyond) beautifully illustrate the heterogeneity of artistic phenomena
>> while maintaining theoretical coherence.
>>
>> The concept of the "spark" as an activation threshold that moves
>> something from the zero point into the space of art (Csáji, 2026, p. 15) is
>> especially intriguing from a cognitive perspective. It resonates well with
>> prototype theory (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) and the principle of family
>> resemblance, acknowledging that art lacks a single defining essence. Your
>> integration of cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995; Sperber, 1996;
>> Tomasello, 1999), cognitive semantics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and
>> neuroaesthetics (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Seeley, 2020) creates a
>> truly multidisciplinary framework.
>>
>> *1. A Systemic Consideration: The Triadic Structure of Information
>> Interaction*
>>
>> While reflecting on your model, I found myself considering the systemic
>> nature of artistic phenomena through the lens of the General Information
>> Theory (GIT) (Markov et al, 2007). In this framework, information
>> interaction is fundamentally defined as a triadic structure:
>>
>>
>>
>> *Donor (source/creator) - Object (message/medium/artwork) - Receiver
>> (destination/audience)*.
>>
>> Crucially, this theory treats information not as an external entity but
>> as a purely subjective phenomenon and exists in reality only as knowledge
>> (externalized mental structures) or as data (not recognized reflections in
>> reality). The term "information" itself is convenient shorthand to avoid
>> constantly specifying whether we refer to data or knowledge.
>>
>> This perspective aligns remarkably well with your cognitive approach. As
>> you note, "words and artifacts call forth fragments of knowledge, emotions,
>> and memories, stimulated by the actual situation, and thus, exist only in
>> human minds" (Csáji, 2026, p. 3, referencing Fillmore's frame semantics).
>> Art, from this viewpoint, is not the physical object itself but the
>> cognitive processes it triggers—the externalized mental structures
>> (knowledge in reality through the artwork) become recognized and
>> internalized through the receiver's cognitive engagement, while remaining
>> data (unrecognized reflections) for those who do not engage with them.
>>
>> This builds on your observation that "perceiving art also requires
>> creativity and a sense of communication" (Csáji, 2026, p. 16) and extends
>> the notion of art as agency (Gell, 1998) and distributed cognition
>> (Hutchins, 1991; White, 1995). The triadic structure is not merely a
>> convenient model but reflects the fundamental nature of how mental
>> structures are externalized into reality (by the Donor), persist as
>> knowledge or data (in the Object), and are recognized and internalized (by
>> the Receiver).
>>
>> Your three vectors might thus be understood as the specifically
>> *artistic* modalities of this cognitive transformation:
>>
>> - *Creativity*: the process of externalizing mental structures into
>> reality in novel or refined ways
>> - *Communication*: the encoding/decoding of these structures through
>> the artwork as medium
>> - *Experience*: the recognition and subjective internalization of
>> these structures
>>
>> This led me to consider various configurations of the triadic system:
>>
>> - *(0,0,0)*: Complete absence of art—the zero point you identify; no
>> information interaction occurs
>> - *(0,1,1)*: Object + Receiver without original Donor (e.g., natural
>> forms reinterpreted as ready-made art, as in your Case 6 with Dušan
>> Palenčar's "pregnant tree"; or ancient anonymous works where the creator is
>> historically absent). Here, the Receiver projects mental structures onto
>> what were merely unrecognized reflections in reality (data), transforming
>> them into knowledge through recognition.
>> - *(1,0,1)*: Donor + Receiver without persistent Object (ephemeral
>> performances, as in your Case 2 with Kechak dance; or improvisations where
>> the externalized structures are immediately recognized without persisting
>> as observable reflections)
>> - *(1,1,0)*: Donor + Object without Receiver (unpublished/unseen
>> works—latent art, as in your Case 5 before you discovered the homeless
>> artist's work; mental structures externalized into reality but remaining as
>> data, not yet recognized by any receiver)
>> - *(1,1,1)*: Full artistic system (classical case, as in your Case 4
>> with Hokusai's widely recognized masterpieces; complete cycle of
>> externalization-persistence-recognition)
>>
>> Each configuration reveals different cognitive processes and raises
>> interesting questions about when and how art "exists" as an informational
>> phenomenon. Your own fieldwork provides excellent examples: in Case 5,
>> initially the system operated as (1,1,0) until your discovery transformed
>> it into (1,1,1). The artist himself stated he "could not imagine attracting
>> anyone" with his work (Csáji, 2026, p. 8), suggesting he didn't initially
>> conceive of it within a complete communicative system—his externalized
>> mental structures remained as unrecognized reflections in reality (data)
>> without being transformed into knowledge by others. Similarly, in Case 1
>> (Dibhi Kami and Dor Bahadur Buramagar), the art began as (1,0,1)—ephemeral
>> call-and-response performance where mental structures were directly
>> externalized and recognized through transient sound—before being documented
>> and reaching wider audiences.
>>
>> The (1,0,1) configuration is particularly interesting from the
>> information-theoretic perspective: it suggests that art can exist as *direct
>> recognition and transformation of externalized mental structures*
>> through transient carriers (sound waves, light, movement) without
>> necessarily persisting as observable data objects.
>>
>> *2. Temporal Dynamics*
>>
>> This triadic view also introduces a temporal dimension that your
>> vectorial model could potentially incorporate. As you note, "we have no
>> evidence that making and enjoying art have been based on unchanging brain
>> processes" (Csáji, 2026, p. 4), suggesting evolutionary and historical
>> change. At the individual artwork level, art seems to evolve through
>> temporal states:
>>
>> - *T1* (creation moment): Donor externalizing mental structures into
>> reality, Object emerging as knowledge/data, Receiver absent
>> - *T2* (reception moment): Donor possibly absent, Object persists (as
>> knowledge or data depending on recognition), Receiver recognizing and
>> internalizing
>> - *T3* (oblivion): All elements return to zero—physical reflections
>> decay, knowledge is forgotten
>>
>> Different cognitive processes may be dominant at each stage, which could
>> help explain the varied brain activation patterns observed in
>> neuroscientific studies of art (Chatterjee, 2011; Ishizu & Zekir, 2011).
>>
>> *3. The Question of Animal Art: Where is the "Spark"?*
>>
>> Your discussion of the "spark" as uniquely human raises a fascinating
>> question that you acknowledge: "Anyone who has a dog surely recognizes that
>> even animals are capable of creative problem-solving and communication that
>> causes emotions in humans" (Csáji, 2026, p. 15). This leads me to wonder
>> about the boundaries of art in the animal kingdom.
>>
>> Consider several intriguing cases:
>>
>> *3.1. Avian vocal performance*: Many songbirds (such as nightingales,
>> lyrebirds, and mockingbirds) engage in elaborate vocal displays that go far
>> beyond simple mating calls (Catchpole & Slater, 2008; Marler & Slabbekoorn,
>> 2004). They exhibit:
>>
>> - *Creativity*: Individual variation, improvisation, and cultural
>> transmission of song dialects
>> - *Communication*: Clear signaling function, but with aesthetic
>> elaboration beyond minimal effectiveness
>> - *Experience*: Evidence of pleasure centers activating during song
>> production (Riters, 2012)
>>
>> Does this constitute art, or merely elaborate signaling? The triadic
>> structure exists (singer-song-listener), and all three vectors appear to be
>> non-zero. From the information-theoretic perspective, do birds externalize
>> and recognize mental structures in ways qualitatively similar to humans, or
>> is their processing fundamentally different?
>>
>> *3.2. Courtship displays*: The dances of cranes, swans, and bowerbirds
>> involve:
>>
>> - *Creativity*: Individual variation in display quality; bowerbirds
>> even decorate their bowers with colored objects (Borgia, 1985; Endler et
>> al., 2010)
>> - *Communication*: Clear purpose, but with aesthetic judgment by
>> females who select mates based on display quality
>> - *Experience*: Both performer and observer are engaged; unsuccessful
>> males modify their displays, suggesting experiential learning
>>
>> Bowerbirds, in particular, appear to externalize mental structures (their
>> aesthetic preferences) into physical arrangements (bower decorations) that
>> are then evaluated by others—a remarkable parallel to human artistic
>> behavior.
>>
>> *3.3. Cetacean songs*: Humpback whales produce complex, evolving songs
>> that change over seasons and spread through populations culturally (Payne &
>> Payne, 1985; Garland et al., 2011). These shows:
>>
>> - *Creativity*: Novel phrases appear and propagate
>> - *Communication*: Function unclear (not simple mating calls)
>> - *Experience*: Whales appear to attend to each other's songs
>>
>> The cultural transmission of whale songs suggests a degree of
>> externalization and recognition of mental structures across individuals and
>> time.
>>
>> *3.4. Elephant painting*: While controversial (some argue it's trained
>> behavior), elephants in captivity spontaneously manipulate paint on canvas
>> with apparent intentionality and individual styles, which you note as
>> important (Csáji, 2026).
>>
>> Your criterion of the "spark" as involving metaphorical thinking (Lakoff
>> & Johnson, 1980) might be the key distinction. As you note, "the ability to
>> use and understand metaphor...demonstrates everyday human artistic
>> cognition" (Csáji, 2026, p. 1). There is limited evidence for metaphorical
>> cognition in great apes (Tanner & Byrne, 1996), but whether this extends to
>> aesthetic domains remains unclear.
>>
>> From the information-theoretic perspective, the question becomes: Can
>> animals engage in the *metacognitive framing* of their externalizations
>> as "artistic"? Do they possess the mental structures necessary to
>> categorize certain behaviors as belonging to a special domain beyond purely
>> functional communication? Your model's focus on the "spark" as a threshold
>> suggests this metacognitive awareness might be the distinguishing feature.
>>
>> Alternatively, if we accept your vectorial model as gradient rather than
>> binary, perhaps some animal behaviors occupy the low end of the artistic
>> spectrum—say (0.3, 0.5, 0.4)—above zero but below the threshold we
>> typically recognize as "art." This would align with your observation that
>> "art as a cognitive process, does not inevitably depend on such aesthetic
>> criteria (like beauty, asymmetry-seeking, etc.)" (Csáji, 2026, p. 14).
>>
>> The question becomes: Is the "spark" a uniquely human metacognitive
>> capacity (the ability to frame an activity as "artistic"), or does it exist
>> on a continuum where some animals achieve rudimentary forms? Your model's
>> flexibility could accommodate either interpretation, but clarifying this
>> boundary might strengthen the framework's universality claims while
>> respecting the specifically human dimension you emphasize.
>>
>> *4. Mathematical Formalization and Systemic Mapping*
>>
>> One additional observation: your vectorial model lends itself naturally
>> to mathematical formalization as a unit cube [0,1]³, which addresses a
>> potential limitation in the unbounded vector representation. Each artistic
>> phenomenon can be represented as a point A = (c, m, e) with bounded
>> coordinates corresponding to the three dimensions.
>>
>> Moreover, there appears to be a natural mapping between your three
>> vectors and the triadic information interaction structure:
>>
>> - *Creativity (c)* ↔ *Donor* (the source, externalizing mental
>> structures into reality)
>> - *Communication (m)* ↔ *Object* (the medium/artwork, carrying
>> knowledge or remaining as data)
>> - *Experience (e)* ↔ *Receiver* (the destination, recognizing and
>> internalizing)
>>
>> This correspondence suggests that within the unit cube framework, we can
>> model the entire human information interaction system. The bounded [0,1]
>> range for each dimension captures the finite, subjective nature of
>> information as it transitions between mental structures and their
>> reflections in reality (Markov, 2007), avoiding the conceptual issues of
>> infinite vectors. A complete artistic system would require all three
>> coordinates to be non-zero: c > 0 ∧ m > 0 ∧ e > 0, formally expressing
>> your insight that art emerges from the triadic interaction.
>>
>> This formalization would enable the application of fuzzy logic operators
>> (such as t-norms) to rigorously define the "spark" threshold and measure
>> artistic intensity as μ_art(A) = T(c, m, e), where T represents a
>> triangular norm capturing the interdependence of the three elements.
>> Different system configurations—(0,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,1,0)—can be precisely
>> analyzed, and temporal dynamics A(t) can be modeled as trajectories through
>> the unit cube.
>>
>> Such mathematical apparatus could facilitate comparative studies,
>> computational modeling of artistic cognition, and more rigorous hypothesis
>> testing within the cognitive neuroscience of art. I believe this direction
>> could strengthen the model's applicability across disciplines while
>> preserving its conceptual elegance.
>>
>> *Conclusion*
>>
>> Please understand these reflections as enthusiastic engagement with your
>> work rather than criticism. Your model has already made a significant
>> contribution to how we conceptualize art in cognitive sciences,
>> particularly in transcending "previous Eurocentric concepts" (Csáji, 2026,
>> p. 3) and avoiding the colonial hierarchies that have long plagued art
>> theory.
>>
>> The connections to GIT (particularly the understanding of information as
>> subjective, existing as externalized mental structures (knowledge) or data
>> depending on recognition), the question of animal aesthetics, and the
>> potential for mathematical formalization are perhaps avenues for future
>> exploration that could further strengthen your already robust framework. I
>> would be happy to share more details about the GIT, the mathematical
>> formalization, or the mental structures, which are the subject of an
>> extensive article currently in preparation—if they might be useful for your
>> continued research.
>>
>> Thank you for this important work. It bridges anthropology, cognitive
>> science, and art theory in a way that genuinely advances our understanding
>> while respecting cultural diversity.
>>
>> With respect,
>>
>> Krassimir
>>
>>
>>
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