[Fis] Art and the Cognitive (Is art a human phenomenon?)

[Krassimir Markov]

Dear László,

I hope this message finds you well. I recently had the pleasure of reading
your article "Toward a Multidimensional Definition of Art from the
Perspective of Cognitive Sciences" (Csáji, 2026), and I wanted to express
my deep appreciation for your work. I do not usually write long letters,
but your article left a remarkably deep impression on me and genuinely
moved my curiosity. This is why I have taken the liberty of writing to you
at greater length than I normally would.

Your three-dimensional vectorial model—creativity, communication, and
experience—offers a genuinely refreshing and cognitively grounded approach
to understanding art. I particularly appreciate how you avoid binary
classifications and Eurocentric aesthetic biases, instead proposing a
universal framework that can accommodate diverse cultural expressions. The
case studies you present (from Nepal, Bali, Sami culture, Japan, and
beyond) beautifully illustrate the heterogeneity of artistic phenomena
while maintaining theoretical coherence.

The concept of the "spark" as an activation threshold that moves something
from the zero point into the space of art (Csáji, 2026, p. 15) is
especially intriguing from a cognitive perspective. It resonates well with
prototype theory (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) and the principle of family
resemblance, acknowledging that art lacks a single defining essence. Your
integration of cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995; Sperber, 1996;
Tomasello, 1999), cognitive semantics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), and
neuroaesthetics (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999; Seeley, 2020) creates a
truly multidisciplinary framework.

*1. A Systemic Consideration: The Triadic Structure of Information
Interaction*

While reflecting on your model, I found myself considering the systemic
nature of artistic phenomena through the lens of the General Information
Theory (GIT) (Markov et al, 2007). In this framework, information
interaction is fundamentally defined as a triadic structure:



*Donor (source/creator) - Object (message/medium/artwork) - Receiver
(destination/audience)*.

Crucially, this theory treats information not as an external entity but as
a purely subjective phenomenon and exists in reality only as knowledge
(externalized mental structures) or as data (not recognized reflections in
reality). The term "information" itself is convenient shorthand to avoid
constantly specifying whether we refer to data or knowledge.

This perspective aligns remarkably well with your cognitive approach. As
you note, "words and artifacts call forth fragments of knowledge, emotions,
and memories, stimulated by the actual situation, and thus, exist only in
human minds" (Csáji, 2026, p. 3, referencing Fillmore's frame semantics).
Art, from this viewpoint, is not the physical object itself but the
cognitive processes it triggers—the externalized mental structures
(knowledge in reality through the artwork) become recognized and
internalized through the receiver's cognitive engagement, while remaining
data (unrecognized reflections) for those who do not engage with them.

This builds on your observation that "perceiving art also requires
creativity and a sense of communication" (Csáji, 2026, p. 16) and extends
the notion of art as agency (Gell, 1998) and distributed cognition
(Hutchins, 1991; White, 1995). The triadic structure is not merely a
convenient model but reflects the fundamental nature of how mental
structures are externalized into reality (by the Donor), persist as
knowledge or data (in the Object), and are recognized and internalized (by
the Receiver).

Your three vectors might thus be understood as the specifically *artistic*
modalities of this cognitive transformation:

   - *Creativity*: the process of externalizing mental structures into
   reality in novel or refined ways
   - *Communication*: the encoding/decoding of these structures through the
   artwork as medium
   - *Experience*: the recognition and subjective internalization of these
   structures

This led me to consider various configurations of the triadic system:

   - *(0,0,0)*: Complete absence of art—the zero point you identify; no
   information interaction occurs
   - *(0,1,1)*: Object + Receiver without original Donor (e.g., natural
   forms reinterpreted as ready-made art, as in your Case 6 with Dušan
   Palenčar's "pregnant tree"; or ancient anonymous works where the creator is
   historically absent). Here, the Receiver projects mental structures onto
   what were merely unrecognized reflections in reality (data), transforming
   them into knowledge through recognition.
   - *(1,0,1)*: Donor + Receiver without persistent Object (ephemeral
   performances, as in your Case 2 with Kechak dance; or improvisations where
   the externalized structures are immediately recognized without persisting
   as observable reflections)
   - *(1,1,0)*: Donor + Object without Receiver (unpublished/unseen
   works—latent art, as in your Case 5 before you discovered the homeless
   artist's work; mental structures externalized into reality but remaining as
   data, not yet recognized by any receiver)
   - *(1,1,1)*: Full artistic system (classical case, as in your Case 4
   with Hokusai's widely recognized masterpieces; complete cycle of
   externalization-persistence-recognition)

Each configuration reveals different cognitive processes and raises
interesting questions about when and how art "exists" as an informational
phenomenon. Your own fieldwork provides excellent examples: in Case 5,
initially the system operated as (1,1,0) until your discovery transformed
it into (1,1,1). The artist himself stated he "could not imagine attracting
anyone" with his work (Csáji, 2026, p. 8), suggesting he didn't initially
conceive of it within a complete communicative system—his externalized
mental structures remained as unrecognized reflections in reality (data)
without being transformed into knowledge by others. Similarly, in Case 1
(Dibhi Kami and Dor Bahadur Buramagar), the art began as (1,0,1)—ephemeral
call-and-response performance where mental structures were directly
externalized and recognized through transient sound—before being documented
and reaching wider audiences.

The (1,0,1) configuration is particularly interesting from the
information-theoretic perspective: it suggests that art can exist as *direct
recognition and transformation of externalized mental structures* through
transient carriers (sound waves, light, movement) without necessarily
persisting as observable data objects.

*2. Temporal Dynamics*

This triadic view also introduces a temporal dimension that your vectorial
model could potentially incorporate. As you note, "we have no evidence that
making and enjoying art have been based on unchanging brain processes"
(Csáji, 2026, p. 4), suggesting evolutionary and historical change. At the
individual artwork level, art seems to evolve through temporal states:

   - *T1* (creation moment): Donor externalizing mental structures into
   reality, Object emerging as knowledge/data, Receiver absent
   - *T2* (reception moment): Donor possibly absent, Object persists (as
   knowledge or data depending on recognition), Receiver recognizing and
   internalizing
   - *T3* (oblivion): All elements return to zero—physical reflections
   decay, knowledge is forgotten

Different cognitive processes may be dominant at each stage, which could
help explain the varied brain activation patterns observed in
neuroscientific studies of art (Chatterjee, 2011; Ishizu & Zekir, 2011).

*3. The Question of Animal Art: Where is the "Spark"?*

Your discussion of the "spark" as uniquely human raises a fascinating
question that you acknowledge: "Anyone who has a dog surely recognizes that
even animals are capable of creative problem-solving and communication that
causes emotions in humans" (Csáji, 2026, p. 15). This leads me to wonder
about the boundaries of art in the animal kingdom.

Consider several intriguing cases:

*3.1. Avian vocal performance*: Many songbirds (such as nightingales,
lyrebirds, and mockingbirds) engage in elaborate vocal displays that go far
beyond simple mating calls (Catchpole & Slater, 2008; Marler & Slabbekoorn,
2004). They exhibit:

   - *Creativity*: Individual variation, improvisation, and cultural
   transmission of song dialects
   - *Communication*: Clear signaling function, but with aesthetic
   elaboration beyond minimal effectiveness
   - *Experience*: Evidence of pleasure centers activating during song
   production (Riters, 2012)

Does this constitute art, or merely elaborate signaling? The triadic
structure exists (singer-song-listener), and all three vectors appear to be
non-zero. From the information-theoretic perspective, do birds externalize
and recognize mental structures in ways qualitatively similar to humans, or
is their processing fundamentally different?

*3.2. Courtship displays*: The dances of cranes, swans, and bowerbirds
involve:

   - *Creativity*: Individual variation in display quality; bowerbirds even
   decorate their bowers with colored objects (Borgia, 1985; Endler et al.,
   2010)
   - *Communication*: Clear purpose, but with aesthetic judgment by females
   who select mates based on display quality
   - *Experience*: Both performer and observer are engaged; unsuccessful
   males modify their displays, suggesting experiential learning

Bowerbirds, in particular, appear to externalize mental structures (their
aesthetic preferences) into physical arrangements (bower decorations) that
are then evaluated by others—a remarkable parallel to human artistic
behavior.

*3.3. Cetacean songs*: Humpback whales produce complex, evolving songs that
change over seasons and spread through populations culturally (Payne &
Payne, 1985; Garland et al., 2011). These shows:

   - *Creativity*: Novel phrases appear and propagate
   - *Communication*: Function unclear (not simple mating calls)
   - *Experience*: Whales appear to attend to each other's songs

The cultural transmission of whale songs suggests a degree of
externalization and recognition of mental structures across individuals and
time.

*3.4. Elephant painting*: While controversial (some argue it's trained
behavior), elephants in captivity spontaneously manipulate paint on canvas
with apparent intentionality and individual styles, which you note as
important (Csáji, 2026).

Your criterion of the "spark" as involving metaphorical thinking (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980) might be the key distinction. As you note, "the ability to
use and understand metaphor...demonstrates everyday human artistic
cognition" (Csáji, 2026, p. 1). There is limited evidence for metaphorical
cognition in great apes (Tanner & Byrne, 1996), but whether this extends to
aesthetic domains remains unclear.

>From the information-theoretic perspective, the question becomes: Can
animals engage in the *metacognitive framing* of their externalizations as
"artistic"? Do they possess the mental structures necessary to categorize
certain behaviors as belonging to a special domain beyond purely functional
communication? Your model's focus on the "spark" as a threshold suggests
this metacognitive awareness might be the distinguishing feature.

Alternatively, if we accept your vectorial model as gradient rather than
binary, perhaps some animal behaviors occupy the low end of the artistic
spectrum—say (0.3, 0.5, 0.4)—above zero but below the threshold we
typically recognize as "art." This would align with your observation that
"art as a cognitive process, does not inevitably depend on such aesthetic
criteria (like beauty, asymmetry-seeking, etc.)" (Csáji, 2026, p. 14).

The question becomes: Is the "spark" a uniquely human metacognitive
capacity (the ability to frame an activity as "artistic"), or does it exist
on a continuum where some animals achieve rudimentary forms? Your model's
flexibility could accommodate either interpretation, but clarifying this
boundary might strengthen the framework's universality claims while
respecting the specifically human dimension you emphasize.

*4. Mathematical Formalization and Systemic Mapping*

One additional observation: your vectorial model lends itself naturally to
mathematical formalization as a unit cube [0,1]³, which addresses a
potential limitation in the unbounded vector representation. Each artistic
phenomenon can be represented as a point A = (c, m, e) with bounded
coordinates corresponding to the three dimensions.

Moreover, there appears to be a natural mapping between your three vectors
and the triadic information interaction structure:

   - *Creativity (c)* ↔ *Donor* (the source, externalizing mental
   structures into reality)
   - *Communication (m)* ↔ *Object* (the medium/artwork, carrying knowledge
   or remaining as data)
   - *Experience (e)* ↔ *Receiver* (the destination, recognizing and
   internalizing)

This correspondence suggests that within the unit cube framework, we can
model the entire human information interaction system. The bounded [0,1]
range for each dimension captures the finite, subjective nature of
information as it transitions between mental structures and their
reflections in reality (Markov, 2007), avoiding the conceptual issues of
infinite vectors. A complete artistic system would require all three
coordinates to be non-zero: c > 0 ∧ m > 0 ∧ e > 0, formally expressing your
insight that art emerges from the triadic interaction.

This formalization would enable the application of fuzzy logic operators
(such as t-norms) to rigorously define the "spark" threshold and measure
artistic intensity as μ_art(A) = T(c, m, e), where T represents a
triangular norm capturing the interdependence of the three elements.
Different system configurations—(0,1,1), (1,0,1), (1,1,0)—can be precisely
analyzed, and temporal dynamics A(t) can be modeled as trajectories through
the unit cube.

Such mathematical apparatus could facilitate comparative studies,
computational modeling of artistic cognition, and more rigorous hypothesis
testing within the cognitive neuroscience of art. I believe this direction
could strengthen the model's applicability across disciplines while
preserving its conceptual elegance.

*Conclusion*

Please understand these reflections as enthusiastic engagement with your
work rather than criticism. Your model has already made a significant
contribution to how we conceptualize art in cognitive sciences,
particularly in transcending "previous Eurocentric concepts" (Csáji, 2026,
p. 3) and avoiding the colonial hierarchies that have long plagued art
theory.

The connections to GIT (particularly the understanding of information as
subjective, existing as externalized mental structures (knowledge) or data
depending on recognition), the question of animal aesthetics, and the
potential for mathematical formalization are perhaps avenues for future
exploration that could further strengthen your already robust framework. I
would be happy to share more details about the GIT, the mathematical
formalization, or the mental structures, which are the subject of an
extensive article currently in preparation—if they might be useful for your
continued research.

Thank you for this important work. It bridges anthropology, cognitive
science, and art theory in a way that genuinely advances our understanding
while respecting cultural diversity.

With respect,

Krassimir



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