[Fis] Krassimir and Opposed Views

[Marcus Abundis]

I am reposting this as my original FIS post did not list correctly in the
thread . . .
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Krassimir,

I compliment you on your clear and concise framing of a core issue (Mon Sep
21, 'a simple question'), but I also see it falling on deaf ears. Thus, I
wonder if it is worthwhile to add another voice to what remains an
intractable issue (with many faces) in FIS. Still, I wish to firmly support
your posted note.

This *should* be a simple matter/question, but . . .
– I do not think you (and others) are actually debating opposed concepts of
'information', but rather that *you* actually speak of 'information' the
others (Joe in this case) is NOT, or at least, not in any clear manner.
Joe notes (Mon Sep 21)
> In the real world, information is co-emergent with the universe.<
– You, Krassimir, point to innate informatic levels in your short but
precise analysis.
– Joe's 'the real world' is actually 'das Ding an sich' (NOT information)
which will only ever be imperfectly perceived by any informational agent,
including 'a thing's' many simple-to-complex levels – this key issue of
'agent interpretation' dates to Kant over 200 years ago and is *now* noted
in modern science as 'the thing in itself'.
How/why is this most basic and firmly accepted position ignored/missed in
FIS?
That someone or something 'attempts' to grasp that 'thing' is an
'informatic level', unavoidably abstract of 'the thing in itself'. And
there can be many levels, Korzybski points to myriad informatic levels (of
abstraction) being too often ignored (again seen here in FIS). Even T.
Deacon notes major informatic levels in his innateness, referential, and
normalized views.
It only muddies the water when Joe goes on about how the cosmos is not
expanding? (cosmic background radiation?) Not sure what this adds . . . but
in any respect it does nothing to further support Pedro's #1 principle.

Pedro's #1 'principle', like you, I find wholly unsatisfying. Pedro's Sun
19 July post, from before the break, shows more circumspect humility
in accepting he is actually presenting talking 'points' rather than
offering 'principles'. I certainly join his ambition to realize principles,
in place of talking points – but as I noted in that same post, #1 does
nothing to improve on positions already offered by MacKay and Bateson. It
would be more 'intellectually honest' to see #1 as a talking point, rather
than principle – absent that honesty, the whole thing begins to look like a
vanity project, instead of firm critical thinking.
His further notion of adjacency seems trite if compared to Christophe's
mention of 'constraints' (but which themselves could stand further
clarification) or if compared to Deacon's levels of dynamism. Also, Pedro's
#1 is truly a 'same sac' approach, which he earlier seems to dismiss as too
simplistic(?)

There is an even more-basic question of what is an acceptable standard for
analysis/thinking on this matter. – are we to conduct our inquiry in
*scientific* terms, with progressively refining steps, or rely on simple
'positions' unquestioningly clutched? Namely we should seek to:1) describe,
and 2) explain, 3) cause, and 4) effect, in a 5) serially coherent manner
(relying on prior science) . . . for evident worldly events.
I do not see Pedro's note as usefully descriptively (step 1), in a
scientific sense – it thus, I think, has no explanatory (step 2) potential.
Lastly, Joe claims Pedro's #1 is correctly recursive in its framing, but
such a claim ignores Russell's Paradox where a set cannot include itself –
and later gave rise to 'type theory' (again LEVELS). This lack of sense
around informatic types/levels seems to habitually plague FIS . . .

I could say more, but this is probably already too much for some.

Marcus
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