[Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

[Alex Hankey]

These are important points, John, well said.
I shall be giving a lecture in Liege in August,
at the 12th Vigier Symposium, that explicitly
talks about how to modify quantum theory
for non-equilibrium situations, and show how
thermodynamics should then be incorporated
into the equations, differently from ordinary
Quantum Statistical Thermodynamics.

Alex

On 20 May 2018 at 15:29, John Collier <ag659 at ncf.ca> wrote:

> I am not much for the collapse of the wave packet. Bohm and Hiley avoid
> the problem altogether with their guiding wave, though the section in their
> book on special relativity I don't really get. General relativity presents
> further problems, bu this is also true of the standard interpretation.
>
> I further not that in a book edited by Steven Savitt there are tow
> articles that show that macroscopic measurements (indirect all they may be)
> allow measurement of the quantum state that is reversible. One author is
> James Leggett, and the other is Phil Stamp. Both at least suggest that
> irreversibly, such as it is in QM is due to thermodynamics of a fairly
> normal kine. Legget makes this claim exactly
>
> I would further not that this view fits rather nicely with the Bohm-Hiley
> with respect to there views of reversibility through thermodynamics.
>
>
> Overall, I take it that the collapse of the wave packet has be shown
> empirically wrong, and it is no basis for further explorations in Quantum
> Mechanics.
>
> John
>
> On 2018/05/17 4:30 PM, tozziarturo at libero.it wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
>
> as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires
> the tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.
>
> In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.
>
>
>
> I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the
> FISers unaware of the Everett's account:
>
>
> You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.
>
> You have to choose where to turn.
>
> If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.
>
> This is, very roughly speaking, what *quantum wave collapse* means: if
> you make a choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.
>
>
>
> In order to avoid such irreversibility, *Everett, who did not like
> quantum wave collapse, provided the following account*:
>
> every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the
> entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn
> left, while another you turns right in another Universe.
>
>
>
>
> Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is
> not, and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be
> even theoretically demonstrated.
>
>
>
> Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno Marchal <marchal at ulb.ac.be>
> <marchal at ulb.ac.be> ha scritto:
>
> Dear Arturo,
>
>
> On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziarturo at libero.it wrote:
>
> Daer Bruno,
>
> first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a
> mistake, I did not add the FIS list in the CC.
>
>
> Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,
>
> I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. Especially
> that we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth.
>
> Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from primary
> school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, by
> claiming they have not that faith?
>
>
>
> this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of physical and
> biological issues.
>
> The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of assuming our
> bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum weirdness from
> this 45 years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get precise mathematical
> predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when physicalism needs a
> brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown inconsistent.
> I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and
> biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and
> the semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).
>
>
>
>
> It is just in our mind.  See:
>
> http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132
>
>
> What do you mean by “real world”?
> I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is
> indeed shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal
> number, etc.
>
>
>
> I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course,
> the work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like
> Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any
> possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole
> macroscopic world.
>
>
> For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger
> equation, that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put
> simply: the “many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
> Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we
> don’t need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it
> phenomenologically. Then my work shows this can work only if we recover
> also the wave itself from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).
>
> It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable,
> assumption.
>
>
> When you state that:
>
> "the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing
> machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from
> inside that universal mind".
>
> you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand
> your emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and
> so on), needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard.
>
>
> What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you
> read my papers?
> Did you find a problem, or are you just criticising the assumption/theory?
> Ask specific question, but normally all this has been clearly proofed.
>
>
> A suggestion: you cold try to correlate your "physical border of the
> Universal mind viewed from inside that universal mind" with the holographic
> principle and the cosmic horizon.
>
> I prefer to invoke the physical reality only for the testing. There is
> some possible analogy here, which might be interesting, but Mechanism is an
> hypothesis in psychology, or theology, not in physics, which needs to be
> entirely recovered from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). For this type of
> Mechanist (Neo)platonism: looking at the physical universe is … cheating.
> (Somehow).
>
>
>
> But in order to do that, you need a strong math, not to quote old
> philosophers that,
>
>
> I have decided to study Mathematics for just that. My thesis is a PhD in
> mathematics and theoretical computer science. All what I say has been
> translated entirely in arithmetic, by using Gödel’s technic of
> arithmetisation of metamathematics. I got testable quantitative result
> which have been tested. I am not sure you have study my work, which is
> usually criticised for being … mathematics.
>
>
> for a simple matter of luck, were able to inconsciously predict some
> recent developments of the modern science.
>
> ? I predicted the non-cloning theorem 30 years before the physicist get
> it, and much more.
>
> Please study my papers before judging(*)
>
>
>
>   I like logic, I love logic, I read logic, I study logic, I read a lot of
> the latin texts of the old philosophers that use it (in the Medioeval
> ones), but I have to confess that the scientific value of logic is close to
> zero.  Both of the ancient and of the "novel" logics.
>
>
> The logicians are the one who discovered the universal machine (computer),
> before it was build. You are using one just now. You seem to ignore Gödel’s
> contribution, which in my opinion is, when we assume mechanism (the older
> metaphysical/theological assumption)  the most important result ever
> discovered by the humans.
>
>
> Sorry again!
>
>
> You don’t need to be sorry, but my feeling is that you are not aware of
> the result that I got. It is science, which means that it is not a question
> of agreeing or disagreeing, but of understanding or refuting.
> Maybe you could study the following papers (if interested):
>
> Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem.
> Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40
>
> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in
> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381.
>
> B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th
> International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference,
> SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004.
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> (sane04)
>
> Plotinus PDF paper link:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf
> (Reference: Marchal, B, 2007, B. Marchal. A Purely Arithmetical, yet
> Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In
> Barry Cooper S. Löwe B., Kent T. F. and Sorbi A., editors, Computation and
> Logic in the Real World, Third Conference on Computability in Europe June
> 18-23, pages 263–273. Universita degli studi di Sienna, Dipartimento di
> Roberto Magari, 2007).
>
> The math part requires some background in mathematical logic including
> provability logics, like:
>
> G. Boolos. 1979, The Unprovability of Consistency, an Essay in Modal
> Logic,
> Cambridge University Press.
>
> G. Boolos. The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University Press,
> Cambridge, 1993.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> PS That is my second message. Possible comment next week.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Messaggio originale ----------
> Da: Bruno Marchal < marchal at ulb.ac.be>
> A: FIS Webinar < fis at listas.unizar.es>
> Data: 14 maggio 2018 alle 11.48
> Oggetto: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?
>
> Dear Arturo, Dear Colleagues,
>
>
> On 11 May 2018, at 18:36, tozziarturo at libero.it wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
> I'm sorry, but I cannot agree.
>
>
> I take a disagreement as a courtesy to pursue a conversation, which would
> be boring without them.
>
> But, what I say has been proved, peer reviewed by many, so it is perhaps
> more a matter of understanding than of agreeing.
>
> Or you are just telling me that you disbelieve in Mechanism. I prefer to
> remain agnostic.
>
> Mechanism is my working hypothesis. The idea is to take it seriously until
> we find a contradiction (internal or with the observation). It is a common
> by default type of hypothesis, held by many people, notably most
> materialist. But here I can prove that (even weak) materialism (the belief
> in ontological primary substances/matter) is inconsistent with (even weak)
> mechanism. See my papers for this, it is not entirely obvious.
>
>
>
> "eve­ntually I found a co­nceptually isomorphic explanation in
> ari­thmetic."  Isomorphy is a dangerous claim: the underliying mechanisms
> in biology could be something other than isomorphism (i.e., an Ehresmann
> connection in a hyperbolic manifold, as it occurs in gauge theories).
>
>
> Nothing in the observation point on either primary matter, nor on non
> mechanism. I am not sure why you think that Ehresmann connection or gauge
> theories are non mechanist. Actually Mechanism entails that the physical
> phenomenology cannot be mechanistic. You might confuse Mechanism in the
> cognitive science with digital physics.
>
> Digital physics (the idea that the physical reality is Turing emulable)
> does not make any sense. It entails mechanism, but mechanism entails the
> falsity of digital physics (see my paper or ask question: that is not
> obvious). So, with or without Mechanism, Digital Physics makes no sense.
>
>
>
>
> Futhermore, you simply change the name of the primum movens, the first
> principium: instead of calling it physics, you call it arithmetic.  This is
> as fideistic as the Carnap's physicalist claims.
>
> ?
>
> Physics assumes Arithmetic.
>
> Arithmetic do not assume physics.
>
> I can follow you with the idea that arithmetic still ask for some faith,
> but the amount is less than assuming a primary physical reality.
>
> Then, I have never heard about parents taking back their kids when they
> are taught elementary arithmetic.
>
> Also, with mechanism, we need to assume only a Turing universal machinery.
> With less than that, we get no universal machinery at all. With one of
> them, we get all of them. I simply use arithmetic because everyone are
> familiar with it. The theology and physics of machine do not depend on the
> choice of the universal system assumed at the start. It is an important new
> invariant of physics. Indeed, it determines entirely physics (always
> assuming Mechanism (aka computationalism).
>
>
>
>
> "If you think that a brain is not Turing emul­able, you might be the one
> to whom people can ask".  The burden of the final proof is yours, because
> your claim is stronger and less conventional than mine.
>
>
> Mechanism is a common, implicit or explicit, hypothesis among philosophers
> and scientists. It is a very old theory, already in “the question of
> Milinda” (a buddhist old text), and of course Descartes. Diderot identified
> it with rationalism. That makes sense, because to assume its negation
> consists in adding something for which we do not have any evidence (until
> now).
>
> Maybe you confuse computable (like automata) and semi-computable (like
> Turing machine). It is the existence of universal machine which is
> responsible for the incompleteness of theories, because there is no
> complete theory possible for anything enough rich to prove the existence of
> universal machine, like, amazingly enough, already very elementary
> arithmetic.
>
>
>
>   If you say that angels do exist, you have to provide the proof, it's not
> me that have to provide the proofs that they do not exist.
>
>
> But you are the one saying that “angels” exist, with “angels” pointing on
> something not “computable nor semi-computable” in nature or the mind …
>
> Mechanism is just the conjunction of the Church-Turing thesis (CT) + “yes
> doctor” (YD, the idea that we can survive with a brain digital prosthesis).
> A version of Mechanism is that there is no magic at play in our body.
>
> Then it seems that you claim a form of weak materialism, but there too,
> you are the one reifying the notion of primary-matter. That is a strong
> axiom in metaphysics, and there are no evidences for it. It is a natural
> extrapolation from the mundane experience, and we can understand why
> evolution has select such a belief, as we need to take the existence of
> prey and predator seriously. But this, as the Indian and Greeks understood
> a long time ago, does not provide any evidence of primary matter (a notion
> absent of any book in physics).
>
>
> "I will ask your evidence for the wave collapse." This is indeed a strange
> claim.  There are tons of published papers that demonstrate the wave
> collapse.
>
>
> ?
>
> You might give one reference. I have never found one. I would say that
> there are evidences for the wave only.
> The collapse is an addition to avoid the many-histories/worlds/minds,
> which follows from taking the wave seriously, as the experimental
> interference invites us to do. It introduces an non intelligible cut
> between the observed and the observer. It introduces indeterminacy and non
> locality. And there are many incompatible theories for the collapse, which
> is indeed rather non intelligible.
>
> Then, with Mechanism, the problem is that we have to extract the wave too,
> from *all* computations, and not just the quantum one. But that is what I
> have done: I extracted a quantum logic where machines have to expect it: a
> measure on all computations.
>
>
> You may discuss why and how it occurs, but you cannot negate this clear,
> polite, puzzling, experimentally-detected phenomenon.
>
>
> I would suggest you to study the work of Everett, who by using only the
> wave and Mechanism, explains entirely the appearance of a collapse without
> assuming it.
> Then, as I say, bu using mechanism, Everett missed that all computations
> are already in arithmetic, and that universal digital machine cannot detect
> in the first person way if they are emulated by any basic particular
> universal machine, and the wave itself required to be explained by digital
> information theory (aka computer science).
>
> Here, very often people misses that all computations are not just
> described in elementary arithmetic, but are realised, in virtue of the true
> relations among numbers. 99% of this has been found by Gödel, but Gödel
> missed the point, done later by Turing, Post, Church, Kleene, etc.
>
> I think that your theory has just analogies with quantum dynamics, and the
> analogy is the worst enemy of science.
>
> There is no analogy. When you say “yes doctor”, the digital brain in the
> head will not be an analogy. The rest followed by logic and elementary
> arithmetic.
>
>
>
> This seems the same type of theories that claim, for a simple analogy,
> that the brain and consciousness work at quantum levels.
>
> But if we postulate collapse, all the evidence becomes evidence for this.
> Yet, Abner Shimony has refuted, or show the amount of magic, needed to
> sustain that consciousness reduces the wave packet.
>
> You might study my papers, as all what I say just follow from CT + YD.
> (Church’s Thesis + “Yes doctor”). Sometimes I call it Indexical
> computationalism, to distinguish it from Digital physics (in metaphysics.
> Digital physics can be useful as an approximation in some branches of
> physics).
>
>
> Sorry, but diplomacy has never been my first virtue…
>
>
> No problem Arturo, as long as you don’t use insult or mockery, or ad
> hominem remarks, or things like that, which I take as “I have no argument
> but dislike what you did”.
>
> My feeling is that you might ignore the important difference between
> computable and semi-computable, and you might think that mechanism is a
> reductionism, when it is more like a vaccine against the reductionist
> conception of machine and numbers, enforced by the incompleteness theorem.
>
> You can guess that mechanism is less reductionist than non-mechanism, as
> the mechanist will say yes to his daughter when she want to marry a man
> with a prosthetic brain, where the non-mechanist will treat such a man as a
> less human, if not a( philosophical) zombie. Then you seem to assume a
> primary physical universe, which eventually do not make sense with the
> mechanist hypothesis.
>
> To sum up; I have done two things:
>
> - I have shown that (weak) mechanism is logically incompatible with (weak)
> materialism. So there is no problem with Materialists who reject Mechanism:
> as they should.
>
> _ I have shown, by keeping up with my mechanist hypothesis, how to recover
> the physical appearance and its stability from arithmetic (or anything
> Turing equivalent). That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics
> “in the head of the universal machine/number” with the observation. I did
> indeed extracted already the propositional physical logic, and got a
> quantum logic, which fits well with the one of the quantum physical
> logician (and is richer, so it makes new prediction). If mechanism is
> false, this provides in the Mong run a method to evaluate how much
> mechanism is wrong, and, who knows, to detect primary matter. But up to
> now, the empirical study of nature confirms Mechanism, more than
> Materialism.
>
> I don’t know if mechanism is true or false. But I will not hide that I
> find it elegant. Arithmetic gives the third person sharable information,
> and incompleteness + non definability gives a platonic sort of first person
> information “theology” which includes the physical (material) appearances
> as an unavoidable phenomenology. I predicted the many-worlds from mechanism
> and arithmetic much before I knew about quantum physics, but it took me 30
> years of works to derive precisely the quantum logical formalism. Needless
> to say, many open problems remains, but if we count the experimental
> evidences, they all add yup to mechanism, and none add up to (even weak)
> materialism. With Mechanism, Mark Burgin is right: information is not
> physical, but so is matter and the whole object of physics. Abstractly; the
> reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing
> machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from
> inside that universal mind. Again, I do not defend that claim. I show it
> testable only.
>
> Best regards,
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> venerdì, 11 maggio 2018, 06:03PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal
> marchal at ulb.ac.be :
>
> Dear Arturo,
>
>
> On 10 May 2018, at 15:23,   tozziarturo at libero.it  wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
> You state:
> "IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
> THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
> “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
> ...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of
> description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any
> change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the
> brain/body at that level of description".
>
> The problem of your account is the following:
> You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS”.
>
> Yes, indeed. It is my working hypothesis. The idea came when asking myself
> how an amoeba can build an amoeba. Then I discovered the solution provided
> by molecular genetics, and eventually I found a conceptually isomorphic
> explanation in arithmetic. Note that by making explicit the use of the
> level of description, my hypothesis is much weaker than most form of
> computationalism you can see in the literature. My reasoning would remain
> valid even if my body is the entire universe, described by quantum string
> theory with 10^(10^100) exact decimals.
>
> Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested
> and it is not empirically testable.
>
> I start from an hypothesis and show, on the contrary that it is testable.
> I predicted well before I knew anything on quantum mechanics that Mechanism
> entails that if we look at nature below our substitution level, we should
> find the trace of infinitely many computations, and only later did I
> discover that quantum mechanics, without the wave collapse, entails
> something very similar. But Mechanism leads also to a complete formalism
> for both quanta and qualia, and here too, the theory/hypothesis match with
> facts. As it predicts a richer formalism, some crucial tests remain to be
> done.
>
>
>
> You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not
> agree with it.
>
> I prefer to not say my opinion. I am not defending Mechanism. I show it
> testable. My goal consists in showing that we can do metaphysics with the
> scientific method, where we never claim that something is true, just that
> the evidences makes it plausible.
>
> The negation of the digital mechanist theory is usually considered as more
> “extra-ordinary”, as it implies either actual infinities, or some sort of
> magic. If you think that a brain is not Turing emulable, you might be the
> one to whom people can ask: what is your evidence? You might need to refer
> to something non computable in Nature and not recoverable through the first
> person indeterminacy. Note that mechanism entails that physics is NOT
> emulable by a Turing machine, and that consciousness is NOT emulable by a
> machine), so you need special sort of infinities. In fact,
> non-computationalism can only benefit from the study of computationalism,
> as it shows what is need for a theory to be a non-computationalist theory
> of mind.
>
>
>
> The current neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can be
> replaced by) a digital machine.
>
> At which level?
>
> Except for the famous but controversial “reduction of the wave packet” we
> still don’t have find in Nature a non computable process. That might exist,
> as we can “mathematically” find non computable solution to the Schroedinger
> equation, but those are not of the type we observe anywhere.
>
>
>
> In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not
> exist in our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.
>
>
> ?
>
> It falls down because you are making the contrary hypothesis, the
> hypothesis that something is not Turing emulable in nature, nor recoverable
> by the first person indeterminacy. That might be possible, but that has not
> been proved, nor even really defined. Your own hypothesis falls down by a
> similar argument than yours, but your own hypothesis is not as well clear
> as mine, unless you invoke the wave collapse? In that case, I will ask your
> evidence for the wave collapse.
>
> You cannot use the word “real”. That is the same mistake than using the
> word God. What is real is what we search. We cannot start from the answer.
>
> My feeling is that you confuse the universal machine, which is only
> partially computable, and confronted to a lot of non computable truth in
> arithmetic with the pre-Godelian conception of the machine, closer to to
> the notion now called automata. I guess I will have opportunity to make
> this clear.
>
> I would like to insist (and detailed perhaps later) that Mechanism is the
> less reductionist theory we can imagine. Indeed, a universal machine can
> refute all complete theories about itself. It is a sort of universal
> dissident. More intuitively, it does not qualify as zombie a man or woman
> who would have survived with some brain prosthesis. The moral question will
> eventually be this one: “do you accept that your son or daughter marry
> someone having got an artificial hippocampus prosthesis?
>
> Bruno
>
>
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal
> marchal at ulb.ac.be :
>
> (This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it,
> with minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first
> comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
>
>
> Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
>
>
> Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new
> computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
> This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the
> end of the week.
>
>
> On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mburgin at math.ucla.edu> wrote:
>
> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>
>                                       Is information physical?
>
>
> That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on.
>
> My result here is that
>
> *IF* indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
>
> *THEN*  “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
> “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
>
> The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from
> Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model"
> (logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
>
> Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of
> description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any
> change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the
> brain/body at that level of description.
>
> Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all
> physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology.
> Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete
> machinery. Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of
> arithmetic) is Turing complete (Turing Universal).
>
> The basic idea is that:
>
> 1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an
> arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And,
>
> 2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are
> necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in
> arithmetic.
>
> That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my
> actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I
> can describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
>
> Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we
> cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to
> recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano
> arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first
> and third person views (and six others!).
>
> I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this
> (including the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago.  I was
> about sure this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum
> mechanics, which verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical
> Mechanism, unless we add the controversial wave collapse reduction
> principle.
>
> The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many
> computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy
> becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter
> becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person
> indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a
> duplication, …) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that
> neither matter appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as
> the whole arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion as
> we know since Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics
> leaning to inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which
> implies the negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire
> physical universe, which I rather doubt).
>
> My opinion is presented below:
>
>
>    Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
>
>    The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong
> belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical
> reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter
> something that they call information.
>    When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information
> because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical,
> i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that
> information is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend
> that it is information because with the e-mail they receive information.
> The e-mail comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves,
> which are physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that
> information is physical.
>    However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical
> objects are only carriers or containers of information.
>    To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to
> say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the
> textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way,
> the textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same
> is true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical
> objects because all of them only contain information but are not
> information. For instance, as we know, different letters can contain the
> same information. Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any
> other text, then the letter and its copy will be different physical objects
> (physical things) but they will contain the same information.
>    Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge,
> data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on
> physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who
> think that information is physical.
>
>
> OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non
> physical objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem
> faced by dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover
> many dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies.
>
>
>
>
>    One more misleading property of information is that people can measure
> it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only
> physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous
> conclusion that information is physical. However, measuring information is
> essentially different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight.
> There are no “scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do
> this.
>
>
> OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.
>
> Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the
> “knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not
> tell me that this table is unreal”.
>
> I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams
> in which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that
> argument … until I wake up.
>
> When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument”
> illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A
> subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of
> consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of
> strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a
> primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it
> quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus).
>
> Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the
> world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very
> elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is
> already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a Universal
> Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all programs).
>
> So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we
> assume Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not
> *primarily* physical: it is all in the “head of the universal
> machine/number” (so to speak).
>
> And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there
> is a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation,
> and the physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took
> me more than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that
> there is no discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by
> incompleteness (formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive,
> sigma_1) propositions, with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it
> fits rather well.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Bruno
> _______________________________________________
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>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing list
> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Arturo Tozzi*
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing list
> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
>
>
> *Arturo Tozzi*
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing listFis at listas.unizar.eshttp://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
> --
> John Collier
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
> Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
>
> _______________________________________________
> Fis mailing list
> Fis at listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
____________________________________________________________

2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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