[Fis] A PRAGMATIC LANGUAGE FOR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES

Mon Sep 25 19:47:17 CEST 2017

Dear Arturo,

On 24 Sep 2017, at 21:35, tozziarturo at libero.it wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
>
>
> This text is brief is an effort to provide a viable solution for a  
> double concern:
>
> a)   1) the proliferation of models, theories and interpretations  
> that suggest pseudoscientific explanations (e.g., lacking the even  
> theoretical possibility of empiric testability) for not-observable  
> quantities, such as “God”, the “quantum brain”, “phenomenalistic”  
> accounts of experience, “holistic” accounts of “Nirvana-like”  
> psychological states, “observer-based information”, “string  
> theories”, “quantum loop gravity” theories, and so on.
>
> b)    2) the attitude of scientists to generalize their results  
> beyond their own experimental observations.  For example, it is easy  
> to read, in the CONCLUSIONS of good papers, claims such as: “we  
> demonstrated that some Primates acquired the vision of the red; this  
> occurred because this novel ability gave them the evolutionary  
> benefit to detect red soft fruits in the green bushes’ background”.
>
>
>
> In order to avoid the inconsistencies that undermine the (otherwise  
> good) legitimacy of scientific claims and to make them as accurate  
> as possible, here we provide a few suggestions concerning the very  
> structure of scientific propositions.
>
> Our formulation of the required language for scientific propositions  
> wants to be as simple as possible and, at the same time, to  
> encompass syntactic, semantic and pragmatic concerns.  We take into  
> account the claims of several Authors and sources who tackled the  
> difficult issue to cope with the structure of scientific language:  
> Galileo, Mach, Frege, Brower, Carnap, Popper, Quine, Godel, Zermelo  
> and Fraenkel, Brigdman, Feyerabend, Kellogg and Bourland, Kripke,  
> Gadamer, McGinn, Badiou.
>
>
>
> We suggest, so as to describe facts and observables of our physical  
> and social environment, to make use of phrases written or spoken  
> according to the following rules (provided in sparse order):
>
>
>
> 1)    1)   Never use the verb “to be”, including all its  
> conjugations, contractions and archaic forms.  Indeed, the misuse of  
> this verb might give rise to a “deity mode of speech” that allows  
> people “to transform their opinions magically into god-like  
> pronouncements on the nature of things” (Kellogg and Bourland,  
> 1990-91)
>

I think I understand. But it is hard in practice to avoid existential  
words. I would say: be clear of what is assumed, and what is derived,  
and if the derivation is ontological or phenomenological. "to be" has  
many meanings, and the effort must be to reason validly with each of  
the possible meaning. (cf Frege, Carnap, Quine, Godel, Zermelo and  
Fraenkel).

> 2)    2)   Clearly define the universe of discourse in which your  
> proposition is located.
>

Yes, that is important. But some domain, like metaphysics or theology  
will have multidisciplinar facets. 1) above still applies.

> 3)    3)  Define your concepts not in abstract terms, but in terms  
> either of observables, or, if observables are not properly  
> definable, in a language as closest to observable quantities as  
> possible.
>
I agree. But that should be only on "observable in principle". How we  
could kill the next good theory, which not only predict better, but  
linked the many observable better.

Here, if doing metaphysics, it is important to distinguish,  
observable, believable, knowable, justifiable and ... true.

> 4)    4)   Do not compare and mix sets and subsets in the same  
> context (e.g., cat and feline).
>
And don't confuse A included in B, with B included in A, like the  
paper justifying prohibition of "drugs" do systematically.

> 5)    5)   Do not use the first order logic (based on universals  
> described in the very premises of the propositions), rather describe  
> just the relationships between the observables you are coping with.
>
Why? First order logic is the best tool to avoid metaphysical baggage.  
But it is OK to use set theory or second order logic. It will really  
depends on the goal.

> 6)    6)   Use (at least qualitative) terms that indicate the  
> probability of an event.
>

Or laws that such probabilities have to conform with. Some theories  
can predict higher order relation between measurable numbers.

> 7)    7)   Describe events or things that are (at least in  
> principle) testable.
>

OK. That's imporant too.

> Otherwise, state clearly that yours is just a speculation.
>

In the case of "my theory", it is a subtheory of all theories in  
physics, and of most of math. So it is obviously the less speculative  
theory, except for one strong axiom, two actually (Church thesis, and  
the existence of a digital substitution level). Some would argued that  
the theory of evolution would not make sense without assuming some  
mechanist subtitution level, to get notably the redundancy and the  
error tolerance).

In metaphysics, when aboarded with the scientific attitude, we must be  
aware that Aristotle's assumption of the existence of a primary  
physical universe (physicalism) is a speculation until now, when we  
can test it against mechanism. A bit like with the violation of Bell's  
inequality which makes possible concludes "action-at-a-distance OR  
superposition propagate on their environments (many-histories/ 
worlds)". Metaphysics enters the experimental realm, and not just  
through physics.

>
>
> 8)    8)   Do not generalize your descriptions, but take into  
> account just the specific content of what you are assessing.
>

To talk about laws and make prediction, we have to generalize. Without  
generalization, there is no testing possible.

> 9)    9)   Be as vague as possible about cause/effect relationships.
>

?

Be valid about them, which asks for not being too much vague. I think.  
Vague, means generalization. I think I have to disagree with 8) and 9)  
for the same reason.

> 1010)      10)   Do not make inferences not supported by your data.
>

I agree.

> 11)        11)    Do not use too formal or specialized languages.
>

Use them appropriately. I would just say. depending on the hypothesis  
and the domain, formal things (like physical objects notably) are the  
things about which we theorize, and when people want the real things,  
you have to name a cat a cat, and carbon dioxyde CO_2.

> 12)          12)    Try you hidden your own theory-laden approach  
> and your personal considerations.
>

Absolutely.

>
>
>
>
> Here we provide a few practical examples.
>
>
>
> John is nice.
>
> A lot of people state that John looks pleasant.
>
>
>
> E=mc2
>
> In our Universe, it has been demonstrated that a given  
> experimentally measured value of energy corresponds to a  
> experimentally measured value of mass at rest, multiplied for the  
> fixed value of the speed light constant.
>

E = mc^2 is more vague, and to say "in our Universe .." should be: "in  
our current theory of the universe (which is still inconsistent (cf  
gravity and quantum)), theoiry coming from many (but finite) number of  
evidences, we assume that a given experimentally measured value of  
energy corresponds to a experimentally measured value of mass at rest,  
multiplied for the fixed value of the speed light constant.

More or less OK, although some translation seems more jargon in some,  
and remind me of political correctness.

> The brain is equipped with a functional and anatomical network  
> consisting of edges and nodes, termed the connectome.
>
> When researchers experimentally assess brain activity and anatomy in  
> terms of network theory, they find anatomical and functional  
> structures that fully fit their theoretical framework and that they  
> term the “connectome”.
>
>
>
> John is ill, because he took the flu.
>
> John suffers an alteration of his statistically normal biological  
> parameters, because his Medical Doctor diagnosed, based on clinical  
> and epidemiological findings, the highly-probable occurrence of an  
> infection due to the Influenza virus.
>

This one!

>
>
> Scientific studies of the brain must take into account the first- 
> person, epistemological phenomenalistic standpoint, because the  
> latter is the only way to gain sure knowledge.
>
> Some scientists and philosophers believe, in touch with the accounts  
> of the philosophical mainstream of the “phenomenalism”, that the  
> better way to gain knowledge from neuroscientific experimental  
> procedures is to assess the subjective first-person account, rather  
> than the individual-unrelated experimental findings detectable by  
> objective operational procedures.
>

Here the problem is that we have not yet the solution of the mind-body  
problem, and many implicit assumptions are made, in both sentences.
I certainly want a dentist taking into account the phenomenal pain  
which would occur for his patient if he does not use some pain killer  
in the process.

Also, if the subject of study is the first person experience, it is  
obvious we have to compile many experiential reports, and try to  
interpret them in some way.

Thank you for the effort. Some of your points are very important.  
Others are more debatable, I would say.

Best regards.

Bruno

>
>
>
>
> REFERENCES
>
> 1)      Badiou A. 2005.  Being and Event, transl. by Oliver Feltham,  
> New York: Continuum.
>
> 2)      Brigdman PW.  1959. The Way Things Are. Cambridge, Mass:  
> Harvard University Press.
>
> 3)      Brouwer LEJ. 1976. Collected Works, Vol. II, Amsterdam:  
> North-Holland.
>
> 4)      Carnap R.  1947. Meaning and Necessity: a Study in Semantics  
> and Modal Logic. University of Chicago Press, 1957.
>
> 5)      Feyerabend PK. 1981.  Realism, Rationalism and Scientific  
> Method: Philosophical papers, Volume 1.
>
> 6)      Frege G.  1879.  Concept Notation, the Formal Language of  
> the Pure Thought like that of Arithmetics.
>
> 7)      Galileo G. 1932. Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del  
> mondo.
>
> 8)      Godel K. 1940. The Consistency of the Axiom of Choice and of  
> the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis with the Axioms of Set Theory.  
> Princeton University Press.
>
> 9)      Kellogg EW. Bourland Jr DD.  1990-91. Working with E-Prime:  
> Some Practical Notes.  Etc. 47 (4): 376-392.
>
> 10)  Kripke S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard  
> University Press.
>
> 11)  Mach E. 1897. The Analysis of Sensations.
>
> 12)  McGinn C. 2004. Consciousness and Its Objects. Oxford  
> University Press.
>
> 13)  Popper K. 1963. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of  
> Scientific Knowledge.
>
> 14)  Quine WVO. 1963. Set Theory and Its Logic. Harvard Univ. Press,  
> 1969.
>
> 15)  Gadamer H-G. 1981. Reason in the Age of Science. Trans. by  
> Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
>
> 16)  Zermelo E., Ebbinghaus H-D; Fraser CG, Kanamori A.  2013. eds.,  
> Ernst Zermelo—collected works. Vol. I. Set theory, miscellanea,  
> Schriften der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Klasse der  
> Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 21, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
>
>
>
>
>
> If you want to quote this manuscript, please write:
>
> Tozzi A.  2017.  A pragmatic language for scientific purposes.   
> ViXra, http://vixra.org/abs/1709.0362
>
>
>
>
> Arturo Tozzi
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>
> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>
> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>
> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>
>
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