[Fis] _ Reply to Loet (A Priori Modeling)

Marcus Abundis 55mrcs at gmail.com
Mon Jun 27 12:43:25 CEST 2016

Dear Loet,

    I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I
often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have
difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.

>[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
> is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
> to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
> information". <
• Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or
meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.

> Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
> of a system of reference; for example, an observer.<
• It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that you
suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not
require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately

>Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<
> ("a priori"). <
• I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions –
for example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, this is
not truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional need innate to
any “system of relating“ has bearing. For example, a single Oxygen atom has
a compelling/innate need to react with other elements, just as any agent is
compelled to react to “nutrients.“ Both imply dimensional expectations, no?
(obviously – of different orders/types).

> In my opinion, a "real theory of meaning" should enable <
> us to specify/measure meaning as redundancy / reduction <
> of uncertainty given . . . I took this further in . . . <
> The Self-Organization of Meaning and the Reflexive . . .<
• My weak grasp of the concepts in this paper leads me to think you are
actually modeling the “processing of meaning,“ related-to-but-distinct-from
“generating meaning“ that I target. I also vaguely recall(?) in an offline
exchange I asked you if you saw this paper as presenting a “theory of
meaning“ and you answered “No.“

• In your later response to Pedro, I found your citation matrix a
interesting example of your thinking, but still too “high-order“ for my
reductive-but-meaningful aim. Your matrix (for me) presents an essential
complexity of high-order views, but in itself it is too simple to detail
*how* a citation is *meaningfully used.* Still, an intriguing concept that
might be meaningfully expanded? Perhaps there are more useful details in
the additional papers you list, which I have not had a chance to explore.

• Your last post then reinforces my sense you are actually exploring the
processing of meaning, rather than the generation of meaning. Diverse
“systems of relating“ you name seem to be “on point“ and
> can be considered as a semantic domain (Maturana,1978)<
But I find this unsatisfying as exactly *what(s)* is being related, and
exactly *how* it is being related, does not seem to be covered. It is in
precisely naming those “whats“ and “hows“ that true a priori models become
possible. For example, a *system of relating* between “a hominid and a
rock“ affords certain types of meaning, equally a *system of relating*
between “the same rock and an ant“ affords wholly different types of
meaning – all in regards to an identical (autonomous) rock.
> the same information is delineated differently and <
> considered from a different perspective <
arguing for essential subjectivity? This seems to point to my use of delta
O and delta S in the video.

• I am unsure if we are in: radical agreement, radical disagreement, or if
we just name subtle differences. . . but I thought I should at least
attempt a reply to your posts and see what ensues.
> In my opinion, the task is to specify mechanisms which <
> generate redundancy <
This leads me to believe we essentially agree but focus on different levels
of operation and complexity. Any thoughts you have to share are appreciated.


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