[Fis] "no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced"

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

Dear List,

A few days ago Joseph Brenner wrote the following :

> … I conclude that no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced to address the essential aspects of life, mind, and information. That information has dual aspects has been more or less explicit in everything I have tried to write in the last eight years.

This has bothered me from a number of perspectives, it sounds reasonable but is in fact deeply flawed. I worry that others may take it seriously and so I step from the shadows. The argument seems to be an advocacy of dualism and information mysterianism, but I doubt that Joe sees it this way.

For example, consider the biophysical motions necessarily involved in sensation, thought, and consideration when going to the store and the selective motions when reaching the store. Joe suggests that the dual aspects of information in a conventional physics is sufficient to explain these actions or motions, I simply cannot accept this. It is rather like saying that gravitation and electromagnetism are dual aspects of matter - and even though we have two clear and mathematical theories of each no physicist believes that this is the case.

I am especially concerned with the introduction here of the dismissive idea of “doubtful physical concepts” that seem to me to open the door of judgementalism.

As a reminder, Relativity was once considered a “doubtful physical concept.”

Can anyone defend Joe’s position?

Regards,
Steven

--
    Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611
    http://iase.info <http://iase.info/>


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