[Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 23, Issue 24

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Loet,


On 22 Feb 2016, at 20:36, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> All worldviews begin in a miracle. No exceptions.
>
>
> I agree. Nevertheless, we should, and can, minimize the miracle.
>
> Why would one need a worldview?

We need some theory, and around the mind-body problem or the first  
person/third person views relation problem (my subject) at some point  
we must be aware of the difference of conception between Aristotle and  
Plato. Roughly speaking:

Aristotle: reality is what we see, observe, measure, etc.
Plato: what we see might be only a symptom of a simpler reality (like  
numbers for example).

The digital mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science seems to favor a  
lot Plato, if not Pythagorus.



> The whole assumption of an order as a Given (in a Revelation) is  
> religious.

What would it mean to do (fundamental) research if we do not postulate  
some reality?

The beauty is that once we assume mechanism, we are led to a very  
minimal ontologic assumption/ precisely the following theory will do:  
(classical or intuitinist logic +

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

where s(x) denotes the intended x + 1. I put the induction axioms  
already in the epistemology.



> Order is always constructed (by us) and can/needs to be explained.


OK, but then we need a theory of "us", and many are OK with the  
mechanist theory, especially since we can use some theorem in logic to  
show that universal machine defeat all reductionist theory: they  
already know that they have a soul which is not a machine, with the  
soul defined by the conjunction of truth and representation.




>
> No “harmonia praestabilita”, but ex post. No endpoint omega. No  
> cosmology, but chaology.

To have chaos, you need to assume the axioms given above (or Turing  
equivalent one).



>
> With due respect for those of you who wish to hold on to religion or  
> nature as a given; however, vaguely defined.

The religion of the ideally correct machine is platonist: god is a  
nickname for the ultimate truth that we search, and in that theory,  
god is not omniscient, not omnipotent, cannot be invoked in reasoning,  
explanation and any terrestrial affairs, ...
Machine can have personal revelation, but cannot prove or communicate  
them rationally. But they can prove that: they can prove that if God  
exist, then it has no name, is simple, etc.
In fact the nuances brought by incompleteness make that machine  
theology quasi identical with the discourse of Moderatus of Gades, (a  
neopythagorean of the first century), Plotinus (neoplatonist, third  
century).

Machines are born "theological": they quickly intuit (produce as true  
without proving) that truth extends properly reason, when looking  
inward in the Gödel manner. There is an annulus of "surrationalism"  
between rationalism and irrationalism. It plays a key role in the  
explanation of consciousness, qualia, pain, etc, which can also be  
personally revealed, but not in a provable way.

Then such theology contains physics, and so can be tested by comparing  
with nature. Up to now, it fits rather well. If Mechanism is false,  
this approach gives experimental tools to measure our degree of non- 
mechanism.
Note that as a scientist, I don't use or mention any public  
revelation, which in my opinion, are only pseudo-religious political  
methods to control people (basically no relation with the antic  
theology of Plato which was banished by such authorities).

Best,

Bruno




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