[Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning

Thu Dec 29 01:46:40 CET 2016

I meant to send this not only to Karl (which I did)  but to Alex and to the rest of the group as well.

> What  a fascinating analysis into the many aspects of gestalt, Karl!
> 
>  I would like to comment on your statement  that “the idea of gestalt transcends the language in which it can be said. In linguistic parlance, the idea is a deep structure which exists in different cultures, each of which give it a differing superficial structure, like the French say chaise for chair.”
> I  was doing some aimless internet drifting when I came across the following remarks by Perry Link on the problem of translation from Chinese to English (from a review he wrote for the NY Review of Books on the most recent and best translation of the Chinese classic novel Chin Ping Mei):
> 
>  In teaching Chinese-language courses to American students, which I have done about thirty times, perhaps the most anguishing question I get is “Professor Link, what is the Chinese word for ______?” I am always tempted to say the question makes no sense. Anyone who knows two languages moderately well knows that it is rare for words to match up perfectly, and for languages as far apart as Chinese and English, in which even grammatical categories are conceived differently, strict equivalence is not possible. Book is not shu, because shu, like all Chinese nouns, is conceived as an abstraction, more like “bookness,” and to say “a book” you have to say, “one volume of bookness.” Moreover shu, but not book, can mean “writing,” “letter,” or “calligraphy.” On the other hand you can “book a room” in English; you can’t shu one in Chinese. I tell my students that there are only two kinds of words they can safely regard as equivalents: words for numbers (excepting integers under five, the words for which have too many other uses) and words that are invented expressly for the purpose of serving as equivalents, like xindiantu (heart-electric-chart) for “electrocardiogram.” I tell them their goal in Chinese class should be to set aside English and get started with thinking in Chinese.
> 
> With reference to Wittgenstein, perhaps the dilemma facing the translator from Chinese to English is that the linguistic gap is not between differing naming systems but between different language games — in other words the players can’t agree on the rules of the game they are playing! Although Wittgenstein exhorts us to describe and not explain if we insist on doing proper philosophy, I would suggest that even basic descriptions cannot be completely equivalent across linguistic barriers because of the differing cultural backgrounds that underlie most actual language use. Thus the Chinese person and the English person may both recognize the smiley face as human, but how they view the place of the human within the larger community of humans will no  doubt be very different.
> 
> Then I came across the following passages concerning the nature of  the self  from (of all things) a Vedadatabase:  
>> tvam ādyaḥ puruṣaḥ sākṣād
>>  īśvaraḥ prakṛteḥ paraḥ
>> māyāṁ vyudasya cic-chaktyā
>>  kaivalye sthita ātmani
>> Synonyms: 
>> tvam <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=tvam> ādyaḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=adyah> — You are the original; puruṣaḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=purusah> — the enjoying personality; sākṣāt <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=saksat> — directly; īśvaraḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=isvarah> — the controller; prakṛteḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=prakrteh> — of material nature; paraḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=parah> — transcendental; māyām <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=mayam> — the material energy; vyudasya <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=vyudasya> — one who has thrown aside; cit <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=cit>-śaktyā <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=saktya> — by dint of internal potency; kaivalye <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=kaivalye> — in pure eternal knowledge and bliss; sthitaḥ <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=sthitah> — placed; ātmani <http://vedabase.com/en/synonyms-index?original=atmani> — own self.
>> Translation: 
>> You are the original Personality of Godhead who expands Himself all over the creations and is transcendental to material energy. You have cast away the effects of the material energy by dint of Your spiritual potency. You are always situated in eternal bliss and transcendental knowledge.
> 
> I discovered this site from my memory of the Sanskrit word TVAM, which I recalled from my teaching of comparative religions years ago, with reference to a passage where the teacher tells the student to imagine something tangible and substantial, and then imagine dividing it into smaller and smaller pieces. At some point in time the student will reach something which cannot further be divided. That will be the Self. Tat Tvam Asi — That art thou, Sepatuku.
> 
> I freely admit that a non-Indian person can ultimately understand this concept — this gestalt — but I am not sure if this understanding is linguistic, cultural, personal or philosophical. Furthermore, in what way does this understanding effect that person’s way of  thinking and being? Such ideas matter. Does this mean that they are part of the deep structure that Karl mentions re Chomsky’s distinction? For me to move from grammatical surface structure to  grammatical deep structure I  need specific rules to do so and thus be understood. But what about significantly deeper philosophical meaning? How is it communicated? Does it require different additional rules? Or different experiences?
> 
> Steve Bindeman

> On Dec 28, 2016, at 2:44 PM, Karl Javorszky <karl.javorszky at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Gestalt
> 
>  
> Alex asks to contribute to his writing on Gestalt, based on Vedic teachings relating to how we memorise texts. Not knowing anything about the Vedic part of it, let me summarise what used to be accepted wisdom on Gestalt in psychology: this without any claim to completeness or correctness or other virtues.
> 
> 
> 
> Gestalt is “what makes a whole /to be worth, to have a value/ more than the sum of its parts” (Ehrenfels), we have been taught, and to my knowledge there is no better approach accepted yet. In this respect, Gestalt resembles life, because there is a difference between a dead body and that same organism as a living one, and between a random pattern of pixels black on a screen and the picture of a face, made up by the same number of pixels black. We had learnt that only a living organism can perceive a Gestalt, because it is the active collaboration of constituents that join them together into something recognisable, and this activity comes not from the objects on the scene but is performed by the spectator. So much the teachings of old times. Now with all kinds of recognising software, this approach no more stands. Artificial intelligence machines project, match and detect patterns among pixels or other data points, be they fingerprints, voice recordings or contact habits. They perform the pattern-detection part of peripheral ganglia, including the recognition of Gestalts. Ehrenfels has introduced a logic with some disregard to accepted rules of additivity, causing a deep alienation between psychology and mathematics, the consequences of which we may hopefully help to clean up here in this FIS.
> 
> 
> 
> The ability to look a Gestalt into objects has transformed into the ability of inanimate objects to constitute a Gestalt, which we can or cannot perceive. Are these animistic concepts of the world, where the objects have properties, not we look their properties into them? If the objects, e.g. pixels on a screen, are a Gestalt, constitute momentarily a constellation among them into that what is a Gestalt, then the objects have an immanent property of relations among each other, which is transportable across individuals and species. (The definition of objectivity is that the stimulus causes comparable reactions across individuals and across cultures.) Children and animals react differently to pictures of a circle and of two dots, if these represent the archetype of a face. There appears to exist an immanent property of pixels that the nervous system utilises. In other words: it is a property of a set that it is ordered. There exists the logical category of possible orders, among which some can be realised concurrently. Some of the combinations of the possible orders will be so much more probable than others that they will create a density in a probability space. Coordinates for pixels in forms that resemble a Gestalt of a face with two eyes will exist as a delineated class of possible realisations. The coordinates are the result of superior probabilities of combinations of orders to appear, relative to the other orders that also produce coordinates for pixels, but not so frequently, consistently and reliably. 
> 
> 
> 
> Not only must the nervous system be prepared to recognise a state of the world (something is looking at me) in the circle with two dots in it, but the biological reality must also produce this pattern in abundance. The recognition of the smiley is done by the central nervous system, which operates by means of impulses of -70 mV; these are uniform but place-bound and sequenced in time. As such they resemble N. The production of the head and the eyes is done while the butterfly is still fluid, so the same principle is present also in the humeral fluids of the body. The same Gestalt is produced in two different environments. Producing a smiley in a biochemical factory and perceiving it as an electric pattern means that the idea of a smiley exists, irrespective of how we express it in terms of relations of symbols among each other. We can express the idea of a smiley by means of elements that can be of many kinds and be anywhere; and we can express the same idea also by means of uniform units that have fixed topological positions by being sequenced among each other. The idea of this Gestalt transcends the languages in which it can be said. In linguistic parlance, the idea is a deep structure which exists in differing cultures, each of which give it a differing superficial structure, like the French say chaise to chair. We are again with the classical problem of having an n of N that is to be identified consistently across describing languages, here seen as enumerating systems. 
> 
> 
> 
> The archetype apparently indeed does exist, and it must be of a simple, every-day, almost axiomatic truth. The algorithms that produce the coordinates of a Gestalt are of course some specific of the tautologies that make up the naming system. The necessary tautology can be of no other form but the result of very simple, basic rules that apply as well in fluid environments, as well in solid systems of coordinates. The system of rules that produces tautologies must have hierarchies, where references to a circle and two dots within are more elementary, therefore produce realisations more frequently than the more subtle, which children and animals do not recognise that instinctively. The tautology, and this is what Wittgenstein underlined, is in the grammar of what can be said, and can be of no news itself. Introducing the new grammatical rule that order competition is a logical pastime every bit as legitimate as addition and multiplication, one is permitted to say new sentences in a grammatically correct, legitimate fashion. These sentences may sound strange at first, prove utile with time, but they cannot convey anything new. We have just not realised it so far, but it has always been so and will remain always so, being a meaningless tautology, otherwise known as a Principle of Nature.
> 
> 
> 
> The Aha! experience gives us a good approach to Gestalt. There is a moment of constriction when one realises a Gestalt: after the discovery of its principle (explanation, meaning), the previous puzzle occupies less room. 
> 
> 
> 
> The ancient Vedic gurus were not in a position to come up with an explanation for the Gestalt, because one needs a computer to get an overview of the possible patterns. One does not stumble upon the central element and the two agglomeration points by chance. 
> 
> 
> 
> If any logical relation is possible, then among all possible of them, the simpler are more frequently present. If the idea of Archetype A, circle with two dots in it, is so common that it gets hard-wired in recognition instincts and used as a basic form-giving structuring pattern, then it has something to do with basic truths of logic, like: a+b=c. The basic, fundamental, simple part of the invention could have come from the creators of Zero. They simply did not possess the computing power, but if they had, they would have tabulated, what is where and when, involving into their research also other objects than the stars, in a more general fashion.
> 
> 
> 
> As to the memorising of texts, it appears that a specific pattern of humoral fluids is that what carries the content of the memory. In the same emotional state one has easier access to patterns of excitations that were once present. The theory of “ausgeschliffenen Bahnen” (paths well-trodden) is very old and keeps its credibility, as a general idea. It would be a pleasure to contribute to research into packaging and unpackaging specific excitation patterns and humoral states.
> 
> 
> 
> Wishing you all the best with your project on the theory of thinking in a historic perspective!
> 
> 
> 
> Karl
> 
> 
> 2016-12-24 14:01 GMT+01:00 Alex Hankey <alexhankey at gmail.com <mailto:alexhankey at gmail.com>>:
> RE: "The same situation is here with gravitation. We have a name for
> it, can measure it and integrate the concept - more or less seamlessly
> – into a general explanation. We just do not know, in an
> epistemological sense, what gravitation is. We have to take the
> normative power of the factual seriously and admit that we may have
> problems in the naming of an observed fact. This does not absolve us
> from the task of philosophers, that is, to try to understand and find
> good explanations for the facts that we perceive and to our thoughts
> about the perceptions and the facts.
> 
> Dear Karl,
> 
> I do not quite see how the point you are making here differs from the
> very simple statement that 'we do not know what anything in the
> physical world is' (where the word 'is' is being used in some loosely
> defined Absolute sense). We only know how it interacts and how it
> behaves in given experimental / experiential situations.
> 
> Of course in the case of sugar (sucrose, for example) we know what it
> is as crystals we see, as something we taste, use to sweeten our
> desserts, and our tea / coffee etc., and its chemical structure. I am
> then comfortable with the feeling that I 'know what sugar is'. The
> same applies to a superconductor or a Josephson junction between two
> superconductors.
> 
> In the case of elementary particles, we say that 'a free electron is a
> spin 1/2 representation of the Poincare Group', and this gives it a
> meaning of a slightly more precise kind than sugar. It becomes a
> precisely stated element of mathematics, that I personally equate with
> a kind of 'Platonic Form'.
> 
> Equally in my heart, I feel that I have quite a good idea of what
> 'goodness' is, and I am equally clear that the IS - Daesh members who
> murder innocent victims in Iraq / Syria etc. do not.
> 
> We communicate on a day to day basis taking these things for granted.
> Am I missing something?
> 
> I would sincerely like to know if I am, because I am about to write up
> an account of cognition of gestalts from the perspective of the
> ancient Vedic science of Shiksha concerning the memorization and
> understanding of texts, and I would like to get it as water-tight as
> possible.
> 
> PLEASE comment!!
> 
> Best wishes for Christmas, New Year and the Holiday season,
> 
> Alex
> 
> P.S. You say that 'Wittgenstein begot Frege', but surely Frege was
> completing his work just when Russell discovered his paradox at the
> end of writing the Principia with Whitehead, which Wiki say was
> published, 1910, 1912 and 1913, whereas Wittgenstein wrote his
> Tractatus while a prisoner of war in Italy in 1917-18.
> 
> On 24/12/2016, Karl Javorszky <karl.javorszky at gmail.com <mailto:karl.javorszky at gmail.com>> wrote:
> > Information and Wittgenstein
> >
> >
> >
> > We should keep the self-evident in focus and refrain from descending into a
> > philosophical nihilism. We are, after all, reasonable people, who are able
> > to use our intelligence while communicating, and usually we understand each
> > other quite well. The idea, that information is just a mental creation,
> > evades the point: conceding that information is only a mental image, then
> > what is that which determines, which amino acid comes to which place and is
> > apparently contained in the sequence of the DNA triplets? If information is
> > just an erroneous concept, then what is that what we receive as we ask at
> > the airport, which gate to go for boarding?
> >
> > No, information does exist and we do use it day by day. Shannon has
> > developed a method of repeatedly bifurcating a portion of N until finding
> > that n of N that corresponds to the same n of which the sender encoded the
> > search pattern for the receiver. The task lies not in negating the
> > existence of the phaenomenon, but in proposing a more elegant and for
> > biology useful explanation of the phaenomenon. The object of the game is
> > still the same: identifying an n of N.
> >
> > The same situation is here with gravitation. We have a name for it, can
> > measure it and integrate the concept - more or less seamlessly – into a
> > general explanation. We just do not know, in an epistemological sense, what
> > gravitation is. We have to take the normative power of the factual
> > seriously and admit that we may have problems in the naming of an observed
> > fact. This does not absolve us from the task of philosophers, that is, to
> > try to understand and find good explanations for the facts that we perceive
> > and to our thoughts about the perceptions and the facts.
> >
> > Adorno summarised the critique on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, by saying, that
> > W. apparently had not read the job description of a philosopher carefully
> > enough: the task is not to investigate that what can be said exactly about
> > a subject that is well known to all, but the task is to chisel away the
> > border separating that what can be only felt and that what can be expressed
> > understandably. This is the envy speaking of someone who suffered an
> > Oedipus tragedy. Socrates said that the perpetrator of a crime suffers more
> > than the victim, and post-war German philosophy understandably had no time
> > to be interested in rules of exact speech. The grammar of the logical
> > language, as a subject for serious study, was swept aside by historical
> > cataclysms, although Wittgenstein begot Frege and Carnap who begot von
> > Neumann and Boole who begot Shannon and Chomsky. That he in his later life
> > put aside his epoch-generating work is completely in the consequence of
> > what he had said. It is not disowning the ladder one has built to climb up
> > a level of abstraction while doing a cartography of what exact talking
> > really means, but a wise and truthful modesty of an artist who had
> > fabricated a tool for a specific project. No self-respecting artist would
> > want to be remembered for a practical tool he had assembled for a specific
> > task. Roughly citing, he says so much: those who have understood what is
> > written here, may throw [this book] away, like one has no need for a ladder
> > after one has climbed a level. Having found out how the technical people
> > speak (or should speak), he withdraws from that field, having clarified the
> > rules of exact thinking, closing the subject in a conclusive fashion for
> > about 4 generations, and acts in later life as if precognisant of Adorno’s
> > words.
> >
> > Information is a connection of a symbol with a different symbol, if this
> > state of the world can have a background and alternatives. If something can
> > be otherwise, then the information is contained in the enumeration of the
> > cases of being otherwise.
> >
> > By the use of computers, we can now create a whole topography and
> > dramaturgy of exact speech. Had we the creativity of the Greeks, we would
> > write a comedy, performed in public, by actors and narrators. The title
> > could be: “All acting dutifully, striving their right place, catharsia are
> > inevitable”. The best youth of Sparta, Athens etc. would compete for
> > prominent places in diverse disciplines, but the results are not
> > satisfactory, as the debate emerges, which of the disciplines are above the
> > others. The wise people of Attica have come up with a perpetual compromise,
> > its main points repeatedly summarised by the chorus, ruling that being
> > constantly underway between both correct positions: p1 in discipline d1 and
> > position p2 in discipline d2, is the divine sign of a noble character. If
> > every athlete follows the same rule, imagine the traffic jams on the stage
> > of the amphitheatre! The Greeks would have built an elaborate system of
> > philosophy about the predictable collisions among actors representing
> > athletes who have attended many of the concourses. They could have come up
> > with specific names for typical results and would have named the
> > agglomerations “elements” and “isotopes” that differ among each other on
> > how many of the actors are glued together for lack of space to pass
> > through, where too many paths cross, and on the form of the squeeze they
> > constitute. They would no doubt have categorised and sub-classified and
> > tabulated the inevitable melee that comes from having competing
> > requirements to serve, a subject not far from their preoccupations with
> > logic and predictable, consistent, rule observing behaviour by all, that by
> > its very nature creates cooperation and conflict, destruction and growth.
> >
> > As long as the background and the alternatives to the statements, that
> > describe what is the case, are conceptually discouraged or disallowed, it
> > appears not very easy to use the term “information” in a consistent
> > fashion. Information describes that what is not the case. (The DNA
> > eliminates all the alternatives to that specific amino acid on that
> > specific place; we have received information by knowing all those gates
> > where we will not board the plane.)
> >
> >
> >
> > Thank you for this enjoyable year.
> >
> > Karl
> >
> >
> >
> > 2016-12-24 2 <tel:2016-12-24%202>:39 GMT+01:00 Louis H Kauffman <kauffman at uic.edu <mailto:kauffman at uic.edu>>:
> >
> >> Dear Steve,
> >> You write
> >> "But in later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of
> >> relating propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not
> >> in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once
> >> the
> >> validity of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and
> >> unambiguous way is questioned, not much is left.”
> >>
> >> I do not think that the issue of proof was foremost for Wittgenstein.
> >> Rather, he later understood that a pure mirroring of language and world
> >> was
> >> untenable and worked directly with language and its use to show how
> >> complex
> >> was the actuality. The result is that one can still read the Tractatus
> >> meaningfully, knowing that it states and discusses an ideal of (formal)
> >> language and a view of the world so created that is necessarily limited.
> >> Indeed the later Wittgenstein and the Tractatus come together at the
> >> point
> >> of the Tractatus showing how meagre is that ‘that can be said’ from its
> >> mirrored and logical point of view.
> >> The Tractatus indicates its own incompleteness, and in do doing
> >> invalidates its use by the logical positivists as a model for the
> >> performance of science. It was in this background that (through Goedel)
> >> the
> >> Incompleteness Theorem arose in the midst of the Vienna Circle. And here
> >> we
> >> are in a world generated by formal computer languages, facing the
> >> uncertainties of models that are sensitive enough (as in economics and
> >> social science) to cross the boundary and affect what is to be modeled.
> >> Best,
> >> Lou Kauffman
> >>
> >> On Dec 23, 2016, at 11:27 AM, steven bindeman <bindeman1 at verizon.net <mailto:bindeman1 at verizon.net>>
> >> wrote:
> >>
> >> I would like to contribute to the current ongoing discussion regarding
> >> the
> >> relation between information and meaning. I agree with Dai Griffiths and
> >> others that the term information is a problematic construction. Since it
> >> is
> >> often used as an example of fitting the details of a specific worldly
> >> situation into a linguistic  form that can be processed by a computer,
> >> this
> >> fact in itself introduces various distortions from the reality that is
> >> being represented.  The degree of distortion might even be an example of
> >> the degree of uncertainty.
> >>
> >> I believe that reference to the early work of Wittgenstein might be of
> >> use
> >> in this context, especially since his work in his Tractatus text on
> >> problems related to logical atomism influenced the design of the von
> >> Neumann computer, led to the creation of the Vienna Circle group and
> >> later
> >> inspired the philosophical movement of logical positivism. Alan Turing
> >> was
> >> also one of his students.
> >>
> >> In this early work Wittgenstein had believed that a formal theory of
> >> language could be developed, capable of showing how propositions can
> >> succeed in representing real states of affairs and in serving the
> >> purposes
> >> of real life. He believed that language is like a picture which is laid
> >> against reality like a measuring rod and reaches right out to it. But in
> >> later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of relating
> >> propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not in
> >> itself
> >> be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once the validity
> >> of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and unambiguous
> >> way
> >> is questioned, not much is left. Although propositions are indeed capable
> >> of modeling and describing the world with a rigor not unlike that of
> >> mathematical representations of physical phenomena, they cannot
> >> themselves
> >> describe how they represent this world without becoming self-referential.
> >> Propositions are consequently essentially meaningless, since their
> >> meaning
> >> consists precisely in their ability to connect with the world outside of
> >> language. A perfect language mirrors a  perfect world, but  since the
> >> latter is nothing more than a chimera so is the former.
> >>
> >> Here are some quotes (taken out of their original contexts) from
> >> Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that I believe are relevant to the discussion on
> >> information and meaning:
> >>
> >> The facts in logical space are the world. What is the case — a fact— is
> >> the existence of states of affairs.  A state of affairs (a state of
> >> things)
> >> is a combination of objects (things). It is essential to things that they
> >> should be possible constituents of states of affairs. If I know an object
> >> I
> >> also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.  Objects
> >> contain the possibility of all situations. The configuration of objects
> >> produces states of affairs. The totality of existing states of affairs is
> >> the world. The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is
> >> reality.
> >> States of affairs are independent of one another.  A picture is a model
> >> of
> >> reality. A picture is a fact.  Logical pictures can depict the world. A
> >> picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and
> >> non-existence of states of affairs. Situations can be described but not
> >> given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows — they have
> >> sense.)  Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition
> >> does  a name have meaning.
> >>
> >> Finally, with regards to the problems about information, I would add that
> >> Alfred Korzybski (and later Marshall McLuhan) once wrote that “the map is
> >> not the territory.” The map is merely a picture of something that it
> >> represents. Increasing the amount of information may reduce the
> >> granularity
> >> of the picture, but it remains a picture. This means that accumulation
> >> greater and greater amounts of information can never completely replace
> >> or
> >> represent the infinite complexity of any real-lilfe situation — and this
> >> is
> >> an insight that Wittgenstein realized only in his later philosophical
> >> work.
> >>
> >> Steve Bindeman
> >>
> >>
> >> On Dec 22, 2016, at 7:37 AM, fis-request at listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis-request at listas.unizar.es> wrote:
> >>
> >> Send Fis mailing list submissions to
> >> fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >>
> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> >> fis-request at listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis-request at listas.unizar.es>
> >>
> >> You can reach the person managing the list at
> >> fis-owner at listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis-owner at listas.unizar.es>
> >>
> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> >> than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..."
> >>
> >>
> >> Today's Topics:
> >>
> >>   1. Re: What is information? and What is life? (Dai Griffiths)
> >>
> >>
> >> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Message: 1
> >> Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:44:59 +0000
> >> From: Dai Griffiths <dai.griffiths.1 at gmail.com <mailto:dai.griffiths.1 at gmail.com>>
> >> To: fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >> Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?
> >> Message-ID: <dbbfa511-b4e1-79b5-f800-bad1c231b65a at gmail.com <mailto:dbbfa511-b4e1-79b5-f800-bad1c231b65a at gmail.com>>
> >> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowed"
> >>
> >> Information is not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise
> >>
> >> than as our construct.
> >>
> >> I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in
> >> discussing information come from our desire to shoe-horn many different
> >> phenomena into the same construct. It would be possible to disaggregate
> >> the construct. It be possible to discuss the topics which we address on
> >> this list without using the word 'information'. We could discuss
> >> redundancy, variety, constraint, meaning, structural coupling,
> >> coordination, expectation, language, etc.
> >>
> >> In what ways would our explanations be weakened?
> >>
> >> In what ways might we gain in clarity?
> >>
> >> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our
> >> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human
> >> experience. But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday
> >> human experience.
> >>
> >> Dai
> >>
> >> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >> Dear colleagues,
> >>
> >> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of
> >> bits of information.
> >>
> >> Alternatively: the expected information content /H /of a probability
> >> distribution is .
> >>
> >> /H/is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb?s
> >> formulation of the entropy .
> >>
> >> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my
> >> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the
> >> question of ?what is information?? As the discussion on this list
> >> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one
> >> can answer the question ?how is information defined?? Information is
> >> not ?something out there? which ?exists? otherwise than as our construct.
> >>
> >> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move
> >> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman?s and Bob Logan?s (2007)
> >> definition of information ?as natural selection assembling the very
> >> constraints on the release of energy that then constitutes work and
> >> the propagation of organization.? I asked several times what this
> >> means and how one can measure this information. Hitherto, I only
> >> obtained the answer that colleagues who disagree with me will be
> >> cited. JAnother answer was that ?counting? may lead to populism. J
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Loet
> >>
> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Loet Leydesdorff
> >>
> >> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> >> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
> >>
> >> loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net> <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net>>;
> >> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ <http://www.leydesdorff.net/>
> >> Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>>University of
> >> Sussex;
> >>
> >> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/ <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>>,
> >> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> >> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>>Beijing;
> >>
> >> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>>, University of
> >> London;
> >>
> >> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en <http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en>
> >>
> >> *From:*Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.stoute at gmail.com <mailto:dick.stoute at gmail.com>]
> >> *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM
> >> *To:* loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net>
> >> *Cc:* James Peters; ulan at umces.edu <mailto:ulan at umces.edu>; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar
> >> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?
> >>
> >> List,
> >>
> >> Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information
> >> stated below.
> >>
> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive
> >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27)
> >>
> >> I agree.  I struggled with this definition for a long time before
> >> realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information"
> >> or the number of bits needed to convey a message.  He was looking for
> >> a formula that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of
> >> bits needed to convey a message and realised that the amount of
> >> information (number of bits) needed to convey a message was dependent
> >> on the "amount" of uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he
> >> equated these.
> >>
> >> It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of
> >> information" and "information".  For example, we can measure amount of
> >> water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise
> >> the measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what
> >> information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed
> >> to fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should
> >> not think that water is therefore identical to an empty volume.
> >> Similarly we should not think that information is identical to
> >> uncertainty.
> >>
> >> By equating the number of bits needed to convey a message with the
> >> "amount of uncertainty" that has to be eliminated Shannon, in effect,
> >> equated opposites so that he could get an estimate of the number of
> >> bits needed to eliminate the uncertainty.  We should not therefore
> >> consider that this equation establishes what information is.
> >>
> >> Dick
> >>
> >> On 18 December 2016 at 15:05, Loet Leydesdorff <loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net>
> >> <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net>>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Dear James and colleagues,
> >>
> >> Weaver (1949) made two major remarks about his coauthor (Shannon)'s
> >> contribution:
> >>
> >> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive
> >> ("bizarre"); (p. 27)
> >>
> >> 2. "In particular, information must not be confused with meaning." (p. 8)
> >>
> >> The definition of information as relevant for a system of reference
> >> confuses information with "meaningful information" and thus sacrifices
> >> the surplus value of Shannon's counter-intuitive definition.
> >>
> >> information observer
> >>
> >> that integrates interactive processes such as
> >>
> >> physical interactions such photons stimulating the retina of the eye,
> >> human-machine interactions (this is the level that Shannon lives on),
> >> biological interaction such body temperature relative to touch ice or
> >> heat source, social interaction such as this forum started by Pedro,
> >> economic interaction such as the stock market, ... [Lerner, page 1].
> >>
> >> We are in need of a theory of meaning. Otherwise, one cannot measure
> >> meaningful information. In a previous series of communications we
> >> discussed redundancy from this perspective.
> >>
> >> Lerner introduces mathematical expectation E[Sap] (difference between
> >> of a priory entropy [sic] and a posteriori entropy), which is
> >> distinguished from the notion of relative information Iap (Learner,
> >> page 7).
> >>
> >> ) expresses in bits of information the information generated when the
> >> a priori distribution is turned into the a posteriori one . This
> >> follows within the Shannon framework without needing an observer. I
> >> use this equation, for example, in my 1995-book /The Challenge of
> >> Scientometrics/ (Chapters 8 and 9), with a reference to Theil (1972).
> >> The relative information is defined as the /H///H/(max).
> >>
> >> I agree that the intuitive notion of information is derived from the
> >> Latin ?in-formare? (Varela, 1979). But most of us do no longer use
> >> ?force? and ?mass? in the intuitive (Aristotelian) sense. JThe
> >> proliferation of the meanings of information if confused with
> >> ?meaningful information? is indicative for an ?index sui et falsi?, in
> >> my opinion. The repetitive discussion lames the progression at this
> >> list. It is ?like asking whether a glass is half empty or half full?
> >> (Hayles, 1990, p. 59).
> >>
> >> This act of forming forming an information process results in the
> >> construction of an observer that is the owner [holder] of information.
> >>
> >> The system of reference is then no longer the message, but the
> >> observer who provides meaning to the information (uncertainty). I
> >> agree that this is a selection process, but the variation first has to
> >> be specified independently (before it can be selected.
> >>
> >> And Lerner introduces the threshold between objective and subjective
> >> observes (page 27).   This leads to a consideration selection and
> >> cooperation that includes entanglement.
> >>
> >> I don?t see a direct relation between information and entanglement. An
> >> observer can be entangled.
> >>
> >> Best,
> >>
> >> Loet
> >>
> >> PS. Pedro: Let me assume that this is my second posting in the week
> >> which ends tonight. L.
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es> <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es>>
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >>
> >>
> >> 4 Austin Dr. Prior Park St. James, Barbados BB23004
> >> Tel:   246-421-8855
> >> Cell:  246-243-5938
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>
> >>
> >> --
> >> -----------------------------------------
> >>
> >> Professor David (Dai) Griffiths
> >> Professor of Education
> >> School of Education and Psychology
> >> The University of Bolton
> >> Deane Road
> >> Bolton, BL3 5AB
> >>
> >> Office: T3 02
> >> http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC <http://www.bolton.ac.uk/IEC>
> >>
> >> SKYPE: daigriffiths
> >> UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559 <tel:%2B44%20%280%297491151559> <+44%207491%20151559>
> >> Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912 <tel:%2B%2034%20687955912> <+34%20687%2095%2059%2012>
> >> Work: + 44 (0)7826917705 <tel:%2B%2044%20%280%297826917705> <+44%207826%20917705>
> >> (Please don't leave voicemail)
> >> email:
> >>    d.e.griffiths at bolton.ac.uk <mailto:d.e.griffiths at bolton.ac.uk>
> >>    dai.griffiths.1 at gmail.com <mailto:dai.griffiths.1 at gmail.com>
> >>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.html>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 497 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment.png>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 829 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0001.png>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 560 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0002.png>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 975 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0003.png>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 497 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0004.png>
> >> -------------- next part --------------
> >> A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
> >> Name: not available
> >> Type: image/png
> >> Size: 495 bytes
> >> Desc: not available
> >> URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/ <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/>
> >> 20161221/39481ed0/attachment-0005.png>
> >>
> >> ------------------------------
> >>
> >> Subject: Digest Footer
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>
> >>
> >> ------------------------------
> >>
> >> End of Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41
> >> ***********************************
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Fis mailing list
> >> Fis at listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis at listas.unizar.es>
> >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis>
> >>
> >>
> >
> 
> 
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 <tel:%2B44%207710%20534195>
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 <tel:%2B91%20900%20800%208789>
> ____________________________________________________________
> 
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
> and Phenomenological Philosophy
> <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>>
> 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/attachments/20161228/d2d73b3a/attachment.html>