[Fis] _ Discussion

[Maxine Sheets-Johnstone]

To all colleagues,

I hope I may voice a number of concerns that have arisen in the course
of the ongoing discussions that are ostensibly about phenomenology and
the life sciences.

The concerns begin with a non-recognition of what is surely the ground
floor of real-life, real-time realities, namely, animation, not in the
sense of being alive or in opposition to the inanimate, but in the sense
of motion, movement, kinetics. As Aristotle cogently remarked,
“Nature is a principle of motion and change. . . . We must therefore see
that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too
would be unknown” (Physics 200b12-14).

Through and through--from animate organisms to an ever-changing world--
movement is foundational to understandings of subject and world, and of
subject/world relationships, and this whether subject and world are
examined phenomenologically or scientifically. In short, movement is at
the core of information and meaning, at the core of mind and 
consciousness,
at the core of both gestural and verbal language, at the core of nervous
system and organic functionings, at the core of molecular 
transformations,
at the core of ellipses, electrons, gravity, waves, particles, and so 
on,
and further, at the core of time, the concept, measurement, and meaning 
of
time.

I enumerate below specifics with respect to what is essentially the
foundational dynamic reality. The summary concerns are followed by
references that document each concern. If further specifics are wanted 
or
if specific articles are wanted, kindly contact msj at uoregon.edu

(1). Instincts and/or feelings motivate animate organisms to move.
Without such instincts or feelings there would be no disposition
to move. An ‘animate organism’ would in truth be akin to a statue,
a statue Condillac described two and a half centuries ago as having
first this sense given to it, then that sense given to it, but that,
lacking movement, is powerless to gain knowledge of the world. Such
a movement deficient creature would furthermore lack the biological
capacity of responsivity, a near universal characteristic of life.
The startle reflex is a premier example. Can what is evolutionarily
given be “illogical”? Clearly, feelings are not “illogical,” but move
through animate bodies, moving them to move. Without feelings of
curiosity, for example, or awe, or wonder, there would be no exploration
of the natural world, no investigations, hence no “information.”
Furthermore, without feelings of movement—initially, from an 
evolutionary
perspective, no proprioception, and later, no kinesthesia--there would 
be
no near and far, no weak and strong, no straight and curved, and so on,
hence, no determinations of Nature. In short, there would be no 
information
and no meaning. (See Note #1: The Primacy of Movement)

(2). An excellent lead-in to scientific understandings of movement and
its inherent dynamics lies in the extensive research and writings of
J. A. Scott Kelso, Pierre de Fermat Laureate in 2007. Kelso was founder
of the Center for Brain and Behavioral Studies and its Director for 
twenty
years. His rigorous multi-dimensional experimental studies are anchored 
in
coordination dynamics, an anchorage that is unconstrained by dogma. The
breadth of his knowledge and his sense of open inquiry is apparent in 
the
literature he cites in conjunction with his articles and books. His 
recent
article in Biological Cybernetics that focuses on “Agency” is strikingly
relevant to the present FIS discussion. It takes experience into 
account,
specifically in the form of “positive feedback,” which obviously 
involves
kinesthesia in a central way. Moreover his upcoming Opinion piece in 
Trends
in Cognitive Science should be essential reading. (See Note #2: “The 
Coordination
Dynamics of Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement” and The Complementary 
Nature)

(3). As pointed out elsewhere, “Certainly words carry no patented 
meanings,
but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when 
it
is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptible 
behaviors
or actions, or any descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors 
or
actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a very 
specific
mode of epistemological inquiry invariably associated with the name 
Edmund Husserl. . . . ”
Phenomenological inquiries are tethered to a very specific methodology, 
one as
rigorous as that of science. Phenomenological findings are furthermore 
open to
verification by others, precisely as in science. Moreover two forms of
phenomenological analysis warrant recognition: static and genetic, the 
former
being a determination of the essential character of the object of 
inquiry, the
second being a determination of how the meaning of that object of 
inquiry came
to be constituted, hence an inquiry into sedimentations of meaning, into
protentions and retentions, into horizons of meaning, and so on. Thus 
too,
what warrants recognition is the fact that bracketing is not the 
beginning and
end of phenomenological methodology. On the contrary, bracketing is only 
the beginning.
Phenomenological reduction follows bracketing and allows the essential 
character
of the object of inquiry or the constitution of its meaning to come to 
light.
(See Note #3: Animation: Analyses, Elaborations, and Implications”)

(4). References made to Gödel’s theorem to uphold certain theses can be 
definitively
questioned. The claim that Gödel makes on behalf of his theorem is 
inaccurate.
Three articles that demonstrate the inaccuracy, one from a 
phenomenological
perspective, two others from a logical-analytical perspective, warrant 
clear-headed
study. In brief, self-referential statements are vacuous, hence neither 
true nor false.
Moreover the sentences expressing the statements may be used to make two 
quite
different statements, a fact ignored by Gödel.(See Note #4:  
“Self-Reference and
Gödel’s Theorem,” “The Liar Syndrome,” and “Doctor’s Diagnosis 
Sustained")

(5): Information is commonly understood as factual knowledge, thus 
empirically
sustained and sustainable knowledge. It is thus a matter of the 
condition or
nature or workings, etc., of something out there in the world, including 
even
your liver if that is the source of information. Mathematics has its 
origin in
arithmetic, the latter having its origins in counting things in the 
world,
including if not beginning with one’s fingers, and in shape, including 
if not
beginning with differentiating contours and size, thus with linear and 
amplitudinal
dimensions of things in the world. As I wrote in my last posting, I hope 
that
someone will take up the challenge of doing a phenomenological analysis 
of information.
An inquiry into the relationship of meaning to information and of 
information to
meaning might then be undertaken. That step, to my mind, would provide 
solid ground
for linking informational sciences and phenomenology, linking by way of 
showing—-
demonstrating—complementarities, precisely complementarities in the 
sense that
Bohr and Kelso specify.

Note #1: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2011. The Primacy of Movement, 
expanded 2nd ed.
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing

Note #2: Kelso, J. A. Scott and Armin Fuchs. 2016. “The Coordination 
Dynamics of
Mobile Conjugate Reinforcement,” Biological Cybernetics:  DOI 
10.1007/s00422-015-0676-0.
Kelso, J. A. Scott and David A. Engström. 2006. The Complementary 
Nature. Cambridge,
MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.

Note #3: Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine. 2015. “Animation: Analyses, 
Elaborations, and Implications,”
Husserl Studies, 30/3: 247-268.  DOI 10.1007/s10743-014-9156-y

Note #4: Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Self-Reference and Gödel’s Theorem: 
A Husserlian Analysis."
Husserl Studies, 19: 131-151.
Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “The Liar Syndrome,” SATS/Nordic Journal of 
Philosophy, 3/1: 37-55.
Johnstone, Albert A. 2002. “Doctor’s Diagnosis Sustained,” SATS/Nordic 
Journal of Philosophy,
3/2: 142-153.

Maxine