[Fis] information as physical entity
Bruno Marchal
marchal at ulb.ac.be
Wed Jul 1 16:40:31 CEST 2015
On 30 Jun 2015, at 05:36, Andrei Khrennikov wrote:
> Dear all,
> May be some addition to my previous post: information physics and in
> particular recent information approach to QM
> are based on the interpretation of information as primary physical
> entity, similar to energy. Quantum systems carry information and can
> exchange
> it, experimenters can guess about information exchange between
> quantum systems and the measurement devices.
> Roughly speaking, this is the beginning and the end of the
> information story: one does not need further theorizing about
> the "meaning" of information.
Hi Andrei,
Are you sure that: not needing to theorize on information and its
meaning, is not a defect of that approach?
Anyway, I can explain in all details why IF the brain is Turing
Emulable, THEN it is the physical which emerges from the meaning of
the information, where the meaning is defined basically by what
universal numbers makes with information (notably "dreaming").
In fact, if we take seriously the idea that biology does not exploit
non Turing emulable processes, the mind-body problem is reducible to
the derivation of physics from machine or number's dream coherence
conditions.
There are two advantages:
- 1)The "theory of everything" becomes very simple, elementary
arithmetic is enough, or just the equation Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz)
on the combinators.
- 2) Incompleteness provides the tools to distinguish proof, truth,
knowledge, beliefs, sensations, and notably the difference and
relations between qualia and quanta. In fact, we get the
quantization(s) explaining why the "reality" looks quantum.
The key notion is the first person indeterminacy. That is the rather
simple (but apparently not for everyone) idea that IF "our bodies are
machines", then it is duplicable, and we have no algorithm to predict
the particular subjective experience when we accept such personal
duplication. Physics can then be recovered by the global FPI on the
computable number relations.
Best regards to all,
Bruno Marchal
> yours, andrei
>
> Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
> International Center for Mathematical Modeling
> in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
> Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden
> ________________________________________
> From: Fis [fis-bounces at listas.unizar.es] on behalf of Terrence W.
> DEACON [deacon at berkeley.edu]
> Sent: Monday, June 29, 2015 10:48 PM
> To: Joseph Brenner
> Cc: fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: It-from-Bit and information interpretation of
> QM
>
> On Bateson's "difference that makes a difference."
>
> We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
> information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic
> (coined also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference")
> that captures both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic
> implications. But this is not all. If one wants to try to force this
> phrase to carry more of the weight of completely characterizing
> information it should be further interpreted. Notice that it is also
> an appropriate quip to describe the concept of physical work— a
> gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
> constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
> difference in potntial or pushes a system further from equilibrium.
>
> This double applicability is not merely a terminological
> coincidence, though I don't think that Gregory realized this, since
> he used this quip to argue for an energy/information dichotomy. I
> have instead argued (most recently in my January FIS essay) that
> both the referential and normative properties of information are
> intimately entangled with the concept of physical work.
>
> Also, in English parlance the phrase to "make a difference" is an
> idiom that means "to matter" or to be significant or of value. I
> believe that this double entendre was intended in order to implicate
> the normative and goal directed aspects of information. Explicating
> either the aboutness or the normative consequence in terms of "bits"
> therefore inevitably results in reductionistic oversimplication.
> Bits are a relevant measure of intrinsic logical properties of the
> communication medium, but of minimal value in assessing the
> extrinsic relational properties that are implicated in the larger
> concept of information. I think that measuring work (though in ways
> that are more complex than mere physical work) can lead to a more
> useful incorporation of the referential and normative properties
> that are implied by "information."
>
> Another problem is introduced by the use of the concept of "meaning"
> in these discussions. The term ambiguously connotes both reference
> and significance, and while it is applicable to symbolic and
> linguistic information, it only metaphorically applies to iconic and
> indexical forms of communication. Thus we discern that a sneeze
> indicates (provides potential information about) an allergic
> response, but doesn't "mean" allergy or nasal irritation. Seeing the
> imprint of a person's face on a coin doesn't "mean" that person. I
> would not want to exclude these semiotic forms of conveying
> information from our consideration of the concept.
>
> Clearly, we need to carefully distinguish the intrinsic logical
> properties of a signal medium (Shannon's usage) from information
> "about" something not intrinsic to that medium, from the
> "informative value" or normative / significant / useful consequence
> that is the point of interpreting something to be about something
> else.
>
> To fail to make these distinctions and instead flatten our
> discussions to the Shannonian usage is to loose track of the
> challenge. Let me conclude by noting that this troublesome
> flattening of the meaning of "information" was recognized by Shannon
> and many others, in the formative years of the field. In the words
> of a major figure in the field:
>
> “I didn’t like the term Information Theory. Claude didn’t like
> it either. You see, the term ‘information theory’ suggests that
> it is a theory about information – but it’s not. It’s the
> transmission of information, not information. Lots of people just
> didn’t understand this... I coined the term ‘mutual
> information’ to avoid such nonsense: making the point that
> information is always about something. It is information provided by
> something, about something.” [Interview with R. Fano, 2001]
>
> ... and I would add "for something."
>
> — Terry
>
> On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 1:48 AM, Joseph Brenner <joe.brenner at bluewin.ch
> <mailto:joe.brenner at bluewin.ch>> wrote:
> Dear Terry,
>
> I agree with the distinction you make between the two types of
> properties indicated, but I wish you had stated your point
> positively. I hope we are all not so lazy as not to be able to use
> modifers such as 'meaningful' with information,as Loet suggests. If
> one does not, does that mean that one will be in a position to
> establish a single monolithic interpretation for information? In the
> exchange below, there is thus a faint perfume of reductionism that
> floats around the focus on properties of informational entities
> without reference to the necessary energetic processes of their
> production, transmission and reception. But your post was less than
> four full lines . . .
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Terrence W. DEACON<mailto:deacon at berkeley.edu>
> To: Marcus Abundis<mailto:55mrcs at gmail.com>
> Cc: fis<mailto:fis at listas.unizar.es>
> Sent: Friday, June 26, 2015 9:17 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM
>
> Dear Marcus,
>
> Thank you for this simple and absolutely essential intervention.
> Allowing ourselves the freedom to use the same term—'information'
> which is the defining term for this entire enterprise—for such
> different relationships as intrinsic signal properties and extrinsic
> referential and normative properties is a recipe for irrelevance.
>
> — Terry
>
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 10:33 AM, Loet Leydesdorff <loet at leydesdorff.net
> <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net>> wrote:
> Dear Marcus and colleagues,
>
> Katherine Hayles (1990, pp. 59f.) compared this discussion about the
> definition of “information” with asking whether a glass is half
> empty or half full. Shannon-type information is a measure of the
> variation or uncertainty, whereas Bateson’s “difference which
> makes a difference” presumes a system of reference for which the
> information can make a difference and thus be meaningful.
>
> In my opinion, the advantage of measuring uncertainty in bits cannot
> be underestimated, since the operationalization and the measurement
> provide avenues to hypothesis testing and thus control of
> speculation (Theil, 1972). However, the semantic confusion can also
> be solved by using the words “uncertainty” or “probabilistic
> entropy” when Shannon-type information is meant.
>
> I note that “a difference which makes a difference” cannot so
> easily be measured. ☺ I agree that it is more precise to speak of
> “meaningful information” in that case. The meaning has to be
> specified in the system of reference (e.g., physics and/or biology).
>
> Best,
> Loet
>
>
> References:
>
> Hayles, N. K. (1990). Chaos Bound; Orderly Disorder in Contemporary
> Literature and Science Ithaca, etc.: Cornell University.
> Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/
> London: North-Holland.
>
> ________________________________
> Loet Leydesdorff
> Emeritus University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
> loet at leydesdorff.net <mailto:loet at leydesdorff.net> ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> University
> of Sussex;
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ.<http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html
> > Beijing;
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
> London;
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en
>
> From: Fis [mailto:fis-bounces at listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-bounces at listas.unizar.es
> >] On Behalf Of Marcus Abundis
> Sent: Friday, June 26, 2015 7:02 PM
> To: fis at listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis at listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: [Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM
>
> Dear Andrei,
>
> I would ask for clarification on whether you speak of
> "information" in your examples as something that has innate
> "meaning" or something that is innately "meaningless" . . . which
> has been a core issue in earlier exchanges. If this issue of
> "meaning" versus "meaningless" in the use of the term "information"
> is not resolved (for the group?) it seems hard (to me) to have truly
> meaningful exchanges . . . without having to put a "meaningful" or
> "meaningless" qualifier in front of "information" every time it is
> use.
>
> Thanks.
>
>
>
> Marcus Abundis
> about.me/marcus.abundis<http://about.me/marcus.abundis>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> --
> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> University of California, Berkeley
>
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> --
> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> University of California, Berkeley
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