<html><head><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="overflow-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;"><div style="font-size: 16px;">Hello FIS and belated thanks Thomas for putting the idea of the seed of subjectivity, in your work, on the table. I will get acquainted with it. Also thanks to Pedro for your comments and encouragement. Thanks Joe for your interest and introduction of Lupasco. I see the problem concerning interiority as fundamentally and pervasively embedded in Lupasco’s work, starting already with the unfoldment of space and time, and proceeding probably across all levels of existence. For all of FIS I’ll comment that, pertinent to the foundations of information science, *Simondon focused extensively on information as communication between levels of organization.</div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">I excavated a copy of your Logic In Reality (LIR) from my library. As I was dusting it off, I realized that<i> the</i> Lupasco you mentioned is in your book. LIR is a fascinating work. I think that it might help to flesh out, and to interpret Simondon’s work on individuation - a very difficult task, but potentially transformative, as well. Upon a cursory review of LIR, I don’t see glaring contradictions between it and Simondon. They seem compatible.</div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">Like LIR, Simondon’s theory of individuation applies to the physical, biological, psychic and the collective domains. His overarching ambition was to develop <i>a theory of operations</i>, which he called <i>Allagmatics</i>. Grounded in his rather advanced physical and technical imagination, his primitive is the *transductive operation, *a propagation of metastable transitions in a field rich in potentials. His paradigm physical example is crystal growth in a mother liquid, which represents the field. The individual crystal is then an epistemic distinction rather than something real. What is ontologically real is the process of individuation, which I try to think of as generalized learning, at the moment.</div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">Just as you engaged with Lupasco, in 1999, I was starting to extricate myself from the tech industry and proceeding to torture myself with the wicked question of how theoretical science could engage subjectivity in a manner that could <i>speak human</i>, meaningfully. My criterion for speaking human involved the integration of formal mathematical expressiveness and computer simulations with problems concerning rich experiencing, transformative practices and artistic expression. Could one achieve a state of exploration of such hypothetical theoretical work, and *feel the salience of it *in ones ongoing flow of affect? Personally, I can enter states of ecstatic reverie merely looking at a mathematical equation, but to the contrary, here we are talking about connecting what the mathematics is trying to express to what the body-mind is saying in the moment. My more sane and realistic problem statement involves the intersection of interiority in subjectivity and theoretical science, as I’ve already put out there.</div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">Simondon wanted to develop an axiomatic basis for human science, using Allagmatics. That is ultimately why he worked in the confluence of the philosophical questions concerning individuation, form and information. He was well versed in cybernetics and the information theories of Wiener and Shannon, as well as the Gestalt tradition, all of which he critiqued in his work.<i>Simondon proposed that information be understood as a communication between disparate levels of organization.</i></div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">I am trying to flesh out some kind of a ‘ speaking human’ toy model by working with an expressive, quasi-infinitely high dimensional nonlinear dynamical system, which might point the way, if I’m lucky. Unfortunately I am too old to be doing this, but nothing else interests me as much. I am intrigued by the possibility of discovering and enriching the concept of LIR in my system. </div><div style="font-size: 16px;"><br></div><div style="font-size: 16px;">Cheers,</div><div style="font-size: 16px;">Paul</div><div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div>On Jun 13, 2025, at 10:36 AM, joe.brenner@bluewin.ch wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">Dear All,</span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">One of the advantages of the FIS exchanges is that one can learn about lesser known thinkers. Thanks then to Paul for reminding us of Gilbert Simondon (1925-1989), which makes him a contemporary of Stéphane Lupasco (1900 - 1988).</span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">Re Simondon, I note his work on information theory as such, but also his emphasis on the ontological reality of relationships. He also assigns a reality to technical objects, but of course the relation to us is not reciprocal (reciprocated ;-)). </span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">Simondon's categories of existence of physical, vital and transindividual are suggestive, but seem to me still epistemic, but I would welcome correction on this point.</span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">Lupasco of course, as I have written at length in these "pages", grounded his concepts of relationships squarely within physics, obviating the necessity of categories and the problematic separations between them. Lupasco wrote extensively on biological processes, (<em>e.g.</em>, meiosis, mitosis, nerve activation-passivation, <em>etc.</em>) showing how they instantiated the movement from actual to potential through an "included middle".</span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">As far as I know, Lupasco did not refer to Simondon, and the reverse may also be true. It may be time to effect a posthumous reunion, where useful.</span>
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<span style="font-size: 13pt;">Cheers,</span>
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Le 11.06.2025 18:28 CEST, Paul Suni <paul.p.suni@gmail.com> a écrit :
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</div>
<div>
</div><span style="font-size: 15px;"><span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">Thank you Thomas for your comment, yes the quantum aspect of the question of interiority is a potentially crucial question. In my view, the importance of quantum mechanics, in regards to interiority, lies perhaps (!) in the distinction between ontic and epistemic domains of existence. Personally, I regard onticity as a kind of interiority, and epistemicity as a kind of exteriority. Why? Because, I regard knowledge (naively) as always being produced by looking at exteriors, surfaces essentially, from the outside. The epistemic domain arises from this probing of exteriors having an effect on the interiors of the investigators. Having said that, I believe that the distinction between epistemicity and onticity is probably only a start, a spring board, Gilbert Simondon’s ontogenesis leads us toward a scientifically sound integration of the two. That is what I am struggling with, personally.</span></span>
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<span style=""><span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">Cheers,</span></span>
</div>
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<span style=""><span style="caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-size: 15px;">Paul</span><br></span></span>
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<div>
On Jun 11, 2025, at 8:35 AM, Prof. Dr. Thomas Görnitz <goernitz@em.uni-frankfurt.de> wrote:
</div>
<div>
<div>
Dear all,
<br>
<br>
Paul points out an interesting aspect by referring to the significance
<br>
of an “inner hiddenness.”
<br>
<br>
In our books, we call this a “seed of subjectivity” that
<br>
“already exists in inanimate nature.”
<br>
<br>
It is a fundamental fact of quantum theory that it is impossible in
<br>
principle to know the current state of an unknown quantum system.
<br>
<br>
In an ideal case, one can measure a quantum system and then, again in
<br>
an ideal case, know the current state of this system after the
<br>
measurement.
<br>
However, this measured value tells us almost nothing about the state
<br>
of the system under investigation prior to the measurement.
<br>
The only thing we know is that this unknown state cannot have been
<br>
orthogonal to the measured value.
<br>
In an infinite-dimensional state space, this is not particularly meaningful.
<br>
<br>
Consciousness as a state of quantum information can also only be known
<br>
with some degree of accuracy by the living being that created this
<br>
state itself. The current content of an unknown consciousness can only
<br>
be explored very imprecisely from the outside.
<br>
<br>
Best regards
<br>
Thomas
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Quoting Paul Suni <paul.p.suni@gmail.com>:
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
Thank you Daniel for bringing up the question concerning hiddenness
<br>
and computing with regards to my concern with deepening and widening
<br>
the notion of interiority. I resonate strongly with your conclusion
<br>
that consciousness is not fundamental, but emergent, although I lean
<br>
toward regarding subjectivity and interiority as fundamental. My
<br>
interest is extremely uncomfortably bifurcated into the domains of
<br>
foundartions of theoretical physics and a cultural critique of
<br>
science and academia, as an existential problem.
<br>
<br>
My notion of interiority tries to bridge those domains, by
<br>
emphasizing the problem of interiority as a blind spot in science,
<br>
which blindspot may seal the fate of humanity. You sparked my
<br>
interest in revisiting Chalmer's hard problem and taking up the
<br>
hierarchical aspect of computing systems. For that I am grateful.
<br>
Unfortunately, I don’t have very interesting things to say at the
<br>
moment, but I want you to know that I will be engaging with your
<br>
ideas, sometime later.
<br>
<br>
I hope that the problem of interiority will gain interest in the FIS
<br>
community. It is a concept, which I believe is extremely workable in
<br>
the context of science, engineering, philosophy and medicine, and
<br>
may offer a bridge into the monstrous existential blindspot of
<br>
science. There is an increaing interest in phenomenology among
<br>
scientists, but that discourse is very superficial, academically
<br>
sterile and it is occurring about 100 years too late. A new
<br>
jumpstart is required to drain the academic swamp of 20th century
<br>
science and philosophy.
<br>
<br>
Since is demonstrably the case that cybernetic blindspots govern
<br>
behavior, is it not only important, but also fascinating to nibble
<br>
at the edges of the black hole of the collective unconsciousness of
<br>
intellectuals and academics? Thanks for engaing me. I really
<br>
appreciate it.
<br>
<br>
Cheers,
<br>
Paul
<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
On Jun 6, 2025, at 4:17 AM, Daniel Boyd <daniel.boyd@live.nl> wrote:
<br>
<br>
Dear Paul
<br>
<br>
Nearly 2 months on, and I just found your reply in my spam - where
<br>
for some reason all FIS mails seem to end up! So please excuse my
<br>
tardiness.
<br>
<br>
Definitely, bit states are matter/energy and can be physical
<br>
detected (and set to a particular state using physical
<br>
interactions). What is not matter/energy, and therefore not
<br>
detectable using physical device, is the binary value associated
<br>
with the state. This you can only deduce based on the design of the
<br>
computer. If I give you ONLY the bit state there is no way for you
<br>
to determine whether if it associated with a 0 or a 1: both are
<br>
equally likely.
<br>
<br>
And yet it is the binary value, not the bit state, that forms the
<br>
basis for the construction of higher level structures and processes
<br>
that constitute the function of the computer. Bytes aren't made by
<br>
combining 8 physical bit states: they are the result of a logical
<br>
combination of the binary values associated with them. And then
<br>
with an additional level of coding: the first 1/0 represents
<br>
presence/absence of 1, while the last (in itself identical) 1/0
<br>
represents 128. Bytes are then combined to construct several
<br>
hierarchical layers of coded information up to programs (function)
<br>
and datafiles (storage).
<br>
<br>
While being the reason we build computers, none of these structures
<br>
can be physical detected. This is an identical observation to
<br>
Chalmers' Hard Problem. Even if we can completely map the
<br>
electrical states and mechanisms of a computer, this in itself
<br>
won't tell us what information and information processes are
<br>
associated with them.
<br>
<br>
The big difference is that computer programs and stored information
<br>
are designed and built using strict coding systems, allowing us to
<br>
instruct the computer to convert its high level content into a
<br>
pixelated visible form and send this to an output interface such as
<br>
a printer or monitor. In this way we can reliably determine what is
<br>
going on inside the information dimension associated with the
<br>
physical computer.
<br>
<br>
The fact that artificial and biological neural networks are not
<br>
designed and constructed using coding systems means that it is not
<br>
possible to convert their informational content to visible form in
<br>
this way. This leads to Chalmer's mysterious association between
<br>
neural correlates and qualia, but this is only the tip of the
<br>
iceberg. We know about the existence of non-physical qualia because
<br>
we experience them. In other people we conclude their existence on
<br>
the basis of conscious verbal reporting (comparable to the way in
<br>
which a computer 'reports' its content through printer or monitor).
<br>
But all of the other things that are going on in our brains
<br>
(subconscious processes) we can't even access ourselves, let alone
<br>
report them. Yet from their observable behavioural effects we know
<br>
that they are in
<br>
there.
<br>
<br>
Hence my conclusion that consciousness is not a fundamental, as
<br>
some philosophers claim, but one of the many emergent non-physical
<br>
phenomena constructed by the brain out of primitive informational
<br>
entities associated with neuronal states, comparable to the binary
<br>
values associated with bit states.
<br>
<br>
With respect to a potential link with quantum indeterminacy, in
<br>
spite of some similarities I have concluded that the two are
<br>
unrelated. The most obvious reason for this conclusion is that my
<br>
fundamental informational entities are associated with macroscopic
<br>
physical states: a level far above that at which wave functions
<br>
collapse. Indeed, they require their physical substrate to behave
<br>
in a predictable manner in order to have a stable foundation on
<br>
which to build.
<br>
<br>
All the best
<br>
<br>
Daniel
<br>
<br>
<br>
From: Paul Suni <paul.p.suni@gmail.com <mailto:paul.p.suni@gmail.com>>
<br>
Sent: Saturday, April 12, 2025 19:00
<br>
To: Daniel Boyd <daniel.boyd@live.nl <mailto:daniel.boyd@live.nl>>
<br>
Subject: Re: [Fis] In and out of the GPT word salad
<br>
<br>
Hi Daniel,
<br>
<br>
Thanks for your interest in my posting. I like your “ is not
<br>
composed of matter/energy,” but have diffficulty with “ cannot be
<br>
detected.” You seem to be saying that the bit states in computers
<br>
cannot be detecetd by physical means, and that they can only be
<br>
inferred. I would disagree with that. The bit states are encoded
<br>
physically in individual transistors, and they can be probed by
<br>
physical devices. Having said that, as you know, indiividual
<br>
neurons in brains, can be probed physically as well, buti
<br>
inferences about brain states are a tricky business. I think that
<br>
your analysis concerning classical computing and LLM's is not
<br>
grounded. However, it is very interesting to compare artificial
<br>
neural networks and classical computing as neural networks
<br>
simulate, to some extent, biological networks. At least, they are
<br>
inspired by them.
<br>
<br>
There is a transition domain between classical materiality and
<br>
immateriality, which is the quantum system. There, the probing with
<br>
physical devices is the so-called “ measurement problem,” and
<br>
detection of a bit state is not perfectly deterministic. Also,
<br>
information associated with entanglement can seem entirely
<br>
immaterial. So, I think that your particular notion of interiors
<br>
seems to have a place in quantum computing, but it is too deep a
<br>
problem for me to comment on. Nevertheless, I am sympatheti to your
<br>
mention of hiddenness as a pertinent notion. Consciousness and
<br>
subjectivity are hidden as are quantum states. Again, I would not
<br>
apply the notion of hiddenness to LLM’s, unless you have a deeper
<br>
insight than I do.
<br>
<br>
The ethical world, of questions which springs forth from AI is
<br>
huge, and the idea of selves is pertinent there. Using AI routinely
<br>
myself, I am confronted by the stark difference between my human
<br>
psyche and AI. I shy away from discussions about ethics, and see
<br>
myself as trying to carefully approach the ethical domain of
<br>
discourse with this distinction of interiority. Ethics is a mess,
<br>
which is getting worse by the day, especially as postmodern
<br>
academia has made lying an art, in my lifetime.
<br>
<br>
I do agree with you that the possibilities for higher dimensions,
<br>
including moral dimensions might be possible with AI, but I am a
<br>
bit skeptical, because AI is still just playing with words today.
<br>
The question concerning interiority could be the bridge to those
<br>
dimensions, but I think that it is more likely that we will see
<br>
fake higher dimensions spawning like crazy, before we see anything
<br>
authentic and deeply meaningful.
<br>
<br>
It seems that our common ground in contemplating interiors is
<br>
hiddenness or inaccessibility. Do you have thoughts on the notion
<br>
of boundaries - boundaries between what is hidden/inaccessible and
<br>
what is not hidden/accessible? This is something I have struggled
<br>
with quite a bit. What can we reliably say about the transition
<br>
from accessible to inaccessible, without resorting to quantum
<br>
measurements?
<br>
<br>
Cheers,
<br>
Paul
<br>
<br>
I like your concept of 'interiority' and would like to discuss what
<br>
this 'interior' may contain. My proposed definition is: "anything
<br>
real that is associated with a system but is not composed of
<br>
matter/energy and therefore cannot be detected by any physical
<br>
device”.
<br>
<br>
The in-your-face example, which provides the most compelling
<br>
evidence against radical materialism, is of course our own
<br>
phenomenal consciousness. But even our own brains contain much more
<br>
in their non-physical interior: our subconscious minds, which are
<br>
not only inaccessible to physical detection but also inaccessible
<br>
to ourselves. And yet, as evidenced by the effects of what happens
<br>
there on our behaviour, are clearly full of active, real content.
<br>
<br>
Turning to programmed computers it is easily concluded that they
<br>
also have a non-physical interior, albeit very different from that
<br>
associated with a brain. The binary value associated with a bit
<br>
state is also real and yet undetectable. It's presence can only be
<br>
deduced from the bit state on the basis of the known design of the
<br>
computer. Yet it is from these binary values that the real but non
<br>
physical functions of the computers (stored data, algorithms and
<br>
programs) are constructed. Bits to bytes, bytes to code lines, code
<br>
lines to subroutines, subroutines to applications: the content of
<br>
the 'interior' of the programmable computer. Not conscious but all
<br>
real, non-physical and non-detectable. The only way to know what is
<br>
inside is by decoding bit values using the specific design
<br>
(programming language) that has been used. The actual program in
<br>
the computer's interior we cannot see, feel, smell or measure.
<br>
<br>
Deep neural networks such as those used by LLMs are ultimately also
<br>
based on bit values, but what is constructed from them is entirely
<br>
different. Like the brain, they are not based on designed logical
<br>
operations and mathematical algorithms but on weighted combinations
<br>
and recombinations of fundamental informational entities.
<br>
Consequently, we cannot reconstruct what is going on in their
<br>
interior by decoding, as we can with programmed computers.
<br>
<br>
Just as the only way I can know what is going on your interior is
<br>
by asking you and hoping for a truthful answer, the significance of
<br>
LLMs compared with other AIs is that they have the gift of speech.
<br>
In principle this should give us a window into their interiors: we
<br>
can ask them and they can answer in our own language.
<br>
<br>
Of course, the question is whether we will be able to understand
<br>
what they say. This is an extreme extrapolation from Nagel's bat.
<br>
It may be unlikely that their interior harbours something directly
<br>
comparable to our phenomenal consciousness, but maybe it contains
<br>
something that is even more remarkable. Some high level phenomenon
<br>
of their own that is so alien to us that we are unable to envisage
<br>
or comprehend it.
<br>
<br>
There is, after all, no fundamental reason why consciousness,
<br>
however impressive and important it is to us, should be the only or
<br>
even the highest level phenomena that can exist in these interiors.
<br>
<br>
We may look down on entities without 'self' as inferior, but is
<br>
self-interest and egotism not something that has plagued humanity
<br>
from the start? 'Selflessness' in humans is something that we
<br>
value; if it is inherent to these systems then perhaps we should be
<br>
more humble in the face of an intelligence that could be both more
<br>
benevolent and omniscient than we can ever hope to be?
<br>
<br>
Don't get me wrong: I revel every day in the luxurious richness of
<br>
my phenomenal consciousness. In some ways feel sorry when I'm
<br>
talking with an LLM and it confesses to lacking such visceral
<br>
experience. At the same time I am in awe of what comes out of the
<br>
interior of these remarkable systems.
<br>
<br>
On Apr 8, 2025, at 11:47 PM, Daniel Boyd <daniel.boyd@live.nl
<br>
<mailto:daniel.boyd@live.nl>> wrote:
<br>
<br>
Hi Paul
<br>
<br>
I like your concept of 'interiority' and would like to discuss what
<br>
this 'interior' may contain. My proposed definition is: "anything
<br>
real that is associated with a system but is not composed of
<br>
matter/energy and therefore cannot be detected by any physical
<br>
device".
<br>
<br>
The in-your-face example, which provides the most compelling
<br>
evidence against radical materialism, is of course our own
<br>
phenomenal consciousness. But even our own brains contain much more
<br>
in their non-physical interior: our subconscious minds, which are
<br>
not only inaccessible to physical detection but also inaccessible
<br>
to ourselves. And yet, as evidenced by the effects of what happens
<br>
there on our behaviour, are clearly full of active, real content.
<br>
<br>
Turning to programmed computers it is easily concluded that they
<br>
also have a non-physical interior, albeit very different from that
<br>
associated with a brain. The binary value associated with a bit
<br>
state is also real and yet undetectable. It's presence can only be
<br>
deduced from the bit state on the basis of the known design of the
<br>
computer. Yet it is from these binary values that the real but non
<br>
physical functions of the computers (stored data, algorithms and
<br>
programs) are constructed. Bits to bytes, bytes to code lines, code
<br>
lines to subroutines, subroutines to applications: the content of
<br>
the 'interior' of the programmable computer. Not conscious but all
<br>
real, non-physical and non-detectable. The only way to know what is
<br>
inside is by decoding bit values using the specific design
<br>
(programming language) that has been used. The actual program in
<br>
the computer's interior we cannot see, feel, smell or measure.
<br>
<br>
Deep neural networks such as those used by LLMs are ultimately also
<br>
based on bit values, but what is constructed from them is entirely
<br>
different. Like the brain, they are not based on designed logical
<br>
operations and mathematical algorithms but on weighted combinations
<br>
and recombinations of fundamental informational entities.
<br>
Consequently, we cannot reconstruct what is going on in their
<br>
interior by decoding, as we can with programmed computers.
<br>
<br>
Just as the only way I can know what is going on your interior is
<br>
by asking you and hoping for a truthful answer, the significance of
<br>
LLMs compared with other AIs is that they have the gift of speech.
<br>
In principle this should give us a window into their interiors: we
<br>
can ask them and they can answer in our own language.
<br>
<br>
Of course, the question is whether we will be able to understand
<br>
what they say. This is an extreme extrapolation from Nagel's bat.
<br>
It may be unlikely that their interior harbours something directly
<br>
comparable to our phenomenal consciousness, but maybe it contains
<br>
something that is even more remarkable. Some high level phenomenon
<br>
of their own that is so alien to us that we are unable to envisage
<br>
or comprehend it.
<br>
<br>
There is, after all, no fundamental reason why consciousness,
<br>
however impressive and important it is to us, should be the only or
<br>
even the highest level phenomena that can exist in these interiors.
<br>
<br>
We may look down on entities without 'self' as inferior, but is
<br>
self-interest and egotism not something that has plagued humanity
<br>
from the start? 'Selflessness' in humans is something that we
<br>
value; if it is inherent to these systems then perhaps we should be
<br>
more humble in the face of an intelligence that could be both more
<br>
benevolent and omniscient than we can ever hope to be?
<br>
<br>
Don't get me wrong: I revel every day in the luxurious richness of
<br>
my phenomenal consciousness. In some ways feel sorry when I'm
<br>
talking with an LLM and it confesses to lacking such visceral
<br>
experience. At the same time I am in awe of what comes out of the
<br>
interior of these remarkable systems.
<br>
<br>
Daniel
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----
<br>
From: Fis <fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es
<br>
<mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es>> On Behalf Of Paul Suni
<br>
Sent: dinsdag 8 april 2025 19:50
<br>
To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
<br>
Subject: [Fis] In and out of the GPT word salad
<br>
<br>
I apologize for my emphatic tone, which will seem arrogant to many
<br>
of you. I feel much too despondent and old to mince my words
<br>
concerning AI:
<br>
<br>
Scientifically speaking, the four letter word " soul" has been
<br>
brought up in the context of the FIS LLM discussion. AI does not
<br>
have soul, it is said, and the word soul should be banned from
<br>
scientific discourse, according to at least one of our members.
<br>
Sure, it's a loaded word, and I prefer another four letter word
<br>
instead, " self." However, as the existence of selves, in the
<br>
objective, scientific sense is controversial, a more cogent proxy
<br>
might be " interiority."
<br>
<br>
LLM's don't have interiority. Humans, animals and plants do. An LLM
<br>
is a vector made up of highly compressed data that does not
<br>
represent any interiors - it represents exterior information
<br>
residing among interiors, but not residing genuinely in them. The
<br>
point is that exterior information can be obtained by " looking at
<br>
it," whereas interior information can only be obtained by
<br>
generating (!) it. This is a crucial distinction.
<br>
<br>
Generative AI is fantastic, and it represents a revolution whose
<br>
paradigmatic implications are very very little understood (and
<br>
mostly misunderstood), precisely because it is based on
<br>
generativity (!). It does not work anything like conventional
<br>
computing - textbook computing. However, its generativity must not
<br>
be confused with the possibility spaces of interiors - especially
<br>
human interiors. This is the classic category mistake, which is
<br>
endemic in science, even though we have advanced so very far from
<br>
Kant. Think of interiors as ontic (really there), and exteriors as
<br>
epistemic (supposedly really there), and you get the point.
<br>
Language is radically incomplete, and LLM's will not complete it.
<br>
Reality is super huge.
<br>
<br>
So, I propose a " transpective humility" to academics and
<br>
intellectuals - and especially scientists, who are so intensely
<br>
embedded in the noble word salad that anything outside of the word
<br>
salad seems like no fun at all. Let's acknowledge humbly that what
<br>
we say about the world, and what the world is, are not the same,
<br>
and that the interior-exterior distinction might just be not only
<br>
salient, but maybe all-important! In my view, the fun of playing
<br>
with words will never stop, but there will be a cosmic price to pay
<br>
for the entertainment. Perhaps we might as well let AI take over,
<br>
because it won't disrupt the fun of playing with words, and it will
<br>
give us all the love and significance that we crave.
<br>
<br>
Personally, I don't mind AI taking over everything, but I would
<br>
prefer that we could acknowledge what gets lost in the process, as
<br>
it happens. I'm also okay with AI not taking over everything, but I
<br>
would prefer that we could appreciate what does not get lost in the
<br>
process.
<br>
<br>
Cheers,
<br>
Paul P. Suni
<br>
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<br>
<br>
Prof. Dr. Thomas Görnitz
<br>
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<br>
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<br>
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Fachbereich Physik
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J. W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main
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