<div dir="auto"><div>Dear Mike, Bill, all,</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I must confess to have slightly lost the plot with the present discussion. It could be just me, but FIS feels like a broken record sometimes. It certainly isn't caused by Bill or Mike - personally I blame the technology... (for reasons of trust and truth which I mentioned earlier - incidentally, on that topic, Ian McGilchrist here is great - <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_KNgKQVkcFI__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmLLx1TFqMvqpGJQrHLAuNtEZYGxm_0B5tm6d7uFSZQLN1wIgZekbPCydezUubeuvQlOPiUQp40U-VWFu2_47gI$">https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=_KNgKQVkcFI</a> )</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I want to suggest a few propositions, relating particularly to Mike's concern for the distinction between machines and living things, and I'm interested if Bill, Mike or others agree. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">1. Although we humans are living things, in the context of a mechanised world, we (and perhaps only we) can behave like machines. The irony of this is that if we knew how machine-like the organic substrate of our consciousness is, we would behave more humanely, organically and less mechanically. This is the essential message of cybernetics. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">2. Our apprehension of what it is to be mechanical is a charicature of mechanism. Essentially human perception of "mechanical" is low-variety, unadaptive and by definition, inorganic - Von Foerster's trivial machine. It is from this charicature that our apprehension of "binary" systems comes. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">3. Our mechanistic charicature comes from an inability to perceive the topology of mechanism. I think this is more than Von Foerster's non-trivial machine, although it may be the case that to build a non-trivial machine a spatial dimension in its behaviour is necessary (see Tom Fischer's work on the Ashby's box: <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337959136_Learning_the_Ashby_Box_an_experiment_in_second_order_cybernetic_modeling__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmLLx1TFqMvqpGJQrHLAuNtEZYGxm_0B5tm6d7uFSZQLN1wIgZekbPCydezUubeuvQlOPiUQp40U-VWFCies8ks$">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337959136_Learning_the_Ashby_Box_an_experiment_in_second_order_cybernetic_modeling</a> ). We miss the full dimensional picture, and so attenuate it, and things like the Ashby box make no sense to us.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">4. If we could perceive the full topology of mechanism we would revise our understanding of logic, binary, distinction, evolution and organisation. I wonder if such a new logic may resemble Joe's work, or Lou's topological work. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">5. Our present rapidly advancing AI technologies are scientific instruments that may yet extend our perception to apprehend the topology of mechanism. Alongside this, empirical biological work (particularly Mike's bioelectricity work) may well complement the technology and help establish a coordinated scientific understanding. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">What do you think? </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Best wishes</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Mark </div><div><br></div><div data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr">Dr. Mark William Johnson<br><div dir="ltr" style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">Faculty of Biology, Medicine and Health</div><div dir="ltr" style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">University of Manchester</div><div dir="ltr" style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></div><div style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">Department of Science Education</div><div style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">University of Copenhagen</div><div style="color:rgb(34,34,34)"><br></div><div style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">Department of Eye and Vision Science (honorary)</div><div style="color:rgb(34,34,34)">University of Liverpool</div>Phone: 07786 064505<br>Email: <a href="mailto:johnsonmwj1@gmail.com" target="_blank">johnsonmwj1@gmail.com</a><br>Blog: <a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!SmLLx1TFqMvqpGJQrHLAuNtEZYGxm_0B5tm6d7uFSZQLN1wIgZekbPCydezUubeuvQlOPiUQp40U-VWFKLJkN30$" target="_blank">http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com</a></div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote gmail_quote_container"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Tue, 13 May 2025, 14:31 Pedro C. Marijuán, <<a href="mailto:pedroc.marijuan@gmail.com">pedroc.marijuan@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p><font size="5">Mind, Life & Machines</font></p>
<p><b><font size="4">From Mike Levin: Living Things Are Not Machines
(Also, They<br>
Totally Are)</font></b><br>
</p>
<p>To start with, different contexts require us to adopt diverse
perspectives as to<br>
how much mind, or mechanism, is before us. The continuing battle
over whether<br>
living beings are or are not machines is based on two mistaken but
pervasive<br>
beliefs. First, the belief that we can objectively and uniquely
nail down what<br>
something is. And second, that our formal models of life,
computers or materials<br>
tell the entire story of their capabilities and limitations.<br>
</p>
<p>Despite the continued expansion and mainstream prominence of
molecular<br>
biology, and its reductionist machine metaphors, or likely because
of it, there has<br>
been an increasing upsurge of papers and science social media
posts arguing that<br>
“living things are not machines” (LTNM). There are thoughtful,
informative,<br>
nuanced pieces exploring this direction, such as this exploration
of “new post-<br>
genomic biology” and others, masterfully reviewed and analyzed by
cognitive<br>
scientist and historian Ann-Sophie Barwich and historian Matthew
James<br>
Rodriguez at Indiana University Bloomington. (A non-exhaustive
list includes<br>
engineer Perry Marshall’s look at how biology transcends the
limits of<br>
computation, computer scientist Alexander Ororbia’s discussion of
“mortal<br>
computation,” biologist Stuart Kauffman and computer scientist
Andrea Roli’s<br>
look at the evolution of the biosphere, and the works of
philosophers like Daniel<br>
Nicholson, George Kampis and Günther Witzani.)</p>
<p>Many others, however, use the siren song of biological
exceptionalism and<br>
outdated or poorly defined notions of “machines” to push a view
that misleads lay<br>
readers and stalls progress in fields such as evolution, cell
biology, biomedicine,<br>
cognitive science (and basal cognition), computer science,
bioengineering,<br>
philosophy and more. All of these fields are held back by hidden
assumptions<br>
within the LTNM-lens that are better shed in favor of a more
fundamental framework.</p>
In arguing against LTNM, I use cognitive science-based <br>
approaches to understand and manipulate biological substrates.<br>
I have claimed that cognition goes all the way down to the molecular
level; after all,<br>
we find memory and learning in small networks of mutually
interacting<br>
chemicals, and studies show that molecular circuits can act as
agential materials.<br>
I take the existence of goals, preferences, problem-solving skills,
attention,<br>
memories, etc., in biological substrates such as cells and tissues
so seriously that<br>
I’ve staked my entire laboratory career on this approach.<br>
<br>
Some molecular biology colleagues consider my views — that bottom-up<br>
molecular approaches simply won’t suffice, and must be augmented
with the tools<br>
and concepts of cognitive science — to be an extreme form of
animism. Thus, my<br>
quarrel with LTNM is not coming from a place of sympathy with
molecular<br>
reductionism; I consider myself squarely within the organicist
tradition of<br>
theoretical biologists like Denis Noble, Brian Goodwin, Robert
Rosen, Francisco<br>
Varela and Humberto Maturana, whose works all focus on the
irreducible,<br>
creative, agential quality of life; however, I want to push this
view further than<br>
many of its adherents might.<br>
<br>
LTNM must go, but we should not replace this concept with its
opposite, <br>
the dreaded presumption that living things are machines;<br>
that is equally wrong and also holds back progress.<br>
Still, it is easy to see why the LTNM-lens persists. The LTNM
framing gives the<br>
feeling that one has said something powerful — cut nature at its
joints with<br>
respect to the most important thing there is, life and mind, by
establishing a<br>
fundamental category that separates life from the rest of the cold,
inanimate<br>
universe. It feels as if it forestalls the constant, pernicious
efforts to reduce the<br>
majesty of life to predictable mechanisms with no ability to drive
consideration or<br>
the first-person experiences that make life worth living.<br>
“Many use the siren song of biological exceptionalism and outdated<br>
or poorly defined notions of ‘machines’ to push a view that misleads<br>
lay readers and stalls progress.”<br>
<br>
But this is all smoke and mirrors, from an idea that took hold as a
bulwark against<br>
reductionism and mechanism; it refuses to go away even though we
have<br>
outgrown it. The approach I am advocating for is anchored by the
principles of<br>
pluralism and pragmatism: no system definitively is our formal model
of it, but if<br>
we move beyond expecting everything to be a nail for one particular
favorite<br>
hammer, we are freed up to do the important work of actually
characterizing the<br>
sets of tools that may open new frontiers.<br>
<br>
As scientists and philosophers, we owe everyone realistic stories of
scaling and<br>
gradual metamorphosis along a continuum — not of magical and sharp<br>
transitions — and a description of the tools we propose to use to
interact with a<br>
wide range of systems, along with a commitment to empirical
evaluation of those<br>
tools. We must battle our innate mind-blindness with new theories in
the field of<br>
Diverse Intelligence and the facilitating technology it enables,
much as a theory<br>
and apparatus for electromagnetism enabled access to an enormous,
unifying<br>
spectrum of phenomena of which we had previously had only narrow,
disparate-<br>
seeming glimpses. We must resist the urge to see the limits of
reality in the limits<br>
of our formal models. Everything, even things that look simple to
us, are a lot<br>
more than we think they are because we, too, are finite observers —
wondrous<br>
embodied minds with limited perspectives but massive potential and
the moral<br>
responsibility to get this (at least somewhat) right.<br>
<i><br>
</i><br>
<i>See an enlarged version of this text at: </i><br>
<p><i><span style="font-size:calc(var(--scale-factor)*8.00px);font-family:serif" role="presentation" dir="ltr"><a href="https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.noemamag.com/living-things-are-not-machines-also-they-totally-are/__;!!D9dNQwwGXtA!TuRf27kMqxXb6vn61GDuY5SQFOpW-2bJsv9g_xjpV95LAvd4KXEvjSvlYJyKOCwm5VRzNhHx_qeJdN1pix7IJbKTwFLX$" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://www.noemamag.com/living-things-are-not-machines-also-they-totally-are/</a></span></i></p>
<p><i><span style="font-size:calc(var(--scale-factor)*8.00px);font-family:serif" role="presentation" dir="ltr">-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
</span><span style="font-size:calc(var(--scale-factor)*8.00px);font-family:serif" role="presentation" dir="ltr"> </span></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-US"><font size="4"><b> From William B. Miller, Jr. : </b></font></span><font size="4"><b><span lang="EN-US">Information in a cellular
framework</span></b><span lang="EN-US"> –
abstract for discussion</span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><font size="4"><span lang="EN-US">See in the accompanying attached
file (for technical reasons)<br>
</span></font></p>
<div align="left">
<blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal" align="center" style="text-align:center"><font size="5"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></font></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span lang="EN-US"> </span></p>
<span style="font-size:calc(var(--scale-factor)*8.00px);font-family:serif" role="presentation" dir="ltr"> </span>
</div>
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