<div dir="ltr">Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information' per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive. <div><br></div><div>STAN </div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
Dear Loet,<br>
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy. <br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
Mark<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-cite-prefix">On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div>Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between<i>
res cogitans</i> and<i> res extensa</i> as two different
realities. Our knowledge in each case that things could have
been different is not out there in the world as something
seizable such as piece of wood.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not
seizable, but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one
measure among others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my
opinion, to enable us to operationalize Descartes'<i> cogitans</i> and
make it amenable to the measurement as information. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided
with meaning by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a
discourse). Some of us prefer to call only thus-meaningful
information real information because it is embedded. One can
also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls",
the physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two
particles have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on
collision, this distribution will change in the ideal case into
7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3)
+ .3 log2 (.3/.7) = .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One
thus can prove that this information is not physical.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Best,</div>
<div>Loet</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364signature_old">
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364x7c68ad0f49114b1">
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364x337b22579712426abf55c20f258d0a74">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:center" align="center"><span>
<hr align="center" size="3" width="100%">
</span></div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1f497d">Loet
Leydesdorff <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1f497d">Professor
emeritus,
University of Amsterdam<br>
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="mailto:loet@leydesdorff.net" title="mailto:loet@leydesdorff.net" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:10.0pt">loet@leydesdorff.net </span></a></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1f497d">; </span><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="http://www.leydesdorff.net/" title="http://www.leydesdorff.net/" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:10.0pt">http://www.leydesdorff.net/</span></a></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1f497d"> <br>
</span><span style="font-size:9pt">Associate Faculty, </span><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">SPRU, </span></a></span><span style="font-size:9pt">University of Sussex; <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:9pt">Guest Professor </span><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">Zhejiang Univ.</span></a></span><span style="font-size:9pt">, Hangzhou; Visiting Professor,
</span><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">ISTIC, </span></a></span><span style="font-size:9pt">Beijing;<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:9pt">Visiting Fellow, </span><span style="color:#44546a"><a href="http://www.bbk.ac.uk/" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">Birkbeck</span></a></span><span style="font-size:9pt">,
University of London; <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#44546a"><span style="font-size:9.0pt"><a href="http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en" target="_blank">http://scholar.google.com/<wbr>citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&<wbr>hl=en</a></span></span></div>
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364x337b22579712426abf55c20f258d0a74"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";color:#44546a"><br>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>------ Original Message ------</div>
<div>From: "Burgin, Mark" <<a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>></div>
<div>To: "Søren Brier" <<a href="mailto:sbr.msc@cbs.dk" target="_blank">sbr.msc@cbs.dk</a>>;
"Krassimir Markov" <<a href="mailto:markov@foibg.com" target="_blank">markov@foibg.com</a>>;
<a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">"fis@listas.unizar.es"</a> <<a href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>></div>
<div>Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM</div>
<div>Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical
analysis</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364x2d3837418cdb4d5" style="color:#000000">
<blockquote cite="http://5B062239.1050709@math.ucla.edu" type="cite" class="m_-8619733060945975364cite2"> Dear Søren,<br>
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you
only the Physical World is real. So, information has to by
physical if it is real, or it cannot be real if it is not
physical.<br>
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which
includes other realities, as it was demonstrated in my book
“Structural Reality,” allows understand information as real
but not physical.<br>
<br>
<span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
Sincerely,<br>
Mark</span><br>
<br>
<div class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-cite-prefix">On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="m_-8619733060945975364cite">
<div class="m_-8619733060945975364WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d">Dear
Mark<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d" lang="EN-US">Using ’physical’ this way it just tends
to mean ’real’, but that raises the problem of how to
define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s theorem or
mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)?
Is subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do
believe you are a conscious subject with feelings, but
I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical
then?? I only see what you write and your behavior.
And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So
here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more
generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in cognition
and communication). We have problems encompassing
these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the
technical sciences that makes up the foundation of
most conceptions of information science.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d" lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d" lang="EN-US"> Best<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d" lang="EN-US"> Søren<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1f497d" lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #e1e1e1 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif">Fra:</span></b><span style="font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"> Fis <a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank"><fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es></a>
<b>På vegne af </b>Krassimir Markov<br>
<b>Sendt:</b> 17. maj 2018 11:33<br>
<b>Til:</b> <a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>;
Burgin, Mark <a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank"><mburgin@math.ucla.edu></a><br>
<b>Emne:</b> Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A
logical analysis<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Mark and FIS Colleagues,</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">First
of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a
paper and to publish it in IJ ITA.</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">It
will be nice to continue our common work this
way.</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">At
the second place, I want to point that till now
the discussion on </span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Is
information physical?</span></b><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">was
more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and
antithesis to discuss and to come to some
conclusions.</span><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as
the needed thesis.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">What
about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to
write something below.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">For
me, physical, structural and mental are one
and the same.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Mental
means physical reflections and physical
processes in the Infos consciousness. I.e.
“physical” include “mental”.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Structure
(as I understand this concept) is mental
reflection of the relationships “between”
and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well
as “between” and/or “in” mental (physical)
entities.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I.e.
“physical” include “mental” include
“structural”.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Finally,
IF “information is physical, structural and
mental” THEN simply the “information is
physical”!</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Friendly
greetings</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Krassimir</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" title="mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank">Burgin,
Mark</a> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">Sent:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">
Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">To:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <a href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" title="fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank"></a><a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">Subject:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> Re:
[Fis] Is information physical? A logical
analysis<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> Dear FISers,<br>
It was an interesting discussion, in which
many highly intelligent and creative individuals
participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As
a conclusion to this discussion, I would like to
suggest a logical analysis of the problem based
on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.<br>
<br>
To great extent, our possibility to answer
the question “Is information physical? “ depends
on our model of the world. Note that here
physical means the nature of information and not
its substance, or more exactly, the substance of
its carrier, which can be physical, chemical
biological or quantum. By the way, expression
“quantum information” is only the way of
expressing that the carrier of information
belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is
similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or
“decimal numbers”, which are only forms or
number representations and not numbers
themselves.<br>
<br>
If we assume that there is only the physical
world, we have, at first, to answer the question
“Does information exist? “ All FISers assume
that information exists. Otherwise, they would
not participate in our discussions. However,
some people think differently (cf., for example,
Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without
information).<br>
<br>
Now assuming that information exists, we have
only one option, namely, to admit that
information is physical because only physical
things exist.<br>
If we assume that there are two worlds -
information is physical, we have three options
assuming that information exists:<br>
- information is physical<br>
- information is mental<br>
- information is both physical and mental <br>
<br>
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the
World, which comprises three worlds - the
physical world, the mental world and the world
of structures, we have seven options assuming
that information exists:<br>
- information is physical<br>
- information is mental<br>
- information is structural <br>
- information is both physical and mental <br>
- information is both physical and structural <br>
- information is both structural and mental <br>
- information is physical, structural and
mental <br>
<br>
The solution suggested by the general theory of
information tries to avoid unnecessary
multiplication of essences suggesting that
information (in a general sense) exists in all
three worlds but … in the physical world, it is
called <b>energy</b>, in the mental world, it
is called <b>mental energy</b>, and in the
world of structures, it is called <b>information</b>
(in the strict sense). This conclusion well
correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson
that information is both physical and not
physical only the general theory of information
makes this idea more exact and testable.<br>
In addition, being in the world of
structures, information in the strict sense is
represented in two other worlds by its
representations and carriers. Note that any
representation of information is its carrier but
not each carrier of information is its
representation. For instance, an envelope with a
letter is a carrier of information in this
letter but it is not its representation.<br>
Besides, it is possible to call all three
faces of information by the name energy -
physical energy, mental energy and structural
energy.<br>
<br>
Finally, as many interesting ideas were
suggested in this discussion, may be Krassimir
will continue his excellent initiative combining
the most interesting contributions into a paper
with the title<br>
<wbr> <wbr>
<b>Is information physical?</b><br>
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br>
Mark Burgin<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">On
5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Arturo, <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">There
were some reports in clinical psychology,
about 30 years ago, that relate to the
question whether a machine can pretend to
be a therapist. That was the time as
computers could newly be used in an
interactive fashion, and the Rogers
techniques were a current discovery.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">(Rogers
developed a dialogue method where one does
not address the contents of what the
patient says, but rather the emotional
aspects of the message, assumed to be at
work in the patient.)<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">They
then said, that in some cases it was
indistinguishable, whether a human or a
machine provides the answer to a patient's
elucidations. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Progress
since then has surely made possible to
create machines that are indistinguishable
in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is
called "expert systems ", are widely used
in many fields. If the interaction is
rational, that is: formally equivalent to
a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein,
the difference in: "who arrived at this
answer, machinery or a human", becomes
irrelevant. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Artistry,
intuition, creativity are presently seen
as not possible to translate into
Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner
instincts are not yet well understood.
But!: there are some who are busily
undermining the current fundamentals of
rational thinking. So there is hope that
we shall live to experience the ultimate
disillusionment, namely that humans are a
combinatorial tautology. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Accordingly,
may I respectfully express opposing views
to what you state: that machines and
humans are of incompatible builds. There
are hints that as far as rational
capabilities go, the same principles
apply. There is a rest, you say, which is
not of this kind. The counter argument
says that irrational processes do not take
place in organisms, therefore what you
refer to belongs to the main process,
maybe like waste belongs to the organism's
principle. This view draws a picture of a
functional biotope, in which the waste of
one kind of organism is raw material for a
different kind. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Karl
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><<a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" target="_blank"></a><a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" target="_blank">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>>
schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #cccccc 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<p style="margin-top:0cm"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Bruno, <br>
You state: <br>
"IF indexical digital mechanism is
correct in the cognitive science,<br>
THEN “physical” has to be defined
entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a mathematical
notion.<br>
...Indexical digital mechanism is the
hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that
I would survive, or “not feel any
change” if my brain/body is replaced by
a digital machine emulating the
brain/body at that level of
description".<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
problem of your account is the
following:<br>
You say "IF" and "indexical digital
mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".<br>
Therefore, you are talking of an
HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested
and it is not empirically testable. You
are starting with a sort of postulate:
I, and other people, do not agree with
it. The current neuroscience does not
state that our brain/body is (or can be
replaced by) a digital machine.<br>
In other words, your "IF" stands for
something that possibly does not exist
in our real world. Here your entire
building falls down. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-default-signature">
<p><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">--<br>
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">giovedì,
10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno
Marchal <a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" target="_blank">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br>
<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid #85af31 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm 8.0pt;margin-left:7.5pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<div>
<div id="m_-8619733060945975364m_1048372877214317129style_15259565360000035165_BODY">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">(This
mail has been sent
previously , but without
success. I resend it, with
minor changes). Problems due
to different accounts. It
was my first comment to Mark
Burgin new thread “Is
information physical?”.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Mark, Dear Colleagues, <u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Apology
for not answering the mails
in the chronological orders,
as my new computer
classifies them in some
mysterious way!<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">This
is my first post of the
week. I might answer
comment, if any, at the end
of the week.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">On 25 Apr 2018, at
03:47, Burgin, Mark
<<a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank"></a><a class="m_-8619733060945975364moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>>
wrote:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear Colleagues,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I would like to
suggest the new topic
for discussion<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <wbr>
Is information
physical?<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">That
is an important topic
indeed, very close to
what I am working on. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">My
result here is that <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">IF</span></u></b><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> indexical digital
mechanism is correct in
the cognitive science, <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">THEN</span></u></b><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> “physical” has to
be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
proof is constructive.
It shows exactly how to
derive physics from
Arithmetic (the reality,
not the theory. I use
“reality” instead of
“model" (logician’s
term, because physicists
use “model" for
“theory").<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Indexical
digital mechanism is the
hypothesis that there is
a level of description
of the brain/body such
that I would survive, or
“not feel any change” if
my brain/body is
replaced by a digital
machine emulating the
brain/body at that level
of description.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Not
only information is not
physical, but matter,
time, space, and all
physical objects become
part of the universal
machine phenomenology.
Physics is reduced to
arithmetic, or,
equivalently, to any
Turing-complete
machinery. Amazingly
Arithmetic (even the
tiny semi-computable
part of arithmetic) is
Turing complete (Turing
Universal).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
basic idea is that:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">1)
no universal machine can
distinguish if she is
executed by an
arithmetical reality or
by a physical reality.
And,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">2)
all universal machines
are executed in
arithmetic, and they are
necessarily undetermined
on the set of of all its
continuations emulated
in arithmetic. <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">That
reduces physics to a
statistics on all
computations relative to
my actual state, and see
from some first person
points of view
(something I can
describe more precisely
in some future post
perhaps).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Put
in that way, the proof
is not constructive, as,
if we are machine, we
cannot know which
machine we are. But
Gödel’s incompleteness
can be used to recover
this constructively for
a simpler machine than
us, like Peano
arithmetic. This way of
proceeding enforces the
distinction between
first and third person
views (and six others!).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
have derived already
many feature of quantum
mechanics from this
(including the
possibility of quantum
computer) a long time
ago. I was about sure
this would refute
Mechanism, until I
learned about quantum
mechanics, which
verifies all the most
startling predictions of
Indexical Mechanism,
unless we add the
controversial wave
collapse reduction
principle.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
curious “many-worlds”
becomes the obvious (in
arithmetic) many
computations (up to some
equivalence quotient).
The weird indeterminacy
becomes the simpler
amoeba like duplication.
The non-cloning of
matter becomes obvious:
as any piece of matter
is the result of the
first person
indeterminacy (the first
person view of the
amoeba undergoing a
duplication, …) on
infinitely many
computations. This
entails also that
neither matter
appearance nor
consciousness are Turing
emulable per se, as the
whole arithmetical
reality—which is a
highly non computable
notion as we know since
Gödel—plays a key role.
Note this makes Digital
Physics leaning to
inconsistency, as it
implies indexical
computationalism which
implies the negation of
Digital Physics (unless
my “body” is the entire
physical universe, which
I rather doubt).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">My opinion is
presented below:<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> Why some people
erroneously think
that information is
physical<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> The main reason to
think that
information is
physical is the
strong belief of
many people,
especially,
scientists that
there is only
physical reality,
which is studied by
science. At the same
time, people
encounter something
that they call
information.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> When people receive a
letter, they
comprehend that it
is information
because with the
letter they receive
information. The
letter is physical,
i.e., a physical
object. As a result,
people start
thinking that
information is
physical. When
people receive an
e-mail, they
comprehend that it
is information
because with the
e-mail they receive
information. The
e-mail comes to the
computer in the form
of electromagnetic
waves, which are
physical. As a
result, people start
thinking even more
that information is
physical.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> However, letters,
electromagnetic
waves and actually
all physical objects
are only carriers or
containers of
information.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> To understand this
better, let us
consider a textbook.
Is possible to say
that this book is
knowledge? Any
reasonable person
will tell that the
textbook contains
knowledge but is not
knowledge itself. In
the same way, the
textbook contains
information but is
not information
itself. The same is
true for letters,
e-mails,
electromagnetic
waves and other
physical objects
because all of them
only contain
information but are
not information. For
instance, as we
know, different
letters can contain
the same
information. Even if
we make an identical
copy of a letter or
any other text, then
the letter and its
copy will be
different physical
objects (physical
things) but they
will contain the
same information.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> Information belongs to
a different
(non-physical) world
of knowledge, data
and similar
essences. In spite
of this, information
can act on physical
objects (physical
bodies) and this
action also misleads
people who think
that information is
physical.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">OK.
The reason is that we
can hardly imagine how
immaterial or non
physical objects can
alter the physical
realm. It is the usual
problem faced by dualist
ontologies. With
Indexical
computationalism we
recover many dualities,
but they belong to the
phenomenologies.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> One more misleading
property of
information is that
people can measure
it. This brings an
erroneous assumption
that it is possible
to measure only
physical essences.
Naturally, this
brings people to the
erroneous conclusion
that information is
physical. However,
measuring
information is
essentially
different than
measuring physical
quantities, i.e.,
weight. There are no
“scales” that
measure information.
Only human intellect
can do this.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">OK.
I think all intellect
can do that, not just he
human one.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Now,
the reason why people
believe in the physical
is always a form of the
“knocking table”
argument. They knocks on
the table and say “you
will not tell me that
this table is unreal”.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
have got so many people
giving me that argument,
that I have made dreams
in which I made that
argument, or even where
I was convinced by that
argument … until I wake
up.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">When
we do metaphysics with
the scientific method,
this “dream argument”
illustrates that seeing,
measuring, … cannot
prove anything
ontological. A
subjective experience
proves only the
phenomenological
existence of
consciousness, and
nothing more. It shows
that although there are
plenty of strong
evidences for a material
reality, there are no
evidences (yet) for a
primitive or primary
matter (and that is why,
I think, Aristotle
assumes it quasi
explicitly, against
Plato, and plausibly
against Pythagorus).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Mechanism
forces a coming back to
Plato, where the worlds
of ideas is the world of
programs, or
information, or even
just numbers, since very
elementary arithmetic
(PA without induction, +
the predecessor axiom)
is already Turing
complete (it contains
what I have named a
Universal Dovetailer: a
program which generates
*and* executes all
programs).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">So
I agree with you:
information is not
physical. I claim that
if we assume Mechanism
(Indexical
computationalism) matter
itself is also not
*primarily* physical: it
is all in the “head of
the universal
machine/number” (so to
speak).<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">And
this provides a test for
primary matter: it is
enough to find if there
is a discrepancy between
the physics that we
infer from the
observation, and the
physics that we extract
from “the head” of the
machine. This took me
more than 30 years of
work, but the results
obtained up to now is
that there is no
discrepancies. I have
compared the quantum
logic imposed by
incompleteness
(formally) on the
semi-computable (partial
recursive, sigma_1)
propositions, with most
quantum logics given by
physicists, and it fits
rather well.<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Best
regards,<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Bruno<u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Fis mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br>
<a href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" target="_blank">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr>bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Fis mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br>
<a href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" target="_blank">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr>bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</blockquote>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><br>
<br>
<br>
<u></u><u></u></span></p>
<pre>______________________________<wbr>_________________<u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre>Fis mailing list<u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre><a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><u></u><u></u></pre>
<pre><a href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" target="_blank">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr>bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><u></u><u></u></pre>
</blockquote>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><u></u> <u></u></span></p>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:center" align="center"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
<hr align="center" size="3" width="100%"> </span></div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Fis mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br>
<a href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" target="_blank">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr>bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><u></u><u></u></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</blockquote>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
Fis mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br>
<a href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr>bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><br>
<br></blockquote></div><br></div>