<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Thanks Lou, you are surely right to point out the object-nature
of concepts.<br>
</p>
<div class="">>There is no escape from sooner or later realizing
that 2 exists only in the mind or in the Mind.<br>
<br>
Indeed. Our minds are full of such concepts. It seems that one of
the important activities of the mind is to generate 'things' from
the processes that impinge upon us. This makes living our lives
much simpler (we don't need to set about curating the collection
of all couples).<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="">>Mind as eigenform never happens except at the
limit where self-reference occurs.<br>
<br>
I found it useful to read your paper on that is to be found at
eigenforms <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Eigen.pdf">http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Eigen.pdf</a>.<br>
<br>
Best<br>
<br>
Dai<br>
<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 24/05/18 05:08, Louis H Kauffman
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:BDB16228-8C40-4F26-9DB9-FCFA13F6D2C7@uic.edu">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<div class="">Dai,</div>
<div class="">I start down a road toward attempting to understand
information by first understanding number and form.</div>
<div class="">|</div>
<div class="">||</div>
<div class="">|||</div>
<div class="">||||</div>
<div class="">|||||</div>
<div class="">…</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">Is a number a thing?</div>
<div class="">Is 2 a thing?</div>
<div class="">Cannot say that this 2, this || “is” two. Rather
it partakes in being a couple.</div>
<div class="">2 is relational. We say that there are 2 signs in
the word “is" because a standard couple can be matched to the
i and the s.</div>
<div class="">There is a potential process behind the concept 2.</div>
<div class="">2 is a concept, but you cannot point to any
existent “thing” and say “that is 2”.</div>
<div class="">You can only say there are 2 of them here,
indicating relationship.</div>
<div class="">So process can also be subordinate to the
existence of a something if that something is a concept.</div>
<div class="">Numbers exist.</div>
<div class="">Numbers are concepts.</div>
<div class="">Numbers are related to processes of matching and
comparing.</div>
<div class="">But numbers are not these processes only.</div>
<div class="">No thing is so real as the number 2.</div>
<div class="">Numbers are at the base of what we mean by
information.</div>
<div class="">Do you want the actual couples to somehow allow 2
to emerge in the proliferation of many many couples?</div>
<div class="">Russel said: “2 is the collection of all couples.”</div>
<div class="">Are you convinced that the collection of all
possible couples captures the concept of 2?</div>
<div class="">I doubt it unless you take collection to be a
verb.</div>
<div class="">There is no escape from sooner or later realizing
that 2 exists only in the mind or in the Mind.</div>
<div class="">Mind as eigenform never happens except at the
limit where self-reference occurs.</div>
<div class="">I am the observed link between myself and
observing myself (HVF).</div>
<div class="">Lou</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On May 17, 2018, at 6:44 AM, Dai Griffiths
<<a href="mailto:dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com" class=""
moz-do-not-send="true">dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class="">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8" class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<p class="">What is a 'thing'? <br class="">
</p>
<p class="">Perhaps it is more reasonable to think
that only processes exist, and that for human
convenience in living in the world we put conceptual
membranes around some parts of those processes and
call them 'things'. From this point of view we do
not have two aspects (things and predictions about
those things), but simply the monitoring of
processes, and theorising about what we find. This
does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g.
mechanisms might be a special kind of process).<br
class="">
</p>
<p class="">Perhaps our "Is information physical"
problem could be usefully reformulated as "Is
information a thing?".<br class="">
</p>
Dai<br class="">
<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose
Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAMEsQ-vORLzewKMRjuCgphxiQRssebdmaX-uWJT81m4rH7Gw=A@mail.gmail.com"
class="">
<p dir="ltr" class="">Dear FISers, </p>
<p dir="ltr" class="">I recently came across an old
interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an idea
-maybe not very original per se. Quine
distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems:
ontological (those referred to the existence of
things) and predicative (what can we say and know
about things). Against Quine materialism I came
across the idea that ontological problems are
undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem.
The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative
realm. All we have as scientists is scientifical
statements (therefore I think of Science as a
communicative social system differentiated from
its environment by means of a code -I think Loet
would agree with me in this point). As a system (I
mean not the social system, but the set of
statements taken as a unity) they all are
incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it,
as logicians have shown (in this point I confess I
would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's
ideas. I think I have many points of agreement
with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I
currently lack the knowledge to undertake a
thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is
one of the most coherent ways to deal with it. But
this means we have to learn to deal with
paradoxes. <br class="">
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need
to identify the constitutive paradox of
information and next unfold that paradox in a set
of statements that represent what we know about
information. The problem is that although we can
have the intuition that information is real,
physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An
external reference like "reality ", if we look
carefully, acts as regulatory function within the
system. I remember that in the "Science of the
Society", Luhmann devised the concept of
consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality
as such, the Ding an sich, is inaccessible. In
conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be
asking us a question that cannot be answered. </p>
<p dir="ltr" class="">Best,</p>
<p dir="ltr" class="">JJ</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM,
"Burgin, Mark" <<a
href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>>
escribió:<br type="attribution" class="">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="">
Dear FISers,<br class="">
It was an interesting discussion, in which
many highly intelligent and creative
individuals participated expressing different
points of view. Many interesting ideas were
suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion,
I would like to suggest a logical analysis of
the problem based on our intrinsic and often
tacit assumptions.<br class="">
<br class="">
To great extent, our possibility to answer
the question “Is information physical? “
depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information
and not its substance, or more exactly, the
substance of its carrier, which can be
physical, chemical biological or quantum. By
the way, expression “quantum information” is
only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of
nature. This is similar to the expressions
“mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which
are only forms or number representations and
not numbers themselves.<br class="">
<br class="">
If we assume that there is only the physical
world, we have, at first, to answer the
question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise,
they would not participate in our discussions.
However, some people think differently (cf.,
for example, Furner, J. (2004) Information
studies without information).<br class="">
<br class="">
Now assuming that information exists, we
have only one option, namely, to admit that
information is physical because only physical
things exist.<br class="">
If we assume that there are two worlds -
information is physical, we have three options
assuming that information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br
class="">
<br class="">
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of
the World, which comprises three worlds - the
physical world, the mental world and the world
of structures, we have seven options assuming
that information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is structural <br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br
class="">
- information is both physical and structural
<br class="">
- information is both structural and mental <br
class="">
- information is physical, structural and
mental <br class="">
<br class="">
The solution suggested by the general theory
of information tries to avoid unnecessary
multiplication of essences suggesting that
information (in a general sense) exists in all
three worlds but … in the physical world, it
is called <b class="">energy</b>, in the
mental world, it is called <b class="">mental
energy</b>, and in the world of structures,
it is called <b class="">information</b> (in
the strict sense). This conclusion well
correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson
that information is both physical and not
physical only the general theory of
information makes this idea more exact and
testable.<br class="">
In addition, being in the world of
structures, information in the strict sense is
represented in two other worlds by its
representations and carriers. Note that any
representation of information is its carrier
but not each carrier of information is its
representation. For instance, an envelope with
a letter is a carrier of information in this
letter but it is not its representation.<br
class="">
Besides, it is possible to call all three
faces of information by the name energy -
physical energy, mental energy and structural
energy.<br class="">
<br class="">
Finally, as many interesting ideas were
suggested in this discussion, may be Krassimir
will continue his excellent initiative
combining the most interesting contributions
into a paper with the title<br class="">
<b class=""> Is
information physical?</b><br class="">
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.<br
class="">
<br class="">
Sincerely,<br class="">
Mark Burgin<br class="">
<br class="">
<div
class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-cite-prefix">On
5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:<br
class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div dir="auto" class="">Dear Arturo,
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">There were some
reports in clinical psychology, about 30
years ago, that relate to the question
whether a machine can pretend to be a
therapist. That was the time as
computers could newly be used in an
interactive fashion, and the Rogers
techniques were a current discovery.</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">(Rogers developed
a dialogue method where one does not
address the contents of what the patient
says, but rather the emotional aspects
of the message, assumed to be at work in
the patient.)</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">They then said,
that in some cases it was
indistinguishable, whether a human or a
machine provides the answer to a
patient's elucidations. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Progress since
then has surely made possible to create
machines that are indistinguishable in
interaction to humans. Indeed, what is
called "expert systems ", are widely
used in many fields. If the interaction
is rational, that is: formally
equivalent to a logical discussion modi
Wittgenstein, the difference in: "who
arrived at this answer, machinery or a
human", becomes irrelevant. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Artistry,
intuition, creativity are presently seen
as not possible to translate into
Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner
instincts are not yet well understood.
But!: there are some who are busily
undermining the current fundamentals of
rational thinking. So there is hope that
we shall live to experience the ultimate
disillusionment, namely that humans are
a combinatorial tautology. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Accordingly, may
I respectfully express opposing views to
what you state: that machines and humans
are of incompatible builds. There are
hints that as far as rational
capabilities go, the same principles
apply. There is a rest, you say, which
is not of this kind. The counter
argument says that irrational processes
do not take place in organisms,
therefore what you refer to belongs to
the main process, maybe like waste
belongs to the organism's principle.
This view draws a picture of a
functional biotope, in which the waste
of one kind of organism is raw material
for a different kind. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Karl </div>
</div>
<br class="">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class=""> <<a
href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>>
schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:<br
class="">
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="">
<p style="margin-top:0px" dir="ltr"
class="">Dear Bruno, <br class="">
You state: <br class="">
"IF indexical digital mechanism is
correct in the cognitive science,<br
class="">
THEN “physical” has to be defined
entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a mathematical
notion.<br class="">
...Indexical digital mechanism is
the hypothesis that there is a level
of description of the brain/body
such that I would survive, or “not
feel any change” if my brain/body is
replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at that
level of description".</p>
<p dir="ltr" class="">The problem of
your account is the following:<br
class="">
You say "IF" and "indexical digital
mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".<br
class="">
Therefore, you are talking of an
HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically
tested and it is not empirically
testable. You are starting with a
sort of postulate: I, and other
people, do not agree with it. The
current neuroscience does not state
that our brain/body is (or can be
replaced by) a digital machine.<br
class="">
In other words, your "IF" stands for
something that possibly does not
exist in our real world. Here your
entire building falls down. <br
class="">
</p>
<div
id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-default-signature"
class="">
<p dir="ltr" class="">--<br class="">
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android</p>
</div>
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM
+02:00 da Bruno Marchal <a
class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br
class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote
id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-quote"
style="border-left:1px solid
#85af31;margin:0px 0px 0px
10px;padding:0px 0px 0px 10px"
cite="http://15259565360000035165/"
class="">
<div
class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129js-helper
m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129js-readmsg-msg">
<div class="">
<div
id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129style_15259565360000035165_BODY"
class="">
<div
class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129class_1525973693">
<div class="">(This mail has
been sent previously , but
without success. I resend
it, with minor changes).
Problems due to different
accounts. It was my first
comment to Mark Burgin new
thread “Is information
physical?”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Apology for
not answering the mails in
the chronological orders,
as my new computer
classifies them in some
mysterious way!</div>
<div class="">This is my
first post of the week. I
might answer comment, if
any, at the end of the
week.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite"
class="">
<div class="">On 25
Apr 2018, at 03:47,
Burgin, Mark <<a
href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" rel=" noopener noreferrer
noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br
class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class="">
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">Dear
Colleagues,</p>
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">I would
like to suggest
the new topic for
discussion</p>
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""> <wbr
class="">
Is information
physical?<br
class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">That is an
important topic
indeed, very close to
what I am working on. </div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">My result
here is that </div>
<div class=""><b
class=""><u class=""><br
class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b
class=""><u class="">IF</u></b> indexical
digital mechanism is
correct in the
cognitive science, </div>
<div class=""><b
class=""><u class=""><br
class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b
class=""><u class="">THEN</u></b> “physical”
has to be defined
entirely in
arithmetical term,
i.e. “physical”
becomes a mathematical
notion.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">The proof
is constructive. It
shows exactly how to
derive physics from
Arithmetic (the
reality, not the
theory. I use
“reality” instead of
“model" (logician’s
term, because
physicists use “model"
for “theory").</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Indexical
digital mechanism is
the hypothesis that
there is a level of
description of the
brain/body such that I
would survive, or “not
feel any change” if my
brain/body is replaced
by a digital machine
emulating the
brain/body at that
level of description.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Not only
information is not
physical, but matter,
time, space, and all
physical objects
become part of the
universal machine
phenomenology. Physics
is reduced to
arithmetic, or,
equivalently, to any
Turing-complete
machinery. Amazingly
Arithmetic (even the
tiny semi-computable
part of arithmetic) is
Turing complete
(Turing Universal).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">The basic
idea is that:</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">1) no
universal machine can
distinguish if she is
executed by an
arithmetical reality
or by a physical
reality. And,</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">2) all
universal machines are
executed in
arithmetic, and they
are necessarily
undetermined on the
set of of all its
continuations emulated
in arithmetic. </div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">That
reduces physics to a
statistics on all
computations relative
to my actual state,
and see from some
first person points of
view (something I can
describe more
precisely in some
future post perhaps).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Put in
that way, the proof is
not constructive, as,
if we are machine, we
cannot know which
machine we are. But
Gödel’s incompleteness
can be used to recover
this constructively
for a simpler machine
than us, like Peano
arithmetic. This way
of proceeding enforces
the distinction
between first and
third person views
(and six others!).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have
derived already many
feature of quantum
mechanics from this
(including the
possibility of quantum
computer) a long time
ago. I was about sure
this would refute
Mechanism, until I
learned about quantum
mechanics, which
verifies all the most
startling predictions
of Indexical
Mechanism, unless we
add the controversial
wave collapse
reduction principle.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">The
curious “many-worlds”
becomes the obvious
(in arithmetic) many
computations (up to
some equivalence
quotient). The weird
indeterminacy becomes
the simpler amoeba
like duplication. The
non-cloning of matter
becomes obvious: as
any piece of matter is
the result of the
first person
indeterminacy (the
first person view of
the amoeba undergoing
a duplication, …) on
infinitely many
computations. This
entails also that
neither matter
appearance nor
consciousness are
Turing emulable per
se, as the whole
arithmetical
reality—which is a
highly non computable
notion as we know
since Gödel—plays a
key role. Note this
makes Digital Physics
leaning to
inconsistency, as it
implies indexical
computationalism which
implies the negation
of Digital Physics
(unless my “body” is
the entire physical
universe, which I
rather doubt).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite"
class="">
<div class="">
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">My
opinion is
presented below:<br
class="">
</p>
<div
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><br
class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><br
class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>Why
some people
erroneously
think that
information is
physical</span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""> </span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>The
main reason to
think that
information is
physical is the
strong belief of
many people,
especially,
scientists that
there is only
physical
reality, which
is studied by
science. At the
same time,
people encounter
something that
they call
information.</span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>When
people receive a
letter, they
comprehend that
it is
information
because with the
letter they
receive
information. The
letter is
physical, i.e.,
a physical
object. As a
result, people
start thinking
that information
is physical.
When people
receive an
e-mail, they
comprehend that
it is
information
because with the
e-mail they
receive
information. The
e-mail comes to
the computer in
the form of
electromagnetic
waves, which are
physical. As a
result, people
start thinking
even more that
information is
physical.</span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>However,
letters,
electromagnetic
waves and
actually all
physical objects
are only
carriers or
containers of
information.</span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>To
understand this
better, let us
consider a
textbook. Is
possible to say
that this book
is knowledge?
Any reasonable
person will tell
that the
textbook
contains
knowledge but is
not knowledge
itself. In the
same way, the
textbook
contains
information but
is not
information
itself. The same
is true for
letters,
e-mails,
electromagnetic
waves and other
physical objects
because all of
them only
contain
information but
are not
information. For
instance, as we
know, different
letters can
contain the same
information.
Even if we make
an identical
copy of a letter
or any other
text, then the
letter and its
copy will be
different
physical objects
(physical
things) but they
will contain the
same
information.</span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>Information
belongs to a
different
(non-physical)
world of
knowledge, data
and similar
essences. In
spite of this,
information can
act on physical
objects
(physical
bodies) and this
action also
misleads people
who think that
information is
physical.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. The
reason is that we can
hardly imagine how
immaterial or non
physical objects can
alter the physical
realm. It is the usual
problem faced by
dualist ontologies.
With Indexical
computationalism we
recover many
dualities, but they
belong to the
phenomenologies.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite"
class="">
<div class="">
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""></span></div>
<div
style="margin:0in
0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span
class=""><span
class=""> </span>One
more misleading
property of
information is
that people can
measure it. This
brings an
erroneous
assumption that
it is possible
to measure only
physical
essences.
Naturally, this
brings people to
the erroneous
conclusion that
information is
physical.
However,
measuring
information is
essentially
different than
measuring
physical
quantities,
i.e., weight.
There are no
“scales” that
measure
information.
Only human
intellect can do
this.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. I
think all intellect
can do that, not just
he human one.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Now, the
reason why people
believe in the
physical is always a
form of the “knocking
table” argument. They
knocks on the table
and say “you will not
tell me that this
table is unreal”.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have got
so many people giving
me that argument, that
I have made dreams in
which I made that
argument, or even
where I was convinced
by that argument …
until I wake up.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">When we do
metaphysics with the
scientific method,
this “dream argument”
illustrates that
seeing, measuring, …
cannot prove anything
ontological. A
subjective experience
proves only the
phenomenological
existence of
consciousness, and
nothing more. It shows
that although there
are plenty of strong
evidences for a
material reality,
there are no evidences
(yet) for a primitive
or primary matter (and
that is why, I think,
Aristotle assumes it
quasi explicitly,
against Plato, and
plausibly against
Pythagorus).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism
forces a coming back
to Plato, where the
worlds of ideas is the
world of programs, or
information, or even
just numbers, since
very elementary
arithmetic (PA without
induction, + the
predecessor axiom) is
already Turing
complete (it contains
what I have named a
Universal Dovetailer:
a program which
generates *and*
executes all
programs).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">So I agree
with you: information
is not physical. I
claim that if we
assume Mechanism
(Indexical
computationalism)
matter itself is also
not *primarily*
physical: it is all in
the “head of the
universal
machine/number” (so to
speak).</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">And this
provides a test for
primary matter: it is
enough to find if
there is a discrepancy
between the physics
that we infer from the
observation, and the
physics that we
extract from “the
head” of the machine.
This took me more than
30 years of work, but
the results obtained
up to now is that
there is no
discrepancies. I have
compared the quantum
logic imposed by
incompleteness
(formally) on the
semi-computable
(partial recursive,
sigma_1) propositions,
with most quantum
logics given by
physicists, and it
fits rather well.</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best
regards,</div>
<div class=""><br
class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="">______________________________<wbr
class="">_________________<br
class="">
Fis mailing list<br class="">
<a
href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br
class="">
<a
href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr
class="">bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><br
class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
______________________________<wbr
class="">_________________<br class="">
Fis mailing list<br class="">
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br
class="">
<a
href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis"
rel="noreferrer noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr
class="">bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><br
class="">
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class="">
<fieldset
class="m_-6888820020232975365mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br class="">
<pre class="">______________________________<wbr class="">_________________
Fis mailing list
<a class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a>
<a class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr class="">bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
______________________________<wbr class="">_________________<br
class="">
Fis mailing list<br class="">
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br
class="">
<a
href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-<wbr
class="">bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><br
class="">
<br class="">
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class="">
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br class="">
<pre class="" wrap="">_______________________________________________
Fis mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" moz-do-not-send="true">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis" moz-do-not-send="true">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br class="">
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
-----------------------------------------
Professor David (Dai) Griffiths
Professor of Education
School of Education and Psychology
The University of Bolton
Deane Road
Bolton, BL3 5AB
Office: M106
SKYPE: daigriffiths
Phones (please don't leave voice mail)
UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559
Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912
Work landline: + 44 (0)1204903598
email
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:d.e.griffiths@bolton.ac.uk" moz-do-not-send="true">d.e.griffiths@bolton.ac.uk</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com" moz-do-not-send="true">dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com</a></pre>
</div>
_______________________________________________<br
class="">
Fis mailing list<br class="">
<a href="mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es" class=""
moz-do-not-send="true">Fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br
class="">
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis">http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis</a><br
class="">
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br class="">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
-----------------------------------------
Professor David (Dai) Griffiths
Professor of Education
School of Education and Psychology
The University of Bolton
Deane Road
Bolton, BL3 5AB
Office: M106
SKYPE: daigriffiths
Phones (please don't leave voice mail)
UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559
Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912
Work landline: + 44 (0)1204903598
email
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:d.e.griffiths@bolton.ac.uk">d.e.griffiths@bolton.ac.uk</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com">dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com</a></pre>
</body>
</html>