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<body><div>Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,</div><div><br /></div><div>The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between<i> res cogitans</i> and<i> res extensa</i> as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable such as piece of wood.</div><div><br /></div><div>Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize Descartes'<i> cogitans</i> and make it amenable to the measurement as information. </div><div><br /></div><div>Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.</div><div><br /></div><div>In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) = .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this information is not physical.</div><div><br /></div><div>Best,</div><div>Loet</div>
<div><br /></div><div id="signature_old"><div id="x7c68ad0f49114b1"><div id="x337b22579712426abf55c20f258d0a74">
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<p class="MsoNormal" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1F497D">Loet
Leydesdorff <o:p xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1F497D">Professor emeritus,
University of Amsterdam<br />
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)<o:p xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="mailto:loet@leydesdorff.net" title="mailto:loet@leydesdorff.net"><span style="font-size:10.0pt">loet@leydesdorff.net </span></a></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1F497D">; </span><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="http://www.leydesdorff.net/" title="http://www.leydesdorff.net/"><span style="font-size:10.0pt">http://www.leydesdorff.net/</span></a></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;color:#1F497D"> <br />
</span><span style="font-size: 9pt;">Associate Faculty, </span><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">SPRU, </span></a></span><span style="font-size: 9pt;">University of Sussex; <o:p xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="font-size: 9pt;">Guest Professor </span><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">Zhejiang Univ.</span></a></span><span style="font-size: 9pt;">, Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, </span><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html"><span style="font-size:9.0pt">ISTIC, </span></a></span><span style="font-size: 9pt;">Beijing;<o:p xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="font-size: 9pt;">Visiting Fellow, </span><span style="color:#44546A"><a href="http://www.bbk.ac.uk/"><span style="font-size:
9.0pt">Birkbeck</span></a></span><span style="font-size: 9pt;">,
University of London; <o:p xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"></o:p></span></p>
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EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><span style="font-size:9.0pt"><a href="http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en">http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en</a></span></span></div><div id="x337b22579712426abf55c20f258d0a74"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";mso-fareast-font-family:
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<div>------ Original Message ------</div>
<div>From: "Burgin, Mark" <<a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>></div>
<div>To: "Søren Brier" <<a href="mailto:sbr.msc@cbs.dk">sbr.msc@cbs.dk</a>>; "Krassimir Markov" <<a href="mailto:markov@foibg.com">markov@foibg.com</a>>; "fis@listas.unizar.es" <<a href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>></div>
<div>Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM</div>
<div>Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis</div><div><br /></div>
<div id="x2d3837418cdb4d5" style="color: #000000"><blockquote cite="5B062239.1050709@math.ucla.edu" type="cite" class="cite2">
Dear Søren,<br />
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only
the Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it
is real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.<br />
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes
other realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural
Reality,” allows understand information as real but not physical.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
Sincerely,<br />
Mark</span><br />
<br />
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier
wrote:<br />
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:VI1PR02MB38054CBAFE596842DDA3140E99910@VI1PR02MB3805.eurprd02.prod.outlook.com" type="cite" class="cite">
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Dear
Mark<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US">Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean
’real’, but that raises the problem of how to define real.
Is chance real? I Gödel’s theorem or mathematics and logic
in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and
self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious
subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure
it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your
behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So
here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally
semiotics (the meaning of signs in cognition and
communication). We have problems encompassing these aspects
in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of
information science.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"> Best<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"> Søren<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D;mso-fareast-language:EN-US" lang="EN-US"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></span></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
 1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0cm 0cm 0cm">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">Fra:</span></b><span style="font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;">
Fis <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es"><fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es></a>
<b>På vegne af </b>Krassimir Markov<br />
<b>Sendt:</b> 17. maj 2018 11:33<br />
<b>Til:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>; Burgin, Mark
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu"><mburgin@math.ucla.edu></a><br />
<b>Emne:</b> Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A
logical analysis<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></p>
<div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Mark and FIS Colleagues,</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">First
of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper
and to publish it in IJ ITA.</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">It
will be nice to continue our common work this way.</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">At
the second place, I want to point that till now the
discussion on
</span><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Is
information physical?</span></b><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">was
more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis
to discuss and to come to some conclusions.</span><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the
needed thesis.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">What
about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write
something below.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">For
me, physical, structural and mental are one and
the same.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Mental
means physical reflections and physical processes
in the Infos consciousness. I.e. “physical”
include “mental”.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Structure
(as I understand this concept) is mental
reflection of the relationships “between” and/or
“in” real (physical) entities as well as “between”
and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I.e.
“physical” include “mental” include “structural”.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Finally,
IF “information is physical, structural and
mental” THEN simply the “information is
physical”!</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Friendly
greetings</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:13.5pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Krassimir</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" title="mburgin@math.ucla.edu">Burgin, Mark</a>
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">Sent:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">
Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">To:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" title="fis@listas.unizar.es">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:whitesmoke"><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif">Subject:</span></b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Tahoma",sans-serif"> Re:
[Fis] Is information physical? A logical
analysis<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
Dear FISers,<br />
It was an interesting discussion, in which many
highly intelligent and creative individuals
participated expressing different points of view. Many
interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to
this discussion, I would like to suggest a logical
analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and
often tacit assumptions.<br />
<br />
To great extent, our possibility to answer the
question “Is information physical? “ depends on our
model of the world. Note that here physical means the
nature of information and not its substance, or more
exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be
physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the way,
expression “quantum information” is only the way of
expressing that the carrier of information belongs to
the quantum level of nature. This is similar to the
expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”,
which are only forms or number representations and not
numbers themselves.<br />
<br />
If we assume that there is only the physical world,
we have, at first, to answer the question “Does
information exist? “ All FISers assume that
information exists. Otherwise, they would not
participate in our discussions. However, some people
think differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004)
Information studies without information).<br />
<br />
Now assuming that information exists, we have only
one option, namely, to admit that information is
physical because only physical things exist.<br />
If we assume that there are two worlds -
information is physical, we have three options
assuming that information exists:<br />
- information is physical<br />
- information is mental<br />
- information is both physical and mental <br />
<br />
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World,
which comprises three worlds - the physical world, the
mental world and the world of structures, we have
seven options assuming that information exists:<br />
- information is physical<br />
- information is mental<br />
- information is structural <br />
- information is both physical and mental <br />
- information is both physical and structural <br />
- information is both structural and mental <br />
- information is physical, structural and mental <br />
<br />
The solution suggested by the general theory of
information tries to avoid unnecessary multiplication
of essences suggesting that information (in a general
sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the
physical world, it is called
<b>energy</b>, in the mental world, it is called <b>mental
energy</b>, and in the world of structures, it is
called
<b>information</b> (in the strict sense). This
conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark
Johnson that information is both physical and not
physical only the general theory of information makes
this idea more exact and testable.<br />
In addition, being in the world of structures,
information in the strict sense is represented in two
other worlds by its representations and carriers. Note
that any representation of information is its carrier
but not each carrier of information is its
representation. For instance, an envelope with a
letter is a carrier of information in this letter but
it is not its representation.<br />
Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of
information by the name energy - physical energy,
mental energy and structural energy.<br />
<br />
Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested
in this discussion, may be Krassimir will continue his
excellent initiative combining the most interesting
contributions into a paper with the title<br />
<b>Is information physical?</b><br />
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.<br />
<br />
Sincerely,<br />
Mark Burgin<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">On
5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Arturo,
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">There
were some reports in clinical psychology, about
30 years ago, that relate to the question
whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist.
That was the time as computers could newly be
used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers
techniques were a current discovery.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">(Rogers
developed a dialogue method where one does not
address the contents of what the patient says,
but rather the emotional aspects of the message,
assumed to be at work in the patient.)<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">They
then said, that in some cases it was
indistinguishable, whether a human or a machine
provides the answer to a patient's elucidations.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Progress
since then has surely made possible to create
machines that are indistinguishable in
interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called
"expert systems ", are widely used in many
fields. If the interaction is rational, that
is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion
modi Wittgenstein, the difference in: "who
arrived at this answer, machinery or a human",
becomes irrelevant.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Artistry,
intuition, creativity are presently seen as not
possible to translate into Wittgenstein
sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not yet
well understood. But!: there are some who are
busily undermining the current fundamentals of
rational thinking. So there is hope that we
shall live to experience the ultimate
disillusionment, namely that humans are a
combinatorial tautology.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Accordingly,
may I respectfully express opposing views to
what you state: that machines and humans are of
incompatible builds. There are hints that as far
as rational capabilities go, the same principles
apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not of
this kind. The counter argument says that
irrational processes do not take place in
organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs
to the main process, maybe like waste belongs to
the organism's principle. This view draws a
picture of a functional biotope, in which the
waste of one kind of organism is raw material
for a different kind.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Karl
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it"></a><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>>
schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid
 #CCCCCC 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm
 6.0pt;margin-left:4.8pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<p style="margin-top:0cm"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Bruno,
<br />
You state: <br />
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in
the cognitive science,<br />
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.<br />
...Indexical digital mechanism is the
hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that I
would survive, or “not feel any change” if my
brain/body is replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at that level of
description".<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
problem of your account is the following:<br />
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism
is the HYPOTHESIS".<br />
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS:
it is not empirically tested and it is not
empirically testable. You are starting with a
sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not
agree with it. The current neuroscience does
not state that our brain/body is (or can be
replaced by) a digital machine.<br />
In other words, your "IF" stands for something
that possibly does not exist in our real
world. Here your entire building falls down.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div id="m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-default-signature">
<p><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">--<br />
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">giovedì,
10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno
Marchal
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br />
<br />
<br />
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<blockquote style="border:none;border-left:solid
 #85AF31 1.0pt;padding:0cm 0cm 0cm
 8.0pt;margin-left:7.5pt;margin-right:0cm">
<div>
<div>
<div id="m_1048372877214317129style_15259565360000035165_BODY">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">(This
mail has been sent previously ,
but without success. I resend it,
with minor changes). Problems due
to different accounts. It was my
first comment to Mark Burgin new
thread “Is information physical?”.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear
Mark, Dear Colleagues,
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Apology
for not answering the mails in the
chronological orders, as my new
computer classifies them in some
mysterious way!<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">This
is my first post of the week. I
might answer comment, if any, at
the end of the week.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">On
25 Apr 2018, at 03:47,
Burgin, Mark <<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu"></a><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>>
wrote:<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dear Colleagues,<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I would like to
suggest the new topic for
discussion<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">
Is information physical?<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">That
is an important topic indeed,
very close to what I am
working on.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">My
result here is that
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">IF</span></u></b><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> indexical digital
mechanism is correct in the
cognitive science,
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"> </o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">THEN</span></u></b><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> “physical” has to
be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
proof is constructive. It
shows exactly how to derive
physics from Arithmetic (the
reality, not the theory. I use
“reality” instead of “model"
(logician’s term, because
physicists use “model" for
“theory").<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Indexical
digital mechanism is the
hypothesis that there is a
level of description of the
brain/body such that I would
survive, or “not feel any
change” if my brain/body is
replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at
that level of description.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Not
only information is not
physical, but matter, time,
space, and all physical
objects become part of the
universal machine
phenomenology. Physics is
reduced to arithmetic, or,
equivalently, to any
Turing-complete machinery.
Amazingly Arithmetic (even the
tiny semi-computable part of
arithmetic) is Turing complete
(Turing Universal).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
basic idea is that:<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">1)
no universal machine can
distinguish if she is executed
by an arithmetical reality or
by a physical reality. And,<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">2)
all universal machines are
executed in arithmetic, and
they are necessarily
undetermined on the set of of
all its continuations emulated
in arithmetic.
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">That
reduces physics to a
statistics on all computations
relative to my actual state,
and see from some first person
points of view (something I
can describe more precisely in
some future post perhaps).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Put
in that way, the proof is not
constructive, as, if we are
machine, we cannot know which
machine we are. But Gödel’s
incompleteness can be used to
recover this constructively
for a simpler machine than us,
like Peano arithmetic. This
way of proceeding enforces the
distinction between first and
third person views (and six
others!).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
have derived already many
feature of quantum mechanics
from this (including the
possibility of quantum
computer) a long time ago. I
was about sure this would
refute Mechanism, until I
learned about quantum
mechanics, which verifies all
the most startling predictions
of Indexical Mechanism, unless
we add the controversial wave
collapse reduction principle.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The
curious “many-worlds” becomes
the obvious (in arithmetic)
many computations (up to some
equivalence quotient). The
weird indeterminacy becomes
the simpler amoeba like
duplication. The non-cloning
of matter becomes obvious: as
any piece of matter is the
result of the first person
indeterminacy (the first
person view of the amoeba
undergoing a duplication, …)
on infinitely many
computations. This entails
also that neither matter
appearance nor consciousness
are Turing emulable per se, as
the whole arithmetical
reality—which is a highly non
computable notion as we know
since Gödel—plays a key role.
Note this makes Digital
Physics leaning to
inconsistency, as it implies
indexical computationalism
which implies the negation of
Digital Physics (unless my
“body” is the entire physical
universe, which I rather
doubt).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><br />
<br />
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<p style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">My opinion is
presented below:<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> Why some people
erroneously think that
information is physical<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas">
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> The main reason to
think that information is
physical is the strong
belief of many people,
especially, scientists
that there is only
physical reality, which is
studied by science. At the
same time, people
encounter something that
they call information.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> When people receive a
letter, they comprehend
that it is information
because with the letter
they receive information.
The letter is physical,
i.e., a physical object.
As a result, people start
thinking that information
is physical. When people
receive an e-mail, they
comprehend that it is
information because with
the e-mail they receive
information. The e-mail
comes to the computer in
the form of
electromagnetic waves,
which are physical. As a
result, people start
thinking even more that
information is physical.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> However, letters,
electromagnetic waves and
actually all physical
objects are only carriers
or containers of
information.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> To understand this
better, let us consider a
textbook. Is possible to
say that this book is
knowledge? Any reasonable
person will tell that the
textbook contains
knowledge but is not
knowledge itself. In the
same way, the textbook
contains information but
is not information itself.
The same is true for
letters, e-mails,
electromagnetic waves and
other physical objects
because all of them only
contain information but
are not information. For
instance, as we know,
different letters can
contain the same
information. Even if we
make an identical copy of
a letter or any other
text, then the letter and
its copy will be different
physical objects (physical
things) but they will
contain the same
information.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> Information belongs to
a different (non-physical)
world of knowledge, data
and similar essences. In
spite of this, information
can act on physical
objects (physical bodies)
and this action also
misleads people who think
that information is
physical.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">OK.
The reason is that we can
hardly imagine how immaterial
or non physical objects can
alter the physical realm. It
is the usual problem faced by
dualist ontologies. With
Indexical computationalism we
recover many dualities, but
they belong to the
phenomenologies.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><br />
<br />
<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<blockquote style="margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt">
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="background:white"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas"> One more misleading
property of information is
that people can measure
it. This brings an
erroneous assumption that
it is possible to measure
only physical essences.
Naturally, this brings
people to the erroneous
conclusion that
information is physical.
However, measuring
information is essentially
different than measuring
physical quantities, i.e.,
weight. There are no
“scales” that measure
information. Only human
intellect can do this.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">OK.
I think all intellect can do
that, not just he human one.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Now,
the reason why people believe
in the physical is always a
form of the “knocking table”
argument. They knocks on the
table and say “you will not
tell me that this table is
unreal”.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">I
have got so many people giving
me that argument, that I have
made dreams in which I made
that argument, or even where I
was convinced by that argument
… until I wake up.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">When
we do metaphysics with the
scientific method, this “dream
argument” illustrates that
seeing, measuring, … cannot
prove anything ontological. A
subjective experience proves
only the phenomenological
existence of consciousness,
and nothing more. It shows
that although there are plenty
of strong evidences for a
material reality, there are no
evidences (yet) for a
primitive or primary matter
(and that is why, I think,
Aristotle assumes it quasi
explicitly, against Plato, and
plausibly against Pythagorus).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Mechanism
forces a coming back to Plato,
where the worlds of ideas is
the world of programs, or
information, or even just
numbers, since very elementary
arithmetic (PA without
induction, + the predecessor
axiom) is already Turing
complete (it contains what I
have named a Universal
Dovetailer: a program which
generates *and* executes all
programs).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">So
I agree with you: information
is not physical. I claim that
if we assume Mechanism
(Indexical computationalism)
matter itself is also not
*primarily* physical: it is
all in the “head of the
universal machine/number” (so
to speak).<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">And
this provides a test for
primary matter: it is enough
to find if there is a
discrepancy between the
physics that we infer from the
observation, and the physics
that we extract from “the
head” of the machine. This
took me more than 30 years of
work, but the results obtained
up to now is that there is no
discrepancies. I have compared
the quantum logic imposed by
incompleteness (formally) on
the semi-computable (partial
recursive, sigma_1)
propositions, with most
quantum logics given by
physicists, and it fits rather
well.<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Best
regards,<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> <o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Bruno<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></span></p>
<pre>_______________________________________________<o:p xmlns:o="#unknown"></o:p></pre>
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