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Dear Jerry, Joseph and all FISers,<br>
The title of my contribution is Logical Analysis but not Formal
Logical Analysis. It means that I did not use any formal logic but
thoroughly applied simple mundane logic, which is frequently used in
everyday life.<br>
<br>
Sincerely,<br class="">
Mark <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/18/2018 8:45 AM, Jerry LR Chandler
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:6ED052D0-6238-4212-896E-B9BEE2ED94A3@icloud.com"
type="cite">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252">
Mark, List:
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I find your analysis to be curious from the
perspective of scientific information theories - that is, the
nature of scientific beliefs that are used to do science
pragmatically - in physics, engr., chemistry, biology and
medicine. The practice of scientific information uses
well-established symbol systems, abstractions that relate
meaning of experience to symbolic meaning in the mind. Mental
images (indices, icons, symbols, diagrams, etc,) are
systematically manipulated within the particular framework of
the scientific problem at hand, the focus of the inquiry.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The internal representation of the situation under
investigation is only a private interpretation of the external
objects. It is created by the various sense organs, for example
the critical roles of the senses of touch, smell, hearing, etc
are essential to the natural sciences.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">So, who can define the meaning of the
(mathematical?) varieties of “our model of the world”? </div>
<div class="">How will such a “model” (path?, category?,) relate
the static to the dynamic that we experience in our daily
inquiries?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Let me skip directly to the categorizational logic:</div>
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class="">Finally, coming
to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises three
worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world
of structures, we have seven options assuming that
information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is structural <br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br class="">
- information is both physical and structural <br class="">
- information is both structural and mental <br class="">
- information is physical, structural and mental <br
class="">
</div>
</blockquote>
<br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Given your premises, I concur with your conclusions.
But...</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Philosophically, how does this logic differ from the
Vienna Circle logic of “Unity of Science” of the 1930’s?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Can you expand the premises to include the
processing of informational flows in the natural sciences? </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">It seems to me that the meaning to be associated
with this categorization is obscured by the usage of the term,
structural. </div>
<div class="">For examples: </div>
<div class="">Physical information can be considered structured.</div>
<div class="">Mathematical equations are often considered as
structures.</div>
<div class="">Mental processes are dependent on anatomical
structures.</div>
<div class="">Is time structured?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Where does this categorization take account of the
mathematical representations of molecular biology, genetics,
biological dynamics, human diseases, all of which depend on the
handedness of biochemical isomers and Penrose twistors?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Within this categorization, how are the processes of
communication represented?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Or, is communication not a component of the purposes
for developing the categorization?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My personal philosophy is that categorizations are
always for a goal, purpose, objective, intent, etc. Thus, many
many philosophers have proposed categorical theories.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">It appears that this proposed categorization of
information could be improved by addressing the symbol systems
used in the biological and other sciences. That is, addressing
the forms of abstraction that relate representation to (in-)
forms of physical structures.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Cheers</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Jerry</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On May 16, 2018, at 9:20 PM, Burgin, Mark <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" class=""><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a></a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class="">
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type" class="">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class=""> Dear
FISers,<br class="">
It was an interesting discussion, in which many
highly intelligent and creative individuals participated
expressing different points of view. Many interesting
ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis
of the problem based on our intrinsic and often tacit
assumptions.<br class="">
<br class="">
To great extent, our possibility to answer the
question “Is information physical? “ depends on our
model of the world. Note that here physical means the
nature of information and not its substance, or more
exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be
physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the way,
expression “quantum information” is only the way of
expressing that the carrier of information belongs to
the quantum level of nature. This is similar to the
expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which
are only forms or number representations and not numbers
themselves.<br class="">
<br class="">
If we assume that there is only the physical world, we
have, at first, to answer the question “Does information
exist? “ All FISers assume that information exists.
Otherwise, they would not participate in our
discussions. However, some people think differently
(cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies
without information).<br class="">
<br class="">
Now assuming that information exists, we have only
one option, namely, to admit that information is
physical because only physical things exist.<br class="">
If we assume that there are two worlds - information
is physical, we have three options assuming that
information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br class="">
<br class="">
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World,
which comprises three worlds - the physical world, the
mental world and the world of structures, we have seven
options assuming that information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is structural <br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br class="">
- information is both physical and structural <br
class="">
- information is both structural and mental <br
class="">
- information is physical, structural and mental <br
class="">
<br class="">
The solution suggested by the general theory of
information tries to avoid unnecessary multiplication of
essences suggesting that information (in a general
sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical
world, it is called <b class="">energy</b>, in the
mental world, it is called <b class="">mental energy</b>,
and in the world of structures, it is called <b
class="">information</b> (in the strict sense). This
conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark
Johnson that information is both physical and not
physical only the general theory of information makes
this idea more exact and testable.<br class="">
In addition, being in the world of structures,
information in the strict sense is represented in two
other worlds by its representations and carriers. Note
that any representation of information is its carrier
but not each carrier of information is its
representation. For instance, an envelope with a letter
is a carrier of information in this letter but it is not
its representation.<br class="">
Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of
information by the name energy - physical energy, mental
energy and structural energy.<br class="">
<br class="">
Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in
this discussion, may be Krassimir will continue his
excellent initiative combining the most interesting
contributions into a paper with the title<br class="">
<b class=""> Is information
physical?</b><br class="">
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.<br class="">
<br class="">
Sincerely,<br class="">
Mark Burgin<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl
Javorszky wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CA+nf4CUW+VwxERX1Tmz3-duGgYVyx5J-mR04ptqk2C-DboNQ4w@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite" class="">
<div dir="auto" class="">Dear Arturo,
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">There were some reports in
clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that
relate to the question whether a machine can
pretend to be a therapist. That was the time as
computers could newly be used in an interactive
fashion, and the Rogers techniques were a current
discovery.</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">(Rogers developed a
dialogue method where one does not address the
contents of what the patient says, but rather the
emotional aspects of the message, assumed to be at
work in the patient.)</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">They then said, that in
some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a
human or a machine provides the answer to a
patient's elucidations. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Progress since then has
surely made possible to create machines that are
indistinguishable in interaction to humans.
Indeed, what is called "expert systems ", are
widely used in many fields. If the interaction is
rational, that is: formally equivalent to a
logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the
difference in: "who arrived at this answer,
machinery or a human", becomes irrelevant. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Artistry, intuition,
creativity are presently seen as not possible to
translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the
inner instincts are not yet well understood. But!:
there are some who are busily undermining the
current fundamentals of rational thinking. So
there is hope that we shall live to experience the
ultimate disillusionment, namely that humans are
a combinatorial tautology. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Accordingly, may I
respectfully express opposing views to what you
state: that machines and humans are of
incompatible builds. There are hints that as far
as rational capabilities go, the same principles
apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not of
this kind. The counter argument says that
irrational processes do not take place in
organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs to
the main process, maybe like waste belongs to the
organism's principle. This view draws a picture of
a functional biotope, in which the waste of one
kind of organism is raw material for a different
kind. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Karl </div>
</div>
<br class="">
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class=""> <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" class=""><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it">tozziarturo@libero.it</a></a>>
schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class="">
<p style="margin-top:0px" dir="ltr" class="">Dear
Bruno, <br class="">
You state: <br class="">
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in
the cognitive science,<br class="">
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.<br class="">
...Indexical digital mechanism is the
hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that I
would survive, or “not feel any change” if my
brain/body is replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at that level of
description".</p>
<p dir="ltr" class="">The problem of your
account is the following:<br class="">
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism
is the HYPOTHESIS".<br class="">
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS:
it is not empirically tested and it is not
empirically testable. You are starting with a
sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not
agree with it. The current neuroscience does
not state that our brain/body is (or can be
replaced by) a digital machine.<br class="">
In other words, your "IF" stands for something
that possibly does not exist in our real
world. Here your entire building falls down.
<br class="">
</p>
<div
id="m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-default-signature"
class="">
<p dir="ltr" class="">--<br class="">
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android</p>
</div>
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno
Marchal <a moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br
class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote
id="m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-quote"
style="border-left:1px solid
#85af31;margin:0px 0px 0px 10px;padding:0px
0px 0px 10px"
cite="http://15259565360000035165/" class="">
<div class=" m_1048372877214317129js-helper
m_1048372877214317129js-readmsg-msg">
<div class="">
<div
id="m_1048372877214317129style_15259565360000035165_BODY"
class="">
<div
class="m_1048372877214317129class_1525973693">
<div class="">(This mail has been sent
previously , but without success. I
resend it, with minor changes).
Problems due to different accounts.
It was my first comment to Mark
Burgin new thread “Is information
physical?”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Apology for not
answering the mails in the
chronological orders, as my new
computer classifies them in some
mysterious way!</div>
<div class="">This is my first post of
the week. I might answer comment, if
any, at the end of the week.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 25 Apr 2018, at
03:47, Burgin, Mark <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu"
rel=" noopener noreferrer
noreferrer" target="_blank"
class=""><a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a></a>>
wrote:</div>
<br
class="m_1048372877214317129Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class="">
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">Dear Colleagues,</p>
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">I would like to
suggest the new topic for
discussion</p>
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">
Is information physical?<br
class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That is an important
topic indeed, very close to what
I am working on. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My result here is
that </div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u
class=""><br class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u
class="">IF</u></b> indexical
digital mechanism is correct in
the cognitive science, </div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u
class=""><br class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u
class="">THEN</u></b> “physical”
has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The proof is
constructive. It shows exactly
how to derive physics from
Arithmetic (the reality, not the
theory. I use “reality” instead
of “model" (logician’s term,
because physicists use “model"
for “theory").</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Indexical digital
mechanism is the hypothesis that
there is a level of description
of the brain/body such that I
would survive, or “not feel any
change” if my brain/body is
replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at that
level of description.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Not only information
is not physical, but matter,
time, space, and all physical
objects become part of the
universal machine phenomenology.
Physics is reduced to
arithmetic, or, equivalently, to
any Turing-complete machinery.
Amazingly Arithmetic (even the
tiny semi-computable part of
arithmetic) is Turing complete
(Turing Universal).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The basic idea is
that:</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">1) no universal
machine can distinguish if she
is executed by an arithmetical
reality or by a physical
reality. And,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">2) all universal
machines are executed in
arithmetic, and they are
necessarily undetermined on the
set of of all its continuations
emulated in arithmetic. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That reduces physics
to a statistics on all
computations relative to my
actual state, and see from some
first person points of view
(something I can describe more
precisely in some future post
perhaps).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Put in that way, the
proof is not constructive, as,
if we are machine, we cannot
know which machine we are. But
Gödel’s incompleteness can be
used to recover this
constructively for a simpler
machine than us, like Peano
arithmetic. This way of
proceeding enforces the
distinction between first and
third person views (and six
others!).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have derived
already many feature of quantum
mechanics from this (including
the possibility of quantum
computer) a long time ago. I
was about sure this would refute
Mechanism, until I learned about
quantum mechanics, which
verifies all the most startling
predictions of Indexical
Mechanism, unless we add the
controversial wave collapse
reduction principle.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The curious
“many-worlds” becomes the
obvious (in arithmetic) many
computations (up to some
equivalence quotient). The weird
indeterminacy becomes the
simpler amoeba like duplication.
The non-cloning of matter
becomes obvious: as any piece of
matter is the result of the
first person indeterminacy (the
first person view of the amoeba
undergoing a duplication, …) on
infinitely many computations.
This entails also that neither
matter appearance nor
consciousness are Turing
emulable per se, as the whole
arithmetical reality—which is a
highly non computable notion as
we know since Gödel—plays a key
role. Note this makes Digital
Physics leaning to
inconsistency, as it implies
indexical computationalism which
implies the negation of Digital
Physics (unless my “body” is the
entire physical universe, which
I rather doubt).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<p
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class="">My opinion is
presented below:<br class="">
</p>
<div
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><br
class="m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div
style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><br
class="m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>Why
some people erroneously
think that information is
physical</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""> </span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>The
main reason to think that
information is physical is
the strong belief of many
people, especially,
scientists that there is
only physical reality,
which is studied by
science. At the same time,
people encounter something
that they call
information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>When
people receive a letter,
they comprehend that it is
information because with
the letter they receive
information. The letter is
physical, i.e., a physical
object. As a result,
people start thinking that
information is physical.
When people receive an
e-mail, they comprehend
that it is information
because with the e-mail
they receive information.
The e-mail comes to the
computer in the form of
electromagnetic waves,
which are physical. As a
result, people start
thinking even more that
information is physical.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>However,
letters, electromagnetic
waves and actually all
physical objects are only
carriers or containers of
information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>To
understand this better,
let us consider a
textbook. Is possible to
say that this book is
knowledge? Any reasonable
person will tell that the
textbook contains
knowledge but is not
knowledge itself. In the
same way, the textbook
contains information but
is not information itself.
The same is true for
letters, e-mails,
electromagnetic waves and
other physical objects
because all of them only
contain information but
are not information. For
instance, as we know,
different letters can
contain the same
information. Even if we
make an identical copy of
a letter or any other
text, then the letter and
its copy will be different
physical objects (physical
things) but they will
contain the same
information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>Information
belongs to a different
(non-physical) world of
knowledge, data and
similar essences. In spite
of this, information can
act on physical objects
(physical bodies) and this
action also misleads
people who think that
information is physical.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. The reason is
that we can hardly imagine how
immaterial or non physical
objects can alter the physical
realm. It is the usual problem
faced by dualist ontologies.
With Indexical computationalism
we recover many dualities, but
they belong to the
phenomenologies.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""></span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in
0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)"
class=""><span class=""><span
class=""> </span>One
more misleading property
of information is that
people can measure it.
This brings an erroneous
assumption that it is
possible to measure only
physical essences.
Naturally, this brings
people to the erroneous
conclusion that
information is physical.
However, measuring
information is essentially
different than measuring
physical quantities, i.e.,
weight. There are no
“scales” that measure
information. Only human
intellect can do this.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. I think all
intellect can do that, not just
he human one.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Now, the reason why
people believe in the physical
is always a form of the
“knocking table” argument. They
knocks on the table and say “you
will not tell me that this table
is unreal”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have got so many
people giving me that argument,
that I have made dreams in which
I made that argument, or even
where I was convinced by that
argument … until I wake up.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">When we do
metaphysics with the scientific
method, this “dream argument”
illustrates that seeing,
measuring, … cannot prove
anything ontological. A
subjective experience proves
only the phenomenological
existence of consciousness, and
nothing more. It shows that
although there are plenty of
strong evidences for a material
reality, there are no evidences
(yet) for a primitive or primary
matter (and that is why, I
think, Aristotle assumes it
quasi explicitly, against Plato,
and plausibly against
Pythagorus).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism forces a
coming back to Plato, where the
worlds of ideas is the world of
programs, or information, or
even just numbers, since very
elementary arithmetic (PA
without induction, + the
predecessor axiom) is already
Turing complete (it contains
what I have named a Universal
Dovetailer: a program which
generates *and* executes all
programs).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">So I agree with you:
information is not physical. I
claim that if we assume
Mechanism (Indexical
computationalism) matter itself
is also not *primarily*
physical: it is all in the “head
of the universal machine/number”
(so to speak).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">And this provides a
test for primary matter: it is
enough to find if there is a
discrepancy between the physics
that we infer from the
observation, and the physics
that we extract from “the head”
of the machine. This took me
more than 30 years of work, but
the results obtained up to now
is that there is no
discrepancies. I have compared
the quantum logic imposed by
incompleteness (formally) on the
semi-computable (partial
recursive, sigma_1)
propositions, with most quantum
logics given by physicists, and
it fits rather well.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best regards,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
</div>
</div>
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