<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 20 May 2018, at 11:59, John Collier <<a href="mailto:ag659@ncf.ca" class="">ag659@ncf.ca</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class="">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
I am not much for the collapse of the wave packet. Bohm and Hiley
avoid the problem altogether with their guiding wave, though the
section in their book on special relativity I don't really get.
General relativity presents further problems, bu this is also true
of the standard interpretation.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>But not in Everett QM-without-collapse. </div><div><br class=""></div><div>Bohm can be seen like accepting the many worlds, but adding a potential guiding particles in it. That potential is see as physical, and thus brought Faster than Light action, which is indeed hard to make sense even just with special relativity and a minimal amount of physical realism.</div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
I further not that in a book edited by Steven Savitt there are tow
articles that show that macroscopic measurements (indirect all they
may be) allow measurement of the quantum state that is reversible.
One author is James Leggett, and the other is Phil Stamp. Both at
least suggest that irreversibly, such as it is in QM is due to
thermodynamics of a fairly normal kine. Legget makes this claim
exactly<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>I agree with them.</div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
I would further not that this view fits rather nicely with the
Bohm-Hiley with respect to there views of reversibility through
thermodynamics. <br class="">
<br class="">
<br class="">
Overall, I take it that the collapse of the wave packet has be shown
empirically wrong, and it is no basis for further explorations in
Quantum Mechanics.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>I tend to agree with this. </div><div><br class=""></div><div>Best,</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Bruno</div><div><br class=""></div><div>(Probably more online on this)</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
John<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2018/05/17 4:30 PM,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it">tozziarturo@libero.it</a> wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:327055862.11970.1526567420676@mail.libero.it" class="">
<meta charset="UTF-8" class=""><p class="">Dear Bruno, </p><p class="">as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic
framework requires the tenet that quantum wave collapse does not
exist. </p><p class="">In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.</p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class=""><br class="">
I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!),
for the FISers unaware of the Everett's account:</p><p class=""><br class="">
You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other
turns rigth. </p><p class="">You have to choose where to turn. </p><p class="">If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right. </p><p class="">This is, very roughly speaking, what <strong class="">quantum wave
collapse</strong> means: if you make a choice, it is
irreversible in our Universe.<br class="">
</p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class="">In order to avoid such irreversibility, <strong class="">Everett, who
did not like quantum wave collapse, provided the following
account</strong>: </p><p class="">every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or
right, the entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in
one Universe you turn left, while another you turns right in
another Universe.</p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class=""> <br class="">
Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or
it is not, and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me
how it could be even theoretically demonstrated. </p><p class=""><br class="">
</p>
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4" style="word-wrap: break-word;" class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno
Marchal <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be"><marchal@ulb.ac.be></a> ha scritto: <br class="">
<br class="">
Dear Arturo,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, <a href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>
wrote:</div>
<br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">Daer Bruno, </p><p class="">first of all, sorry for the previous
private communication, but for a mistake, I did
not add the FIS list in the CC. </p><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class="">Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any
scientists. Especially that we need only a tiny part of
the arithmetical truth. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her
children from primary school when they are taught the
laws of addition and multiplication, by claiming they
have not that faith?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">this appraoch... simply does not work
for the description of physical and biological
issues. </p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">The approach just study the necessary logical
consequence of assuming our bodies to be digitalisable.
I predicted all the quantum weirdness from this 45
years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get precise
mathematical predictions, which until now fits with the
fact, when physicalism needs a brain-mind identity
thesis which has been shown inconsistent. </div>
<div class="">I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work
for physical and biological issues. You might confuse
the computable (like automata), and the semi-computable
(like the universal Turing machine).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">It is just in our mind. See: </p><p class=""><a href="http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132</a></p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">What do you mean by “real world”?</div>
<div class="">I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole
physical reality is indeed shown to be “in the head” of
*any* universal machine or universal number, etc.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class=""><br class="">
</p><p class="">I'm not confusing digital physics with
Mechanism, and I read, of course, the work of
Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is
exactly like Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating
analogy. He wants, without any possibility of
proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to
the whole macroscopic world. </p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the
Schroedinger equation, that is QM without the
unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put simply: the
“many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without
collapse.</div>
<div class="">Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he
just showed that we don’t need the collapse axiom, as QM
+ mechanism recovers it phenomenologically. Then my work
shows this can work only if we recover also the wave
itself from arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not
needed, untestable, assumption. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">When you state that:</p>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">"the reality becomes the
universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing
machine) and the physical is the border of the
universal mind viewed from inside that universal
mind".</blockquote><p class="">you are saying something that,
reductionistic or not (I do not understand your
emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of
matter, reduction, and so on), needs to be clearly
proofed, before becoming the gold standard. </p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by
many people. Have you read my papers?</div>
<div class="">Did you find a problem, or are you just criticising
the assumption/theory? Ask specific question, but
normally all this has been clearly proofed. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">A suggestion: you cold try to correlate
your "physical border of the Universal mind viewed
from inside that universal mind" with the
holographic principle and the cosmic horizon. </p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">I prefer to invoke the physical reality only for the
testing. There is some possible analogy here, which
might be interesting, but Mechanism is an hypothesis in
psychology, or theology, not in physics, which needs to
be entirely recovered from arithmetic (or Turing
equivalent). For this type of Mechanist (Neo)platonism:
looking at the physical universe is … cheating.
(Somehow).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">But in order to do that, you need a
strong math, not to quote old philosophers that,</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have decided to study Mathematics for just that. My
thesis is a PhD in mathematics and theoretical computer
science. All what I say has been translated entirely in
arithmetic, by using Gödel’s technic of arithmetisation
of metamathematics. I got testable quantitative result
which have been tested. I am not sure you have study my
work, which is usually criticised for being …
mathematics.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">for a simple matter of luck, were able
to inconsciously predict some recent developments
of the modern science.</p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">? I predicted the non-cloning theorem 30 years before
the physicist get it, and much more. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Please study my papers before judging(*)</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class=""> I like logic, I love logic, I read
logic, I study logic, I read a lot of the latin
texts of the old philosophers that use it (in the
Medioeval ones), but I have to confess that the
scientific value of logic is close to zero. Both
of the ancient and of the "novel" logics.</p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The logicians are the one who discovered the
universal machine (computer), before it was build. You
are using one just now. You seem to ignore Gödel’s
contribution, which in my opinion is, when we assume
mechanism (the older metaphysical/theological
assumption) the most important result ever discovered
by the humans.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""><p class="">Sorry again! </p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">You don’t need to be sorry, but my feeling is that
you are not aware of the result that I got. It is
science, which means that it is not a question of
agreeing or disagreeing, but of understanding or
refuting.</div>
<div class="">Maybe you could study the following papers (if
interested):</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the
mind-body problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol;
2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 <br class="">
<br class="">
Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to
Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology,
2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. <br class="">
<br class="">
B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations.
In 4th International System Administration and Network
Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. <br class="">
<a href="http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html</a>
(sane04) <br class="">
<br class="">
Plotinus PDF paper link: <br class="">
<a href="http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CiE2007/SIENA.pdf</a>
<br class="">
(Reference: Marchal, B, 2007, B. Marchal. A Purely
Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation
of Plotinus’ Theory of Matter. In Barry Cooper S. Löwe
B., Kent T. F. and Sorbi A., editors, Computation and
Logic in the Real World, Third Conference on
Computability in Europe June 18-23, pages 263–273.
Universita degli studi di Sienna, Dipartimento di
Roberto Magari, 2007).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The math part requires some background in
mathematical logic including provability logics, like:</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">G. Boolos. 1979, The Unprovability of Consistency, an
Essay in Modal Logic, <br class="">
Cambridge University Press. <br class="">
<br class="">
G. Boolos. The Logic of Provability. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1993.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">PS That is my second message. Possible comment next
week.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class="">
<div class=""> <br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-webkit-block-placeholder">
</div><p class=""><br class="">
</p>
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d" style="word-wrap: break-word;" class=""><br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">---------- Messaggio
originale ---------- <br class="">
Da: Bruno Marchal < <a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>>
<br class="">
A: FIS Webinar < <a href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">fis@listas.unizar.es</a>>
<br class="">
Data: 14 maggio 2018 alle 11.48 <br class="">
Oggetto: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information
physical? <br class="">
<br class="">
Dear Arturo, Dear Colleagues,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 11 May 2018, at 18:36, <a href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>
wrote:</div>
<br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-interchange-newline">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px; margin-top:
0px;" class="">Dear Bruno,<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span><br class="">
I'm sorry, but I cannot agree.</p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I take a disagreement as a
courtesy to pursue a conversation, which
would be boring without them.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">But, what I say has been
proved, peer reviewed by many, so it is
perhaps more a matter of understanding
than of agreeing.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Or you are just telling me
that you disbelieve in Mechanism. I prefer
to remain agnostic.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism is my working
hypothesis. The idea is to take it
seriously until we find a contradiction
(internal or with the observation). It is
a common by default type of hypothesis,
held by many people, notably most
materialist. But here I can prove that
(even weak) materialism (the belief in
ontological primary substances/matter) is
inconsistent with (even weak) mechanism.
See my papers for this, it is not entirely
obvious. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">"eventually
I found a conceptually isomorphic
explanation in arithmetic."
Isomorphy is a dangerous claim: the
underliying mechanisms in biology
could be something other than
isomorphism (i.e., an Ehresmann
connection in a hyperbolic manifold,
as it occurs in gauge theories).</p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Nothing in the observation
point on either primary matter, nor on non
mechanism. I am not sure why you think
that Ehresmann connection or gauge
theories are non mechanist. Actually
Mechanism entails that the physical
phenomenology cannot be mechanistic. You
might confuse Mechanism in the cognitive
science with digital physics. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Digital physics (the idea that
the physical reality is Turing emulable)
does not make any sense. It entails
mechanism, but mechanism entails the
falsity of digital physics (see my paper
or ask question: that is not obvious). So,
with or without Mechanism, Digital Physics
makes no sense.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">Futhermore,
you simply change the name of the
primum movens, the first principium:
instead of calling it physics, you
call it arithmetic. This is as
fideistic as the Carnap's physicalist
claims. <span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span><br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Physics assumes Arithmetic.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Arithmetic do not assume
physics.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I can follow you with the idea
that arithmetic still ask for some faith,
but the amount is less than assuming a
primary physical reality.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Then, I have never heard about
parents taking back their kids when they
are taught elementary arithmetic.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Also, with mechanism, we need
to assume only a Turing universal
machinery. With less than that, we get no
universal machinery at all. With one of
them, we get all of them. I simply use
arithmetic because everyone are familiar
with it. The theology and physics of
machine do not depend on the choice of the
universal system assumed at the start. It
is an important new invariant of physics.
Indeed, it determines entirely physics
(always assuming Mechanism (aka
computationalism).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">"If
you think that a brain is not Turing
emulable, you might be the one to
whom people can ask". The burden of
the final proof is yours, because your
claim is stronger and less
conventional than mine.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism is a common,
implicit or explicit, hypothesis among
philosophers and scientists. It is a very
old theory, already in “the question of
Milinda” (a buddhist old text), and of
course Descartes. Diderot identified it
with rationalism. That makes sense,
because to assume its negation consists in
adding something for which we do not have
any evidence (until now).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Maybe you confuse computable
(like automata) and semi-computable (like
Turing machine). It is the existence of
universal machine which is responsible for
the incompleteness of theories, because
there is no complete theory possible for
anything enough rich to prove the
existence of universal machine, like,
amazingly enough, already very elementary
arithmetic.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">
If you say that angels do exist, you
have to provide the proof, it's not me
that have to provide the proofs that
they do not exist. <span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">But you are the one saying
that “angels” exist, with “angels”
pointing on something not “computable nor
semi-computable” in nature or the mind …</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism is just the
conjunction of the Church-Turing thesis
(CT) + “yes doctor” (YD, the idea that we
can survive with a brain digital
prosthesis). A version of Mechanism is
that there is no magic at play in our
body.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Then it seems that you claim a
form of weak materialism, but there too,
you are the one reifying the notion of
primary-matter. That is a strong axiom in
metaphysics, and there are no evidences
for it. It is a natural extrapolation from
the mundane experience, and we can
understand why evolution has select such a
belief, as we need to take the existence
of prey and predator seriously. But this,
as the Indian and Greeks understood a long
time ago, does not provide any evidence of
primary matter (a notion absent of any
book in physics).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">"I
will ask your evidence for the wave
collapse." This is indeed a strange
claim. There are tons of published
papers that demonstrate the wave
collapse. </p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">You might give one reference.
I have never found one. I would say that
there are evidences for the wave only. </div>
<div class="">The collapse is an addition to
avoid the many-histories/worlds/minds,
which follows from taking the wave
seriously, as the experimental
interference invites us to do. It
introduces an non intelligible cut between
the observed and the observer. It
introduces indeterminacy and non locality.
And there are many incompatible theories
for the collapse, which is indeed rather
non intelligible.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Then, with Mechanism, the
problem is that we have to extract the
wave too, from *all* computations, and not
just the quantum one. But that is what I
have done: I extracted a quantum logic
where machines have to expect it: a
measure on all computations.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">You
may discuss why and how it occurs, but
you cannot negate this clear, polite,
puzzling, experimentally-detected
phenomenon.</p>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I would suggest you to study
the work of Everett, who by using only the
wave and Mechanism, explains entirely the
appearance of a collapse without assuming
it. </div>
<div class="">Then, as I say, bu using
mechanism, Everett missed that all
computations are already in arithmetic,
and that universal digital machine cannot
detect in the first person way if they are
emulated by any basic particular universal
machine, and the wave itself required to
be explained by digital information theory
(aka computer science).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Here, very often people misses
that all computations are not just
described in elementary arithmetic, but
are realised, in virtue of the true
relations among numbers. 99% of this has
been found by Gödel, but Gödel missed the
point, done later by Turing, Post, Church,
Kleene, etc.</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">I
think that your theory has just
analogies with quantum dynamics, and
the analogy is the worst enemy of
science.</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">There is no analogy. When you
say “yes doctor”, the digital brain in the
head will not be an analogy. The rest
followed by logic and elementary
arithmetic.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">This
seems the same type of theories that
claim, for a simple analogy, that the
brain and consciousness work at
quantum levels.<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span><br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">But if we postulate collapse,
all the evidence becomes evidence for
this. Yet, Abner Shimony has refuted, or
show the amount of magic, needed to
sustain that consciousness reduces the
wave packet. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">You might study my papers, as
all what I say just follow from CT + YD.
(Church’s Thesis + “Yes doctor”).
Sometimes I call it Indexical
computationalism, to distinguish it from
Digital physics (in metaphysics. Digital
physics can be useful as an approximation
in some branches of physics).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">Sorry,
but diplomacy has never been my first
virtue…</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">No problem Arturo, as long as
you don’t use insult or mockery, or ad
hominem remarks, or things like that,
which I take as “I have no argument but
dislike what you did”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My feeling is that you might
ignore the important difference between
computable and semi-computable, and you
might think that mechanism is a
reductionism, when it is more like a
vaccine against the reductionist
conception of machine and numbers,
enforced by the incompleteness theorem.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">You can guess that mechanism
is less reductionist than non-mechanism,
as the mechanist will say yes to his
daughter when she want to marry a man with
a prosthetic brain, where the
non-mechanist will treat such a man as a
less human, if not a( philosophical)
zombie. Then you seem to assume a primary
physical universe, which eventually do not
make sense with the mechanist hypothesis.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">To sum up; I have done two
things: </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">- I have shown that (weak)
mechanism is logically incompatible with
(weak) materialism. So there is no problem
with Materialists who reject Mechanism: as
they should.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">_ I have shown, by keeping up
with my mechanist hypothesis, how to
recover the physical appearance and its
stability from arithmetic (or anything
Turing equivalent). That makes Mechanism
testable, by comparing the physics “in the
head of the universal machine/number” with
the observation. I did indeed extracted
already the propositional physical logic,
and got a quantum logic, which fits well
with the one of the quantum physical
logician (and is richer, so it makes new
prediction). If mechanism is false, this
provides in the Mong run a method to
evaluate how much mechanism is wrong, and,
who knows, to detect primary matter. But
up to now, the empirical study of nature
confirms Mechanism, more than Materialism.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I don’t know if mechanism is
true or false. But I will not hide that I
find it elegant. Arithmetic gives the
third person sharable information, and
incompleteness + non definability gives a
platonic sort of first person information
“theology” which includes the physical
(material) appearances as an unavoidable
phenomenology. I predicted the many-worlds
from mechanism and arithmetic much before
I knew about quantum physics, but it took
me 30 years of works to derive precisely
the quantum logical formalism. Needless to
say, many open problems remains, but if we
count the experimental evidences, they all
add yup to mechanism, and none add up to
(even weak) materialism. With Mechanism,
Mark Burgin is right: information is not
physical, but so is matter and the whole
object of physics. Abstractly; the reality
becomes the universal mind (the mind of
the universal Turing machine) and the
physical is the border of the universal
mind viewed from inside that universal
mind. Again, I do not defend that claim. I
show it testable only.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best regards,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class=""><br class="">
<br class="">
</p>
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-mail-app-auto-default-signature" style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class=""><p class="">--<br class="">
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android</p>
</div>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px; float:
none; display: inline;" class="">venerdì,
11 maggio 2018, 06:03PM +02:00 da
Bruno Marchal<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span></span>
<a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>
<span style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px; float:
none; display: inline;" class="">:</span>
<br style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">
<br style="font-family: Helvetica;
font-size: 12px; font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal; text-indent: 0px;
text-transform: none; white-space:
normal; word-spacing: 0px;" class="">
<blockquote class="">
<div class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-js-readmsg-msg
ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-js-helper">
<div class="">
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-style_15260546960000035185_BODY" class="">
<div class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-class_1526063928">Dear
Arturo,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 10 May
2018, at 15:23, <span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span> <a href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" class="" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">tozziarturo@libero.it</a>
<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span>wrote:</div>
<br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class=""><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;
margin-top: 0px;">Dear
Bruno,<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space_mailru_css_attribute_postfix"> </span><br class="">
You state:<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space_mailru_css_attribute_postfix"> </span><br class="">
"IF indexical
digital mechanism is
correct in the
cognitive science,<br class="">
THEN “physical” has
to be defined
entirely in
arithmetical term,
i.e. “physical”
becomes a
mathematical notion.<br class="">
...Indexical digital
mechanism is the
hypothesis that
there is a level of
description of the
brain/body such that
I would survive, or
“not feel any
change” if my
brain/body is
replaced by a
digital machine
emulating the
brain/body at that
level of
description".</p><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">The
problem of your
account is the
following:<br class="">
You say "IF" and
"indexical digital
mechanism is the
HYPOTHESIS”.<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">Yes, indeed.
It is my working
hypothesis. The idea
came when asking myself
how an amoeba can build
an amoeba. Then I
discovered the solution
provided by molecular
genetics, and eventually
I found a conceptually
isomorphic explanation
in arithmetic. Note that
by making explicit the
use of the level of
description, my
hypothesis is much
weaker than most form of
computationalism you can
see in the literature.
My reasoning would
remain valid even if my
body is the entire
universe, described by
quantum string theory
with 10^(10^100) exact
decimals.</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">Therefore,
you are talking of
an HYPOTHESIS: it is
not empirically
tested and it is not
empirically
testable. <span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">I start from
an hypothesis and show,
on the contrary that it
is testable. I predicted
well before I knew
anything on quantum
mechanics that Mechanism
entails that if we look
at nature below our
substitution level, we
should find the trace of
infinitely many
computations, and only
later did I discover
that quantum mechanics,
without the wave
collapse, entails
something very similar.
But Mechanism leads also
to a complete formalism
for both quanta and
qualia, and here too,
the theory/hypothesis
match with facts. As it
predicts a richer
formalism, some crucial
tests remain to be
done. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">You
are starting with a
sort of postulate:
I, and other people,
do not agree with
it. </p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">I prefer to
not say my opinion. I am
not defending Mechanism.
I show it testable. My
goal consists in showing
that we can do
metaphysics with the
scientific method, where
we never claim that
something is true, just
that the evidences makes
it plausible.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The negation
of the digital mechanist
theory is usually
considered as more
“extra-ordinary”, as it
implies either actual
infinities, or some sort
of magic. If you think
that a brain is not
Turing emulable, you
might be the one to whom
people can ask: what is
your evidence? You might
need to refer to
something non computable
in Nature and not
recoverable through the
first person
indeterminacy. Note that
mechanism entails that
physics is NOT emulable
by a Turing machine, and
that consciousness is
NOT emulable by a
machine), so you need
special sort of
infinities. In fact,
non-computationalism can
only benefit from the
study of
computationalism, as it
shows what is need for a
theory to be a
non-computationalist
theory of mind. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">The
current neuroscience
does not state that
our brain/body is
(or can be replaced
by) a digital
machine.<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class="">At which
level?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Except for
the famous but
controversial “reduction
of the wave packet” we
still don’t have find in
Nature a non computable
process. That might
exist, as we can
“mathematically” find
non computable solution
to the Schroedinger
equation, but those are
not of the type we
observe anywhere.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">In
other words, your
"IF" stands for
something that
possibly does not
exist in our real
world. Here your
entire building
falls down. <span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space_mailru_css_attribute_postfix"> </span><br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">?</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">It falls
down because you are
making the contrary
hypothesis, the
hypothesis that
something is not Turing
emulable in nature, nor
recoverable by the first
person indeterminacy.
That might be possible,
but that has not been
proved, nor even really
defined. Your own
hypothesis falls down by
a similar argument than
yours, but your own
hypothesis is not as
well clear as mine,
unless you invoke the
wave collapse? In that
case, I will ask your
evidence for the wave
collapse.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">You cannot
use the word “real”.
That is the same mistake
than using the word God.
What is real is what we
search. We cannot start
from the answer.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My feeling
is that you confuse the
universal machine, which
is only partially
computable, and
confronted to a lot of
non computable truth in
arithmetic with the
pre-Godelian conception
of the machine, closer
to to the notion now
called automata. I guess
I will have opportunity
to make this clear.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I would like
to insist (and detailed
perhaps later) that
Mechanism is the less
reductionist theory we
can imagine. Indeed, a
universal machine can
refute all complete
theories about itself.
It is a sort of
universal dissident.
More intuitively, it
does not qualify as
zombie a man or woman
who would have survived
with some brain
prosthesis. The moral
question will eventually
be this one: “do you
accept that your son or
daughter marry someone
having got an artificial
hippocampus prosthesis? </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-mail-app-auto-default-signature_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;"><p class="">--<br class="">
Inviato da Libero
Mail per Android</p>
</div>
<span class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;
float: none;
display: inline;">giovedì,
10 maggio 2018,
02:46PM +02:00 da
Bruno Marchal<span class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-converted-space_mailru_css_attribute_postfix"> </span></span>
<a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" class="" target="_blank" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;" moz-do-not-send="true">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a> <span class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;
float: none;
display: inline;">:</span>
<br class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">
<br class="" style="font-family:
Helvetica;
font-size: 12px;
font-style: normal;
font-weight: normal;
text-indent: 0px;
text-transform:
none; white-space:
normal;
word-spacing: 0px;">
<blockquote class="">
<div class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-js-readmsg-msg_mailru_css_attribute_postfix
ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-js-helper_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class="">
<div id="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-style_15259565360000035165_BODY_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" class="">
<div class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-class_1525973693_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class="">(This
mail has been
sent
previously ,
but without
success. I
resend it,
with minor
changes).
Problems due
to different
accounts. It
was my first
comment to
Mark Burgin
new thread “Is
information
physical?”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
Dear Mark,
Dear
Colleagues,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Apology
for not
answering the
mails in the
chronological
orders, as my
new computer
classifies
them in some
mysterious
way!</div>
<div class="">This
is my first
post of the
week. I might
answer
comment, if
any, at the
end of the
week.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On
25 Apr 2018,
at 03:47,
Burgin, Mark
< <a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" class="" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>> wrote:</div>
<br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class=""><p class="" style="background-color:
#ffffff;">Dear
Colleagues,</p><p class="" style="background-color:
#ffffff;">I
would like to
suggest the
new topic for
discussion</p><p class="" style="background-color:
#ffffff;">
Is information
physical?<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That
is an
important
topic indeed,
very close to
what I am
working on. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My
result here is
that </div>
<div class=""><strong class=""><u class=""><br class="">
</u></strong></div>
<div class=""><strong class=""><u class="">IF</u></strong> indexical
digital
mechanism is
correct in the
cognitive
science, </div>
<div class=""><strong class=""><u class=""><br class="">
</u></strong></div>
<div class=""><strong class=""><u class="">THEN</u></strong> “physical”
has to be
defined
entirely in
arithmetical
term, i.e.
“physical”
becomes a
mathematical
notion.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The
proof is
constructive.
It shows
exactly how to
derive physics
from
Arithmetic
(the reality,
not the
theory. I use
“reality”
instead of
“model"
(logician’s
term, because
physicists use
“model" for
“theory").</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Indexical
digital
mechanism is
the hypothesis
that there is
a level of
description of
the brain/body
such that I
would survive,
or “not feel
any change” if
my brain/body
is replaced by
a digital
machine
emulating the
brain/body at
that level of
description.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Not
only
information is
not physical,
but matter,
time, space,
and all
physical
objects become
part of the
universal
machine
phenomenology.
Physics is
reduced to
arithmetic,
or,
equivalently,
to any
Turing-complete
machinery.
Amazingly
Arithmetic
(even the tiny
semi-computable part of arithmetic) is Turing complete (Turing
Universal).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The
basic idea is
that:</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">1)
no universal
machine can
distinguish if
she is
executed by an
arithmetical
reality or by
a physical
reality. And,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">2)
all universal
machines are
executed in
arithmetic,
and they are
necessarily
undetermined
on the set of
of all its
continuations
emulated in
arithmetic. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That
reduces
physics to a
statistics on
all
computations
relative to my
actual state,
and see from
some first
person points
of view
(something I
can describe
more precisely
in some future
post perhaps).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Put
in that way,
the proof is
not
constructive,
as, if we are
machine, we
cannot know
which machine
we are. But
Gödel’s
incompleteness
can be used to
recover this
constructively
for a simpler
machine than
us, like Peano
arithmetic.
This way of
proceeding
enforces the
distinction
between first
and third
person views
(and six
others!).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I
have derived
already many
feature of
quantum
mechanics from
this
(including the
possibility of
quantum
computer) a
long time ago.
I was about
sure this
would refute
Mechanism,
until I
learned about
quantum
mechanics,
which verifies
all the most
startling
predictions of
Indexical
Mechanism,
unless we add
the
controversial
wave collapse
reduction
principle.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The
curious
“many-worlds”
becomes the
obvious (in
arithmetic)
many
computations
(up to some
equivalence
quotient). The
weird
indeterminacy
becomes the
simpler amoeba
like
duplication.
The
non-cloning of
matter becomes
obvious: as
any piece of
matter is the
result of the
first person
indeterminacy
(the first
person view of
the amoeba
undergoing a
duplication,
…) on
infinitely
many
computations.
This entails
also that
neither matter
appearance nor
consciousness
are Turing
emulable per
se, as the
whole
arithmetical
reality—which
is a highly
non computable
notion as we
know since
Gödel—plays a
key role. Note
this makes
Digital
Physics
leaning to
inconsistency,
as it implies
indexical
computationalism
which implies
the negation
of Digital
Physics
(unless my
“body” is the
entire
physical
universe,
which I rather
doubt).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p class="" style="background-color:
#ffffff;">My
opinion is
presented
below:<br class="">
</p>
<div class="" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div class="" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><br class="ox-7e2653bbb4-ox-7d12ee763d-webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>Why
some people
erroneously
think that
information is
physical</span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span></span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>The
main reason to
think that
information is
physical is
the strong
belief of many
people,
especially,
scientists
that there is
only physical
reality, which
is studied by
science. At
the same time,
people
encounter
something that
they call
information.</span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>When
people receive
a letter, they
comprehend
that it is
information
because with
the letter
they receive
information.
The letter is
physical,
i.e., a
physical
object. As a
result, people
start thinking
that
information is
physical. When
people receive
an e-mail,
they
comprehend
that it is
information
because with
the e-mail
they receive
information.
The e-mail
comes to the
computer in
the form of
electromagnetic
waves, which
are physical.
As a result,
people start
thinking even
more that
information is
physical.</span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>However,
letters,
electromagnetic
waves and
actually all
physical
objects are
only carriers
or containers
of
information.</span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>To
understand
this better,
let us
consider a
textbook. Is
possible to
say that this
book is
knowledge? Any
reasonable
person will
tell that the
textbook
contains
knowledge but
is not
knowledge
itself. In the
same way, the
textbook
contains
information
but is not
information
itself. The
same is true
for letters,
e-mails,
electromagnetic
waves and
other physical
objects
because all of
them only
contain
information
but are not
information.
For instance,
as we know,
different
letters can
contain the
same
information.
Even if we
make an
identical copy
of a letter or
any other
text, then the
letter and its
copy will be
different
physical
objects
(physical
things) but
they will
contain the
same
information.</span></div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>Information
belongs to a
different
(non-physical)
world of
knowledge,
data and
similar
essences. In
spite of this,
information
can act on
physical
objects
(physical
bodies) and
this action
also misleads
people who
think that
information is
physical.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK.
The reason is
that we can
hardly imagine
how immaterial
or non
physical
objects can
alter the
physical
realm. It is
the usual
problem faced
by dualist
ontologies.
With Indexical
computationalism we recover many dualities, but they belong to the
phenomenologies.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"> <br class="">
</div>
<div class="" style="margin:
0in 0in
0.0001pt;
font-size:
10.5pt;
font-family:
Consolas;
background-color:
#ffffff;"><span class=""><span class=""> </span>One
more
misleading
property of
information is
that people
can measure
it. This
brings an
erroneous
assumption
that it is
possible to
measure only
physical
essences.
Naturally,
this brings
people to the
erroneous
conclusion
that
information is
physical.
However,
measuring
information is
essentially
different than
measuring
physical
quantities,
i.e., weight.
There are no
“scales” that
measure
information.
Only human
intellect can
do this.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK.
I think all
intellect can
do that, not
just he human
one.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Now,
the reason why
people believe
in the
physical is
always a form
of the
“knocking
table”
argument. They
knocks on the
table and say
“you will not
tell me that
this table is
unreal”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I
have got so
many people
giving me that
argument, that
I have made
dreams in
which I made
that argument,
or even where
I was
convinced by
that argument
… until I wake
up.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">When
we do
metaphysics
with the
scientific
method, this
“dream
argument”
illustrates
that seeing,
measuring, …
cannot prove
anything
ontological. A
subjective
experience
proves only
the
phenomenological
existence of
consciousness,
and nothing
more. It shows
that although
there are
plenty of
strong
evidences for
a material
reality, there
are no
evidences
(yet) for a
primitive or
primary matter
(and that is
why, I think,
Aristotle
assumes it
quasi
explicitly,
against Plato,
and plausibly
against
Pythagorus).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism
forces a
coming back to
Plato, where
the worlds of
ideas is the
world of
programs, or
information,
or even just
numbers, since
very
elementary
arithmetic (PA
without
induction, +
the
predecessor
axiom) is
already Turing
complete (it
contains what
I have named a
Universal
Dovetailer: a
program which
generates
*and* executes
all programs).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">So
I agree with
you:
information is
not physical.
I claim that
if we assume
Mechanism
(Indexical
computationalism)
matter itself
is also not
*primarily*
physical: it
is all in the
“head of the
universal
machine/number”
(so to speak).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">And
this provides
a test for
primary
matter: it is
enough to find
if there is a
discrepancy
between the
physics that
we infer from
the
observation,
and the
physics that
we extract
from “the
head” of the
machine. This
took me more
than 30 years
of work, but
the results
obtained up to
now is that
there is no
discrepancies.
I have
compared the
quantum logic
imposed by
incompleteness
(formally) on
the
semi-computable
(partial
recursive,
sigma_1)
propositions,
with most
quantum logics
given by
physicists,
and it fits
rather well.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best
regards,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="">_______________________________________________
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<br class="">
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</blockquote>
<br class="">
</div><p class=""><br class="">
</p>
<div class="ox-7e2653bbb4-io-ox-signature"><p class="ox-7e2653bbb4-MsoNormalCxSpFirst" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 115%;
margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-size: 14px;" class=""><span style="font-family: 'courier new',
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margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="line-height: 115%;" class=""><span style="font-family: 'courier new',
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University North Texas</span></span></p><p class="ox-7e2653bbb4-MsoNormalCxSpFirst" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 115%;
margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-size: 14px;" class=""><span style="font-family: 'courier new',
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University Manitoba</span></span></p><p class="ox-7e2653bbb4-MsoNormalCxSpFirst" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 115%;
margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-family: 'courier new', monospace;" class=""><a href="http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/" style="font-size: 14px; color: #05447e;" class="" moz-do-not-send="true">http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/</a><span style="font-size: 14px;" class=""> </span></span><br class="">
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<blockquote type="cite" class="">_______________________________________________
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line-height: 115%; margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-size: 14px;" class=""><span style="font-family: 'courier
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line-height: 115%; margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-size: 14px;" class=""><span style="font-family: 'courier
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line-height: 115%; margin: 12.0pt 0cm 12.0pt 0cm;"><span style="font-family: 'courier new', monospace;" class=""><a href="http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/" style="font-size:
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<div class="moz-signature">-- <br class="">
John Collier<br class="">
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate<br class="">
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban<br class="">
<a href="http://web.ncf.ca/collier" class="">Collier web page </a><br class="">
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