<HTML><BODY><p style="margin-top: 0px;" dir="ltr">Dear Bruno, <br> You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the arithmetical reality)".<br> This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill, Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, Benacerraf. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Your idea is interesting and intriguing, related as it is to the philosophy of mathematics. However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method and of testable hypothesis. You are talking about philosophy, not about science. </p>
<p dir="ltr">I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific papers. Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context. </p>
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<p dir="ltr">--<br> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android</p>
</div>domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal <a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br><br><blockquote id="mail-app-auto-quote" style="border-left:1px solid #85AF31; margin:0px 0px 0px 10px; padding:0px 0px 0px 10px;" cite="15268361100000035335">
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<div id="style_15268361100000035335_BODY"><div class="class_1526841835">Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths <<a href="mailto:dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com" class="" target="_blank" rel=" noopener noreferrer" >dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix"><div class="">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">What is a 'thing'? <br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any universal complete theory or system.</div><div>To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. That determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the believer, the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc. </div><div><br class=""></div><div>A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative) neighbourhood of consistent continuations.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it explains many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as immediate undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers.</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">
</p><p class="">Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that only processes
exist, and that for human convenience in living in the world we
put conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and
call them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two
aspects (things and predictions about those things), but simply
the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find.
This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms
might be a special kind of process).<br class="">
</p><p class="">Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
reformulated as "Is information a thing?”.<br class=""></p></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted the non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it. </div><div>The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe, know, observe among all things/relations.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what the universal machine like to do the most. </div><div>See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast variety of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its computable part).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Bruno</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""><p class="">
</p>
Dai<br class="">
<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco
Rivero wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:CAMEsQ-vORLzewKMRjuCgphxiQRssebdmaX-uWJT81m4rH7Gw=A@mail.gmail.com" class=""><p dir="ltr" class="">Dear FISers, </p><p dir="ltr" class="">I recently came across an old interview to W. van
Orman Quine and I got an idea -maybe not very original per se.
Quine distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems:
ontological (those referred to the existence of things) and
predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological
problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem.
The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we
have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think
of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from
its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree
with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social
system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are
incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians
have shown (in this point I confess I would need to examine
carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many points of
agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I
currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough
discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most
coherent ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn
to deal with paradoxes. <br class="">
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify
the constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that
paradox in a set of statements that represent what we know about
information. The problem is that although we can have the
intuition that information is real, physical as has been said,
it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality ", if
we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the
system. I remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann
devised the concept of consistency proofs
(Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not
be asking us a question that cannot be answered. </p><p dir="ltr" class="">Best,</p><p dir="ltr" class="">JJ</p>
<div class="gmail_quote_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark"
<<a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" moz-do-not-send="true" class="" target="_blank" rel=" noopener noreferrer" >mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>> escribió:<br type="attribution" class="">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000" class=""> Dear FISers,<br class="">
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly
intelligent and creative individuals participated expressing
different points of view. Many interesting ideas were
suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would like
to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our
intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.<br class="">
<br class="">
To great extent, our possibility to answer the question
“Is information physical? “ depends on our model of the
world. Note that here physical means the nature of
information and not its substance, or more exactly, the
substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical
biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier
of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This
is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal
numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and
not numbers themselves.<br class="">
<br class="">
If we assume that there is only the physical world, we
have, at first, to answer the question “Does information
exist? “ All FISers assume that information exists.
Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions.
However, some people think differently (cf., for example,
Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).<br class="">
<br class="">
Now assuming that information exists, we have only one
option, namely, to admit that information is physical
because only physical things exist.<br class="">
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is
physical, we have three options assuming that information
exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br class="">
<br class="">
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental
world and the world of structures, we have seven options
assuming that information exists:<br class="">
- information is physical<br class="">
- information is mental<br class="">
- information is structural <br class="">
- information is both physical and mental <br class="">
- information is both physical and structural <br class="">
- information is both structural and mental <br class="">
- information is physical, structural and mental <br class="">
<br class="">
The solution suggested by the general theory of information
tries to avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences
suggesting that information (in a general sense) exists in
all three worlds but … in the physical world, it is called <b class="">energy</b>,
in the mental world, it is called <b class="">mental energy</b>, and
in the world of structures, it is called <b class="">information</b>
(in the strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with
the suggestion of Mark Johnson that information is both
physical and not physical only the general theory of
information makes this idea more exact and testable.<br class="">
In addition, being in the world of structures,
information in the strict sense is represented in two other
worlds by its representations and carriers. Note that any
representation of information is its carrier but not each
carrier of information is its representation. For instance,
an envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in
this letter but it is not its representation.<br class="">
Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of
information by the name energy - physical energy, mental
energy and structural energy.<br class="">
<br class="">
Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this
discussion, may be Krassimir will continue his excellent
initiative combining the most interesting contributions into
a paper with the title<br class="">
<b class=""> Is information physical?</b><br class="">
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.<br class="">
<br class="">
Sincerely,<br class="">
Mark Burgin<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-cite-prefix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">On
5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div dir="auto" class="">Dear Arturo,
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">There were some reports in clinical
psychology, about 30 years ago, that relate to the
question whether a machine can pretend to be a
therapist. That was the time as computers could newly
be used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers
techniques were a current discovery.</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">(Rogers developed a dialogue method
where one does not address the contents of what the
patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the
message, assumed to be at work in the patient.)</div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">They then said, that in some cases it
was indistinguishable, whether a human or a machine
provides the answer to a patient's elucidations. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Progress since then has surely made
possible to create machines that are indistinguishable
in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called
"expert systems ", are widely used in many fields. If
the interaction is rational, that is: formally
equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein,
the difference in: "who arrived at this answer,
machinery or a human", becomes irrelevant. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Artistry, intuition, creativity are
presently seen as not possible to translate into
Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are
not yet well understood. But!: there are some who are
busily undermining the current fundamentals of
rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live
to experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely
that humans are a combinatorial tautology. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Accordingly, may I respectfully express
opposing views to what you state: that machines and
humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints
that as far as rational capabilities go, the same
principles apply. There is a rest, you say, which is
not of this kind. The counter argument says that
irrational processes do not take place in organisms,
therefore what you refer to belongs to the main
process, maybe like waste belongs to the organism's
principle. This view draws a picture of a functional
biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism is
raw material for a different kind. </div>
<div dir="auto" class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div dir="auto" class="">Karl </div>
</div>
<br class="">
<div class="gmail_quote_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div dir="ltr" class=""> <<a href="mailto:tozziarturo@libero.it" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="" rel=" noopener noreferrer" >tozziarturo@libero.it</a>>
schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div class=""><p style="margin-top:0px" dir="ltr" class="">Dear Bruno, <br class="">
You state: <br class="">
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the
cognitive science,<br class="">
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a
mathematical notion.<br class="">
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis
that there is a level of description of the
brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel
any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a
digital machine emulating the brain/body at that
level of description".</p><p dir="ltr" class="">The problem of your account is the
following:<br class="">
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is
the HYPOTHESIS".<br class="">
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is
not empirically tested and it is not empirically
testable. You are starting with a sort of
postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with
it. The current neuroscience does not state that
our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a
digital machine.<br class="">
In other words, your "IF" stands for something
that possibly does not exist in our real world.
Here your entire building falls down. <br class="">
</p>
<div id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-default-signature_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" class=""><p dir="ltr" class="">--<br class="">
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android</p>
</div>
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno
Marchal <a class="m_-6888820020232975365moz-txt-link-abbreviated_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" rel=" noopener noreferrer" >marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>:<br class="">
<br class="">
<blockquote id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129mail-app-auto-quote_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" style="border-left:1px solid #85af31;margin:0px 0px 0px 10px;padding:0px 0px 0px 10px" cite="http://15259565360000035165/" class="">
<div >
<div class="">
<div id="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129style_15259565360000035165_BODY_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" class="">
<div class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129class_1525973693_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class="">(This mail has been sent previously ,
but without success. I resend it, with
minor changes). Problems due to
different accounts. It was my first
comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is
information physical?”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Apology for not answering the mails
in the chronological orders, as my new
computer classifies them in some
mysterious way!</div>
<div class="">This is my first post of the week. I
might answer comment, if any, at the end
of the week.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
<div class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47,
Burgin, Mark <<a href="mailto:mburgin@math.ucla.edu" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true" class="" rel=" noopener noreferrer" >mburgin@math.ucla.edu</a>>
wrote:</div>
<br class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129Apple-interchange-newline_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
<div class=""><p style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class="">Dear
Colleagues,</p><p style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class="">I
would like to suggest the new
topic for discussion</p><p style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class="">
Is information physical?<br class="">
</p>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That is an important topic
indeed, very close to what I am
working on. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">My result here is that </div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u class=""><br class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u class="">IF</u></b> indexical
digital mechanism is correct in the
cognitive science, </div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u class=""><br class="">
</u></b></div>
<div class=""><b class=""><u class="">THEN</u></b> “physical”
has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical”
becomes a mathematical notion.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The proof is constructive. It
shows exactly how to derive physics
from Arithmetic (the reality, not
the theory. I use “reality” instead
of “model" (logician’s term, because
physicists use “model" for
“theory").</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Indexical digital mechanism is
the hypothesis that there is a level
of description of the brain/body
such that I would survive, or “not
feel any change” if my brain/body is
replaced by a digital machine
emulating the brain/body at that
level of description.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Not only information is not
physical, but matter, time, space,
and all physical objects become part
of the universal machine
phenomenology. Physics is reduced to
arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any
Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly
Arithmetic (even the tiny
semi-computable part of arithmetic)
is Turing complete (Turing
Universal).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The basic idea is that:</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">1) no universal machine can
distinguish if she is executed by an
arithmetical reality or by a
physical reality. And,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">2) all universal machines are
executed in arithmetic, and they are
necessarily undetermined on the set
of of all its continuations emulated
in arithmetic. </div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">That reduces physics to a
statistics on all computations
relative to my actual state, and see
from some first person points of
view (something I can describe more
precisely in some future post
perhaps).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Put in that way, the proof is not
constructive, as, if we are machine,
we cannot know which machine we are.
But Gödel’s incompleteness can be
used to recover this constructively
for a simpler machine than us, like
Peano arithmetic. This way of
proceeding enforces the distinction
between first and third person views
(and six others!).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have derived already many
feature of quantum mechanics from
this (including the possibility of
quantum computer) a long time ago.
I was about sure this would refute
Mechanism, until I learned about
quantum mechanics, which verifies
all the most startling predictions
of Indexical Mechanism, unless we
add the controversial wave collapse
reduction principle.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">The curious “many-worlds” becomes
the obvious (in arithmetic) many
computations (up to some equivalence
quotient). The weird indeterminacy
becomes the simpler amoeba like
duplication. The non-cloning of
matter becomes obvious: as any piece
of matter is the result of the first
person indeterminacy (the first
person view of the amoeba undergoing
a duplication, …) on infinitely many
computations. This entails also that
neither matter appearance nor
consciousness are Turing emulable
per se, as the whole arithmetical
reality—which is a highly non
computable notion as we know since
Gödel—plays a key role. Note this
makes Digital Physics leaning to
inconsistency, as it implies
indexical computationalism which
implies the negation of Digital
Physics (unless my “body” is the
entire physical universe, which I
rather doubt).</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class=""><p style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class="">My
opinion is presented below:<br class="">
</p>
<div style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><br class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div style="background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><br class="m_-6888820020232975365m_1048372877214317129webkit-block-placeholder_mailru_css_attribute_postfix_mailru_css_attribute_postfix">
</div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>Why
some people erroneously think
that information is physical</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span></span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>The
main reason to think that
information is physical is the
strong belief of many people,
especially, scientists that
there is only physical
reality, which is studied by
science. At the same time,
people encounter something
that they call information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>When
people receive a letter, they
comprehend that it is
information because with the
letter they receive
information. The letter is
physical, i.e., a physical
object. As a result, people
start thinking that
information is physical. When
people receive an e-mail, they
comprehend that it is
information because with the
e-mail they receive
information. The e-mail comes
to the computer in the form of
electromagnetic waves, which
are physical. As a result,
people start thinking even
more that information is
physical.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>However,
letters, electromagnetic waves
and actually all physical
objects are only carriers or
containers of information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>To
understand this better, let us
consider a textbook. Is
possible to say that this book
is knowledge? Any reasonable
person will tell that the
textbook contains knowledge
but is not knowledge itself.
In the same way, the textbook
contains information but is
not information itself. The
same is true for letters,
e-mails, electromagnetic waves
and other physical objects
because all of them only
contain information but are
not information. For instance,
as we know, different letters
can contain the same
information. Even if we make
an identical copy of a letter
or any other text, then the
letter and its copy will be
different physical objects
(physical things) but they
will contain the same
information.</span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>Information
belongs to a different
(non-physical) world of
knowledge, data and similar
essences. In spite of this,
information can act on
physical objects (physical
bodies) and this action also
misleads people who think that
information is physical.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. The reason is that we can
hardly imagine how immaterial or non
physical objects can alter the
physical realm. It is the usual
problem faced by dualist ontologies.
With Indexical computationalism we
recover many dualities, but they
belong to the phenomenologies.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<br class="">
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div class="">
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""></span></div>
<div style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:10.5pt;font-family:Consolas;background-color:rgb(255,255,255)" class=""><span class=""><span class=""> </span>One
more misleading property of
information is that people can
measure it. This brings an
erroneous assumption that it
is possible to measure only
physical essences. Naturally,
this brings people to the
erroneous conclusion that
information is physical.
However, measuring information
is essentially different than
measuring physical quantities,
i.e., weight. There are no
“scales” that measure
information. Only human
intellect can do this.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">OK. I think all intellect can do
that, not just he human one.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Now, the reason why people
believe in the physical is always a
form of the “knocking table”
argument. They knocks on the table
and say “you will not tell me that
this table is unreal”.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">I have got so many people giving
me that argument, that I have made
dreams in which I made that
argument, or even where I was
convinced by that argument … until I
wake up.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">When we do metaphysics with the
scientific method, this “dream
argument” illustrates that seeing,
measuring, … cannot prove anything
ontological. A subjective experience
proves only the phenomenological
existence of consciousness, and
nothing more. It shows that although
there are plenty of strong evidences
for a material reality, there are no
evidences (yet) for a primitive or
primary matter (and that is why, I
think, Aristotle assumes it quasi
explicitly, against Plato, and
plausibly against Pythagorus).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Mechanism forces a coming back to
Plato, where the worlds of ideas is
the world of programs, or
information, or even just numbers,
since very elementary arithmetic (PA
without induction, + the predecessor
axiom) is already Turing complete
(it contains what I have named a
Universal Dovetailer: a program
which generates *and* executes all
programs).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">So I agree with you: information
is not physical. I claim that if we
assume Mechanism (Indexical
computationalism) matter itself is
also not *primarily* physical: it is
all in the “head of the universal
machine/number” (so to speak).</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">And this provides a test for
primary matter: it is enough to find
if there is a discrepancy between
the physics that we infer from the
observation, and the physics that we
extract from “the head” of the
machine. This took me more than 30
years of work, but the results
obtained up to now is that there is
no discrepancies. I have compared
the quantum logic imposed by
incompleteness (formally) on the
semi-computable (partial recursive,
sigma_1) propositions, with most
quantum logics given by physicists,
and it fits rather well.</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Best regards,</div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<div class="">Bruno</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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<pre class="moz-signature_mailru_css_attribute_postfix" cols="72">--
-----------------------------------------
Professor David (Dai) Griffiths
Professor of Education
School of Education and Psychology
The University of Bolton
Deane Road
Bolton, BL3 5AB
Office: M106
SKYPE: daigriffiths
Phones (please don't leave voice mail)
UK Mobile +44 (0)7491151559
Spanish Mobile: + 34 687955912
Work landline: + 44 (0)1204903598
email
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