<div dir="ltr">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span lang="DE-AT">Dear
Friends,<span></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span lang="DE-AT"><span> </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">we keep talking in different systems of references.
Nevertheless, there are points about which some clarification is helpful, to
connect the translucent picture of numbers to the movies you see. Let us talk
some absolute numbers, in the hope of clarifying the background.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Dai wrote a few days ago: <span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">“ … To my mind the note which is heard is far richer than
the note on the score. The difference includes everything that goes into the
interpretation of a piece of music. I am not arguing that numbers could not
describe this difference, but claiming that hugely more numbers would be
required to adequately describe it. … “<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Now Stanley brings up following perspective:<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">“<span> </span>… But my point was
simply that the observer cannot be 'objective', but always brings in many
constraints to any observation, which might have been made from yet another
perspective, of which we cannot imagine the number or qualities of. … “<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Both injections deal with the numeric extents that are
available to perceive or express a state of the world. Assuming that the
neurology works ideally, the perception or expression of the state of the world
is not influencing anything: as many different states of the world are there,
as many can be flawlessly perceived and expressed.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The question that has to be addressed is, then, how many
different states of the world there are. We know that about a limited number of
things only a limited number of nonredundant sentences can be said (otherwise one
would start repeating oneself). These sentences are only meaningful, if they
convey something that could be otherwise (there is nothing to say about a standalone
tautology, like there is nothing to say about Kant’s thing-as-such). So, the
assumption is that the sentence details the place of the element, relative to
which and what kind and how any symbols the element carries, which make that
element commutative to some other elements, and commutative-cum-sequential to
some specific elements, which are presently relevant. In this context, there is
always something to remark on and make idle predictions about the future. <span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Nevertheless, about a limited number of things only a
limited number of different sentences can be said, be these sentences stating
something about a sequential position of elements, relative to the patterns of
distribution of commutative symbols, or be they of the kind that they detail
the patterns of distribution of commutative symbols, relative to the sequential
positions that the elements have; in both cases one hits an upper limit of <i>rien ne va plus</i>, all that can be said, has
been said.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The monoideismus this person labours with is connected to
the two upper limits not agreeing with each other. One should indeed refer to <a href="http://www.oeis.org/A242615">www.oeis.org/A242615</a>
to see the numeric relations pictured.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">For the present discussion it does well to mention, that we
deal here with different cases of probabilities the numbers of which are in the
order of magnitude of 3.6E+94 and 1.3E+95. These are really big numbers. There
is, by Jupiter!, sufficient number of alternatives for a sound’s timbre,
enchantment, finest innuendo, etc.<span> </span><span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">It is not easy to raise hell by running around and holding
up placates that say: “There is an intricate inexactitude in our counting
system! We count incorrectly to the tune of 3.4E-94%!” There are many, to whom
other problems appear more urgent.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Among the corollaries of the steps to put this inexactitude
in clean cloths is, that there exists a maximal number of aspects
(perspectives, viewpoints) that can be used while describing all possible states
of the world. Commutative statements appear to be independent of each other. We
might have counted a case under <i>{(k
elements carry symbol w, among these, j elements carry also symbol q), (r
elements carry symbol t, among these, k elements also carry symbol z), … etc} </i>as
we met it at any of its partial descriptions, therefore classifications that
come <i>later</i>, repeat redundancies
(which may be the method to force registry in the memory). There is always a <i>first</i> describing aspect that segments
the cases. The <i>second</i> aspect deals
with cases that are already categorised in some ways. The <i>last </i>aspect finds the last cases that were indistinguishable
previously and assigns identifying symbols to them. Any subsequent searches
would turn up only such cases that have already been entered in the databases. This
is a query language, but also in that language only a limited number of sentences
can be said of a collection that is limited in numbers. <span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Yes, we indeed can very well imagine the number and the
qualities of categorising perspectives, at least in idealised cases. There is
an inner granularity to the logical world, things are not spread uniformly in
space. Things congregate by very simple rules, at least on the numeric level.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">The main points again: we compare the maximal number of DNAs
with the maximal diversity of organisms. We find that the upper limits do not
match. There is an inherent inexactitude, caused by our presently used rules of
counting, in the counting system. The extent of this inexacitude is extremely
small. The bias can be fixed, if one uses symbols that are concurrently commutative
and sequential. These are found when one uses cycles. <span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">There are cycles that can co-exist, and some that can not
co-exist. Knowing that some elements of the cycle have already been the case
allows predictions, when, where and which elements will appear next. This
property of ordered collections is used by the nervous system as the basis for
remembering and learning.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Hope that this brings you a context relating to the system
of consistent counting.<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">Karl<span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin:0cm 0cm 8pt;line-height:107%;font-size:11pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"><span> </span><span></span></p>
<br></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">2018-03-23 13:57 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:ssalthe@binghamton.edu" target="_blank">ssalthe@binghamton.edu</a>></span>:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr">Bruno -- That is an interesting, creative move! But my point was simply that the observer cannot be 'objective', but always<div>brings in many constraints to any observation, which might have been made from yet another perspective, of which we cannot</div><div>imagine the number or qualities of.</div><div><br></div><div>STAN</div></div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5"><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" target="_blank">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br></div>Dear Stan,<div><br></div><div><br><div><blockquote type="cite"><div>On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe <<a href="mailto:ssalthe@binghamton.edu" target="_blank">ssalthe@binghamton.edu</a>> wrote:</div><br class="m_-7308386727490816318m_-5602840079763417246Apple-interchange-newline"><div><div dir="ltr">Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our abilities of perception. First, we are physical. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is not compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science, which is my working hypothesis. </div><div><br></div><div>Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine (number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other plausible, from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many below the substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not Turing emulable (in the Mechanist perspective).</div><div><br></div><div>There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that mathematical reality.</div><div><br></div><div>I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence of the computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the existence of a physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical universe appearance can and must be explained by a statistics on all computations (seen in a first person way). That makes mechanism testable and indeed, thanks to Quantum Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very well up to now.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr">Thus:<div><br></div><div>{physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }}}}}}}}}</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable) ability in your matter to select some computation. </div><div><br></div><div>You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I can say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.</div><div><br></div><div>Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of my papers).</div><div><br></div><div>So it is more like</div><div><br></div><div>{arithmetical{dream-like{biolo<wbr>gical{conscious{physical{{<wbr>animal {mammal {primate {human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }}}}}}}}}</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div><div>Hence, actuality is for us non-existent. </div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>? </div><div>Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent Ontologically, I guess you mean. I am not sure I understand well.</div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div>We live in a constructed reality.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical not even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).</div><div><br></div><div>I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian) theology, but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority, sometimes violent.</div><div><br></div><div>Best, </div><div><br></div><div>Bruno</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div><div>STAN</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:marchal@ulb.ac.be" target="_blank">marchal@ulb.ac.be</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,<br>
<br>
> On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths <<a href="mailto:dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com" target="_blank">dai.griffiths.1@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:<br>
><br>
> >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between “reality” and “data”<br>
><br>
> That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.<br>
<br>
If not the whole of mathematics.<br>
<br>
To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.<br>
<br>
In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number getting the machine and the data has its input.<br>
<br>
Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.<br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
> > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the note printed on the partiture,<br>
> > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the description of the position<br>
> > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his hands.<br>
><br>
> I do not think that these are the same case.<br>
<br>
I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).<br>
<br>
Also, is there a reality?<br>
<br>
And what could it be?<br>
<br>
We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the physical reality becomes a phenomenological mode of self-reference of the universal (in the sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, …) machine/number.<br>
<br>
The biological evolution explains the biological origin of the humans, but to avoid the behaviourist error of avoiding consciousness, eventually, we get a “physical evolution”, where the physical laws somehow percolate from the dreams of all universal numbers. The key is that from the universal machines' first person perspectives it is “executed” by infinitely many universal numbers below their computationalist substitution level. A fact that I saw a long time before this is confirmed by Everett quantum mechanics (which is the old one minus the collapse of the wave packet postulate).<br>
<br>
Data are indexicals, defined relatively to the universal machine/number which interpret it, correctly, or incorrectly, relatively to its most probable computations (among an infinity of them).<br>
<br>
With mechanism the big picture is very simple, arithmetic and its enumerable, but non mechanically enumerable set of universal numbers. But the first person phenomenology is “uncertain” on non enumerable computations, making them “living” on the border of the uncomputable.<br>
<br>
Related to this is that the original doubt of the greek theologians/metaphysicians was between "is reality what we see” or is reality something else from which what we see is the shadow, the border, the symptom, ...<br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
> The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit, go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different pieces on another board, and continue with little disturbance.<br>
><br>
> But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From the starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on volumes, intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and variations. These issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor would we be happy to buy a recording of a symphony in which different orchestras played different movements in different concert halls (although it might be interesting to hear).<br>
<br>
<br>
I might agree with Karl, but as expressing a first person phenomenology. With mechanism that keeps enumerability, but loss “recursive enumerability. Even the simple Gödel-Löbian self-observing universal system/number/machine is confronted to the uncomputable main part of the (arithmetical) Truth by just this introspection. The senses comes from the multi-relations in between different universal machine.<br>
<br>
Best Regards,<br>
<br>
Bruno<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
> Dai<br>
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