<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;" class="">Hi John,<div class=""><br class=""></div><div class=""><br class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 26 Feb 2018, at 04:37, John Collier <<a href="mailto:ag659@ncf.ca" class="">ag659@ncf.ca</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class="">
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Inclined to agree with Joseph. </div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>OK. Nice.</div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">I would like to point out that there
are different meanings for "real', and one has to be clear about
ones metaphysics to make the idea (somewhat) clear.</div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div>Yes. That is a key point. Then if we want to adopt the scientific attitude in metaphysics/theology, we better be neutral at the start.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>The god/non-god debate has hidden the original question raised (more or less explicitly) by Plato about what is ultimately real, and the doubt was about the primariness of the physical. The choice, for xeusippes was between physicalism (the ultimate reality is the physical or material universe) and mathematicalism or theologicalism, where the dispute is somehow between the numbers (the finite things) and the ideas (usually infinite).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Now, it can be shown that with the digital mechanist hypothesis (the invariance of consciousness for a digital functional substitution made at *some* level) is logically or at least epistemologically incompatible with materialism (in the weak sense of the ontological commitment in primary material substance, or dubbed as such (technically we can introduce more nuances here. Tegmark suggest a Mathematicalism which is still largely physicalist).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>With digital mechanism, consciousness get contagiated to all computations supporting us so that we are first person indeterminate on an infinity of computations below our substitution level. (Like in Feynman-Everett formulation of QM). Physics get redefined by the observable by the universal machine, which in this case can be translated in arithmetical terms. </div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class=""> Peirce, for
example, would call Plato's shadows (which aren't really shadows at
all, real, but not existent. </div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div>Here, the universal machines, when we listen to them (which today requires mainly studying Gödel’s proof and Kleene’s technic, or searching for the relevant papers as the literature is very rich, too much rich somehow) suggests a very simple Pythagorean ontology (only the natural numbers exists), and the only laws are the laws of succession, addition and multiplication. That already entails the 3p existence of all prime numbers, but also of all computations. So the existence becomes the existence is the semantic of the first order theory of arithmetic (ExP(x)).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Then, the incompleteness makes Gödel’s arithmetical provability predicate into a (strange) believability predicate. The self-referentially correct universal machine quickly becomes modest and does not prove for all proposition that provable(p) -> p. []p->p is not a law in the provability logic.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>But there is much more. This makes possible to “meta”define knowledge in the manner of Theaetetus (true belief), by []p & p. By a theorem of Traski, we cannot define the arithmetical truth in the arithmetical language, but for each proposition we can mimic its truth by its assertability (as we talk about simple machine which we can trust). But this associates the machine (played in arithmetic) by the beweisbar predicate of Gödel to a semantic, and it obeys a very different logic from the logic of “[]” (provability/believability).It provides a notion of first person and a logic of evolving states of knowledge, close to intuitionist logic, and having topological semantics. Then incompleteness push further the nuances, by making the weaker nuance []p & <>t, where we attach only the consistency of the machine, instead of the truth. This is what we need to have a notion of certainty when doing an experience, and this, on the semi-computable p, provides the quantisation justifying a nest of quantum logics lurking there. </div><div><br class=""></div><div>I don’t claim any truth. If mechanism is correct, the physical reality is in the head of the universal Turing machine. That makes the theory easily refutable empirically, by comparing the physics in the head of the universal digital machine, with the physics we observe.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Up to now it fits, as we recover a quantisation at the place needed.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Consciousness of a person p supported by a machine m can be defined quasi axiomatically by what the machine m can assert as true, unprovable, undefinable, but also undoubtable. And invariant in the relative digital substitution for some level.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>I think that the universal (Turing) machine might be maximally intelligent and conscious. We can only make it more stupid (albeit more competent in some tasks). It will still take some time before they become as stupid as the humans, though.</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">The sort of shadows that we normal
experience are both real and existent on Peirce's account.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div>OK.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>With Mechanism, we get the “ontological” existence, or the basic objects that we assume, and I took the numbers 0, 1, 2, … because everyone is familiar, but any terms of a Turing universal machinery would do. Theology and Physics are machine independent, as it depends on *all* computations, and that is mimicked by all universal machine/word/number/finite-entity. Then we get all the phenomenological nuances by the modal variants: physical existence if of the type []<>p, on the logic of []p & <>t, with p a semi-computable/provable propositions.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Peirce’s account is not fundamental at this stage, but it should plausibly introduced itself in the perception modes, around the []p & <>t & p nuances implied by incompleteness. It is very interesting, but to see how the “persistent and partially sharable illusion” emerges, the semantic of Tarski is enough (and easier for a mathematician of course).</div><div><br class=""></div><div>I don’t want you to bother too much, as mathematical logic and computer science are not well known, and when used in philosophy it is often invalid ((cf Penrose and Lucas). Yet very interesting as such works points on the response of the universal machine, which makes such reasoning into a confusion between []p & p with []p. </div><div><br class=""></div><div>Sometimes I agree with many people here, but then some can either dismiss the digital world, or favour a material basic reality, and well, some choice (Aristotle or Plato) does not have to been made, but we must be aware that not everybody take physicalism or materialism for granted. My works make Quantum Mechanics testing retrospectively Aristotle V Plato in Metaphysic/Theology, and that confirms mechanism, and not materialism, unless we introduce some wave packet reduction, which indeed is an alternative taken by some.</div><div><br class=""></div><div>Bruno</div><div><br class=""></div><div>PS Second, and thus last, post of the week! </div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF" class="">
<br class="">
John<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2018/02/26 4:58 AM,
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:joe.brenner@bluewin.ch">joe.brenner@bluewin.ch</a> wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" cite="mid:185866472.194.1519613885446.JavaMail.webmail@bluewin.ch" class="">
<blockquote style="margin-right: 0px; margin-left:15px;" class=""><font face="Arial" class="">Dear FISers,</font></blockquote>
<blockquote style="margin-right: 0px; margin-left:15px;" class="">
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class="">With all due respect to Krassimir, Sung,
and his son, it is becoming a matter of scientific interest
that statements by them and others to the effect that
"systematic research of what the 'shadows' are a part" has
not been done are made routinely. First of all, the logic in
reality of Lupasco about which I have been talking here for
10 years, includes</font><font face="arial,sans-serif" class=""> a
new mereology in which the dynamic relations between part
and whole are set out for discussion. Second, while the
'diagram' of Merleau-Ponty may be considered interesting as
philosophy and as a foundation of religious belief, I see no
reason to include it, without heavy qualification, in a
discussion of the foundations of information science.</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class=""><br class="">
</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class="">Thank you,</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class=""><br class="">
</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class="">Joseph</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class=""><br class="">
</font></div>
<div class=""><font face="Arial" class=""><br class="">
</font></div>
<div class=""><br class="">
</div>
<blockquote style="margin-right: 0px; margin-left:15px;" class="">----Message
d'origine----<br class="">
De : <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:sji@pharmacy.rutgers.edu">sji@pharmacy.rutgers.edu</a><br class="">
Date : 25/02/2018 - 15:04 (PST)<br class="">
À : <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:ag659@ncf.ca">ag659@ncf.ca</a>, <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es">fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br class="">
Objet : Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!<br class="">
<br class="">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8" class="">
<style style="display:none;" type="text/css" class=""><!-- P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;} --></style>
<div id="divtagdefaultwrapper" style="font-size: 12pt;" dir="ltr" class=""><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class="">Hi Krassimir,</div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><br class="">
</div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class="">I agree with you
that "<em style="font-family: Calibri; font-size: large;
font-weight: bold;" class="">The shadows are real</em><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class=""> but
only a part of the whole. What is needed is a systematic
research from what they are part."</span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class=""><br class="">
</span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class="">In my
previous post, I was suggesting that Shadows are a part
of the irreudicible triad consisting of
<b class="">Form (A), Shadow (B) </b>and<b class=""> Thought (C)</b>. The
essential notion of the ITR (Irreducible Triadic
realrtion) is that A, B, and C cannot be reduced to
any one or a pair of the triad. This
automatically means that 'Shadow' is a part of the whole
triad (which is, to me, another name for the Ultimate
Reality), as Form and Thought are. In other words, the
Ultimate Reality is not Form nor Shadow nor Thought
individually but all of them together, since they
constitute an irreducible triad. This idea is
expressed in 1995 in another way: The Ultimate Reality
is the <i class="">complementary union</i> of the
<i class="">Visble</i> and the <i class="">Invisible World</i> (see <b class="">Table
1</b> attached). Apparently a similar idea underlies
the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961),
according to my son, Douglas Sayer Ji (see his semior
research thesis submitted in 1996 to the Department of
Philosophy at Rutgers University under the guidance of
B. Wilshire, attached). </span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class=""><br class="">
</span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class="">All the
best.</span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class=""><br class="">
</span></div><div style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;" class=""><span style="font-size: large; font-family: Calibri;" class="">Sung</span></div><p style="text-align: left; margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:
0px;" class=""> </p>
<br class="">
<div style="" class="">
<hr tabindex="-1" style="display:inline-block;width:98%" class="">
<div id="divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr" class=""><font style="font-size:11pt" face="Calibri, sans-serif" class=""><b class="">From:</b> Fis
<a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es"><fis-bounces@listas.unizar.es></a> on behalf of John
Collier <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:ag659@ncf.ca"><ag659@ncf.ca></a><br class="">
<b class="">Sent:</b> Sunday, February 25, 2018 2:51 PM<br class="">
<b class="">To:</b> <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es">fis@listas.unizar.es</a><br class="">
<b class="">Subject:</b> Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!</font>
<div class=""> </div>
</div>
<div style="background-color:#FFFFFF" class="">Daer Krassimir, List<br class="">
<br class="">
I basically support what you are saying. I understand
the mathematics you presented, I am good at mathematics
and studied logic with some of the best. However, and
this is a big however, giving a mathematical or logical
proof by itself, in its formalism, does not show
anything at all. One has to be able to connect teh
mathematics to experience in a comprehensible way. This
was partly the topic of my dissertation, and I take a
basically Peircean approach, though there are others
that are pretty strong as well.<br class="">
<br class="">
I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the
empirical connections. If I find them, then generally
all becomes clear. Without this, the formalism is
nothing more than formalism. It does not help to give
formal names to things and assume that this identifies
things, Often trying to follow up approaches kine this
is a profound waste of time. I try to, and often am able
to, express my ideas in a nonformal way. Some
mathematically oriented colleagues see this as
automatically defective, since they think that formal
representation is all that really rigorously explains
things. This sort of thinking (in Logical Positivism)
eventually led to its own destruction as people started
to ask the meaning of theoretical terms and their
relation to observations. It is a defunct and self
destructive metaphysics. Irt leads nowhere -- my PhD
thesis was about this problem. It hurts me to see people
making the same mistake, especially when it leads them
to bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the
formalism (actually, it is provable that almost anything
is compatible with a specific formalism, up to
numerosity).<br class="">
<br class="">
I don't like to waste my time with such emptiness,<br class="">
<br class="">
John<br class="">
<br class="">
<div class="x_moz-cite-prefix">On 2018/02/25 6:22 PM,
Krassimir Markov wrote:<br class="">
</div>
<blockquote type="cite" class="">
<div dir="ltr" class="">
<div style="font-size: 14pt; font-family: Calibri;" class="">
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Dear Sung,</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">I like your approach but I
think it is only a part of the whole.</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">1. <strong class=""><em class="">The shadows
are real</em></strong> but only a part of
the whole. What is needed is a systematic
research from what they are part.</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">2. About the whole now I will
use the category theory I have seen you like:</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">CAT<sub class="">A</sub> => F
=> CAT<sub class="">B</sub> => G => CAT<sub class="">C</sub></em></font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class=""></em></font> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">CAT<sub class="">A</sub> => H
=> CAT<sub class="">C</sub></em></font></div>
<div class=""><em class=""></em> </div>
<div class=""><em class=""><sub class=""><font size="4" class="">F ○ G = H</font></sub></em></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">where</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">F</em>, <em class="">G</em>, and <em class="">H</em>
are <em class=""><strong class="">functors</strong></em>;</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font style="" class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">CAT<sub class="">II</sub>
<font style="" face="Symbol" class="">
Î</font> CAT</em> is the category of <em class=""><strong class="">information
interaction categories</strong></em>;</font></font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">CAT<sub class="">A </sub><font face="Symbol" class="">Î</font> CAT<sub class="">II</sub></em>
and
<em class="">CAT<sub class="">C</sub> <font face="Symbol" class="">Î</font>
CAT<sub class="">II</sub></em> are the categories of
<strong class=""><em class="">mental models’ categories</em></strong>;</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><em class="">CAT<sub class="">B</sub> <font face="Symbol" class="">Î</font> CAT<sub class="">II</sub></em>
is the category of
<strong class=""><em class="">models’ categories</em></strong>.</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class="">
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Of course, I will explain
this in natural language (English) in
further posts.
</font></div>
</div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class=""><object tabindex="0" class="x_wlEmoticon x_wlEmoticon-smile" style="border-style: none; user-select:
none;" alt="Smile" naturalwidth="19" naturalheight="19" moz-do-not-send="true" data="cid:part1.DCF1CC3A.4AFFEF42@ncf.ca" type="application/x-apple-msg-attachment"></object></font></div>
<div class="">
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">;</font></div>
</div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Dear Karl,</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Thank you for your post – it
is very useful and I will discus it in further
posts.</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">;</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Dear Pedro,</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Thank you for your nice words.
</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Mathematics is very good to be
used when all know the mathematical languages.</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Unfortunately, only a few
scientists are involved in the mathematical
reasoning, in one hand, and, as the Bourbaki
experiment had shown, not everything is ready
to be formalized.
</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">How much of FIS members
understood what I had written above?</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">The way starts from
philosophical reasoning and only some times
ends in mathematical formal explanations.</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Friendly greetings</font></div>
<div class=""><font size="4" class="">Krassimir</font></div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
<div class=""> </div>
</div>
</div>
<br class="">
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</blockquote>
<br class="">
<div class="x_moz-signature">-- <br class="">
John Collier<br class="">
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate<br class="">
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban<br class="">
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web page </a><br class="">
</div>
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<br class="">
</blockquote>
<br class="">
<br class="">
</blockquote>
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</pre>
</blockquote>
<br class="">
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br class="">
John Collier<br class="">
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate<br class="">
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban<br class="">
<a href="http://web.ncf.ca/collier" class="">Collier web page </a><br class="">
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