<div dir="ltr"><br><div class="gmail_extra"><div><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><br><div>Thank you, Lou.</div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div>
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 8:24 PM, Louis H Kauffman <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:loukau@gmail.com" target="_blank">loukau@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">Dear Plamen,<div>I will make comments in the text.</div><div>Best,</div><div>Lou</div><div><br><div><blockquote type="cite"><span class=""><div>On Mar 9, 2016, at 7:21 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov <<a href="mailto:plamen.l.simeonov@gmail.com" target="_blank">plamen.l.simeonov@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br></span><div><div dir="ltr"><div>Dear Lou,<br><br></div><span class="">thank you for your response.<br><br><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 9:53 AM, Louis H Kauffman <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:loukau@gmail.com" target="_blank">loukau@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">Dear Plamen,<div>I suspect that what you would like to know about ‘distinction logic’ is how distinctions arise in natural systems.</div><div>I would like to know more about this also!</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I suspect Spencer-Brown has beeen working on this too.<br></div></div></div></div></div></span></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div>LK. We all work on this. But recall that Laws of Form begins “We take a given the idea of distinction and the idea of indication and that one cannot have and indication without drawing a distinction. We talk therefore the form of distinction for the form.”. This sentence, as Heinz von Foerster noted in his review of Laws of Form, cuts through 2000 years of semantic weeds.</div><div>There is no conversation, no thought without distinction, without form. And yet we containually try to create a theory of the emergence of form. Each such theory is structured by the basic distinctions with which it begins.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>"Let there be light."</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><span class=""><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div>One can imagine that complex interactions can under appropriate circumstances lead to dynamic closed loops of interaction and even concomitant spatial distinctions (in the eye of an observer of the system). Such patterns would be the subject of a distinction logic or a logic of distinctions for that observer. There is the related question of how observers can arise but this is looped around with the first question. The two questions are linked with one another and one can imagine that systems that produce partly stable looping processes can begin to create naming and reference.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This sounds intriguing. Does not this go into biosemiotics?<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></span>LK. I suppose it does go into biosemiotics, and also it is related to the work of Stuart Kauffman. I am thinking about it in an elemental way. That large scale patternings that lead to partially stable recursive structures will lead internally to the development of the apparently infinitely clever devices we see in evolution. We see this in the exploration of spaces of rules and actions of simple structures like cellular automata.<br></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Stu was also invited to this session. I hope he will be also able to tell something. He recently mentions the role of metaphors in our informal narrative description of the world. By using them we can flash “light”, i.e. sweeping distinctions, nut the problem is that they are language-dependent / anthropocentric and cannot always capture the associations in one’s mind. Do you think there could be a formal way, a categorisation of basic metaphoric notions?</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><span class=""><div> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div> If they can do that, they will not be far from self-reference. Exactly how this could be done is a mystery. But that it happens is evident in the biological world.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></span><div><span class="">So we come back to the old Searle thesis about self-reference?<br><br><a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/ijn_00089222/document" target="_blank">https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/ijn_00089222/document</a><br><br></span> LK. Hmm… I will have to look at Searle’s assertions about self ref. What I mean is that if a system can name processes then it can find a name for its own process of naming.<br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>LK. When it does this, it has found the linguistic I. “I am the one who says I.” I am the one who makes names and reference.” “I name myself I.” “I am that I am."<span class=""><br><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br></div><div>On the other hand you may be interested in the simplicities of the calculus of indications or variations of that. I would be happy to talk about that. When I do it is at the level of human observer and our mutual abilities to distinguish, agree and disagree.</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I see. This is the level of the scientist. <br>This should be doable. Self-referential microbes are out of question for the moment.<br><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></span>LK. Maybe maybe now. The Spencer-Brown Mark refers to itself since it refers to any distinction and it is itself seen to be a distinction by the observer who is him or her self a Mark.</div><div>So is the microbe, but just how doth the microbe make observations. Answer through its interactions. And so … We must reflect on this.</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is interesting. So, it should be possible to develop a formal "virus theory" that interacts with the external world (icl. human beings) from the viewpoint of the virus, right?</div><div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div><br></div><div>Plamen. </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><span class=""><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div dir="ltr"><div><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><br><div><blockquote type="cite"><div><div><div>On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:10 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov <<a href="mailto:plamen.l.simeonov@gmail.com" target="_blank">plamen.l.simeonov@gmail.com</a>> wrote:</div><br></div></div><div><div><div><div dir="ltr"><div><br></div><div>Dear Lou, Pedro and Colleagues,<br></div><div><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">I think that Pedro made an interesting
comment suggesting an extension of Lou’s original model that another sort of recursion can be
injected from the outside world in terms of multiple nested loops of action. That
the species (r)evolution was accelerated and “harmonized” via “cross-cultural”
exchange of DNA segments invoked by viruses is a known fact now. It also changes to some extent
the meaning of infection diseases from something “bad” to fight into a sort of
necessary symbiosis for the co-evolution of the system Earth/Cosmos. So, it makes sense to
think and ask whether by creating more and more artificial drugs and vaccines against
infections we do not intervene in the mutation of viruses in a way that cannot
be regarded as response-able, because of also being too reductionistic with
respect to what are the consequences for both ourselves and the BIG unknown ecosystem
outside our bodies. I am curious to know what do you think about the option to try
integrating Turing Oracle Machines in such extended recursive models of living
systems, which integrate viruses in the evolutionary loop. This idea was
suggested in the course of our integral biomathics discussions in the past. In other words, what do you
think about linking a formal biomathematical representation and a
biocomputation responsive mechanism in maintaining an autonomous biologic? Perhaps we need multiple layers of abstraction, i.e. multiple biologics, and not only the bimolecular and cellular ones. And also, do you think there are other mechanisms for information transfer, e.g. in prokaryotic cells and archaea, also addressing the principles of circularity and recursion?</span></p><div><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Another question I have is ignited from
Pedro’s reflections upon your circularity model for reproduction and directed
to both of you. If biological “clocks” such as the circadian rhythm are the
result of an evolutionary impressed repetition of action, are they the carrier
or the carried, or perhaps both, and if so how does this come into being? I recall a paper by Koichiro Matsuno in the former 2013 IB special issue “Making Biological Theory More Down to Earth” which said something interesting about the role of cycles in maintaining identity and life, also from the phenomenological perspective concerning the distinction between self and outer world. Here is where I’d like to learn more about the distinction logic like Pedro.</span></p><div><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Thank you.</span></p><div><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">All the best.</span></p><div><span lang="EN-US"> </span><br></div><p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-US">Plamen</span></p>
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