<div dir="ltr"><p class="MsoNormal">Dear FIS
colleagues,</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">I didn’t know Maxine’s
work, and I’m very glad to have been introduced to it – I’ve been reading
through the 1972 edition of the Phenomenology of Dance. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">In reading this, and
in reading the contributions on the list, I’ve found myself reflecting on the
relationship between “ontological speculation” (e.g., speculations about
origins) and measurement. Speculations about origins can only ever be
speculations, yet they inevitably assume the status of ‘foundations’ where
their speculative and tentative character is (at best) obscured in various ways.
Measurement, at some level, rests on speculations – yet measurement contributes
to the ‘solidifying’ (stultifying?) of speculations. I’m reminded that it was
precisely this insight into the foundational assumptions of Frege’s mathematics
and their positivistic implications in the sciences which led Husserl into his
phenomenological search in the first place! </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">The methodological
problem of thinking about the experience of dance is a good place to look for the
weaknesses of existing foundations. Personally, I have preferred to think about
music (it's my background) – but it’s a very similar problem. These topics are on fault-lines that comprise
the intellectual domain that Searle calls “epistemic subjectivity” – not facts of
common knowledge (epistemic objectivity), physical phenomena (ontological
objectivity) or social structures (ontological subjectivity) – but feelings and
accounts of feelings – like headaches and itches. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">I wonder if the problem
has to do with indexicallity, or more basically, “pointing”: In wishing to
uncover the structure of consciousness, Husserl wished for ‘structures of
consciousness’ to point at which others could also point to (and agree) what it
was which was being indexed. In the end what he was able to point to was his
method, which most of his followers were dissatisfied with. The problem was (Husserl
knew this well) that what he pointed to was a relation where the pointing was
part of the relation. I think it is for this reason that intersubjectivity becomes
a major theme in his work – although I agree with Alfred Schutz that Husserl’s
concept of intersubjectivity is deficient (Schutz refines it considerably in my
opinion).</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">What has this got to
do with information? </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">If I have detected any
kind of consensus on this list in the past few months, it is on the importance
of constraint, or absence, in the study of information. It may be that information
is the study of constraint; that in Bob U.’s words, the most important
thing about information is “not-information”.
As Bob acknowledges, Bateson said it first…</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">Processes of
measurement, and indeed processes of scientific knowledge, are constrained
processes. Scientists deliberately constrain their experiments within
laboratories. How can we characterise that constraint and the various
biopsychosocial constraints bearing upon the ensuing processes of arriving at
agreement about causal mechanisms? Or the constraints that bear upon the selection of apparatus? This is what recent sociomaterial theories
of scientific practice have been digging at (Barad, Rouse, Harraway). Whilst I
find myself approving of their general point, I also see science disappearing
in a kind beautifully-written mystical haze which I find distressing, but other
seem to quite enjoy!</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">But what about dance?
Is it more or less constrained? If we were to analyse the constraints of dance,
where would we start? </p>
<p class="MsoNormal">We start with many of
the categories which Maxine identifies: rhythm, weight, space, time, force, and
so on. But then there are the interlocking constraints of human biology,
psychology, anatomy, and so on. As an intersubjective relation, is dance more
constrained than a Wheatstone bridge experiment? And sex and mating rituals? (well,
it’s all about sex, isn’t it?) how constrained is that? What about Wittgenstein’s
‘wriggling fly’ (Philosophical Investigations, p284) – is it dancing?</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">I find this a
fascinating thought because it asks many questions about the assumptions of modern science around ‘objectivity’, and the relation between social and physical
science. It also seems consistent (if I understand him right) with what Bob U.
has been saying about ecology. Loet has been pushing at a similar boundary. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">There seems to be many questions about methodologies for examining constraint. Personally, I think Shannon has a useful
contribution to make with regard to measurement (that’s not to exclude critique
of his formulae) – but understanding what it is to use a relational calculation
(which is what it is) within scientific investigation is poorly understood – it
is not causal relations we are examining. At a broader methodological level, the
cybernetic error-driven approach (Ashby is the key figure here) may be more
profound than current popular realist theories. </p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">I've ended up a question and a sub-question...</p><p class="MsoNormal">“What
are the conditions within which a coherent scientific discourse can address the
phenomenon of dance (or music)?” </p><p class="MsoNormal">I suspect Maxine is right to point to Darwin's 'descriptive' process. So a sub-question is:</p><p class="MsoNormal">"What do we do when we describe something?"</p><p class="MsoNormal"></p><p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">best wishes,</p><p class="MsoNormal"><br></p><p class="MsoNormal">Mark</p></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On 19 February 2016 at 13:12, Pedro C. Marijuan <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es" target="_blank">pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<div>Dear Maxine and Colleagues,<br>
<br>
Concerning your presentation I have a couple of questions. About
dance, first, let me inquire about another important aspect it may
have, perhaps a "vital" one . In a number of species, dance is
related to the mutual pre-exploration between potential
reproductive partners. The individual fitness of the candidate(s)
are evaluated quite strategically along the movements of dance, at
least in the essential adaptive traits. Cultural layers of human
societies may have created further "meanings" to dance (artistic,
gimnastic, educative, therapeutic, etc.) but at the very roots of
this human phenomenon the exploration between genders continues to
be of the essence, I think. Those qualities you mention of
tensional, linear, aerial, and projectional are in themselves
excellent ways to observe the whole person: not only in the
motoric dimension, but also concerning some related
intellectual-emotional capabilities. The "gestalts" Alex mentions
are colored very differently depending on the social/cultural
contexts in which the same dance may take place. It is quite
interesting that the folk inter-gender dance is performed in
"safe" public spaces, and that it often conveys a feminine
advantage (better synchronization of movements, more interest for
fashionable pieces), etc. etc. Although perhaps it does not apply
to most of present day "disco dance". Along your points, I was
reminded that many years ago, someone in fis list wrote about the
informational implications of "Tango" (originally a dance between
castaway males in Argentina's immigrant squalors) ... it is a pity
I can remember very little about that. <br>
<br>
And the second comment concerns the paleoanthropological tools.
The analogy between the two major forms of tools and the two major
tooth forms is very well developed.I quite agree, and also would
like to ad a relationship with human gut-microbiome. We needed
"artificial" teeth because with our terrific brain growth, the
overall metabolic needs escalated almost 20%. However, at the same
time the gut size (& contained microbiome) was reduced 50% in
comparison with any Anthropoidea of our size. This is an
impossible budget to maintain, unless the development of
collective intelligence applied to our feeding and created
completely original ways. These new ways were made possible by
language, group identities, tools and artifact creation... but it
was the new feeding style what pushed along this adaptive loop. We
have called the new ways as "cooking", but actually it was a pre-
or external digestion, achieved with those artifactual "molars and
incisives", plus boiling, roasting, etc. And also by incorporating
"external microbiomes"--fermentation-- for our service: bread,
wine, beer, cheese, etc. The essential new foods of civilization<big><big><small><small>.
Cooking made us humans... how a "social brain" was
created, and how our phenomenology became captive of group
collective thinking might be a topic deserving further
analysis.<br>
<br>
Thanking in advance for the tolerance! <br>
<br>
Best--Pedro</small></small> <br>
<br>
</big></big>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<small><br>
<br>
</small></div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:center;line-height:200%" align="center"><small><b><span lang="EN-US"><big><big>Phenomenology and
Evolutionary Biology</big></big><u></u><u></u></span></b></small></p>
<small> <br>
</small>
<div align="justify"><b><span lang="EN-US"><span></span></span></b><span lang="EN-US"><b>(1): Phenomenology<br>
</b>As written in the Preface to the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition
(1979) of The Phenomenology of Dance, “Certainly words carry
no patented meanings, but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem
stretched beyond its limits when it is used to denote either
mere reportorial renderings of perceptive behaviors or
actions, or <i>any</i>
descriptive rendering at all of perceptible behaviors or
actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as
a very specific mode of epistemological inquiry, a method of
eidetic analysis invariably associated with the name Edmund
Husserl, the founder of phenomenology; and at the most
‘phenomenology’ should be recognized as a
philosophically-spawned terms, that is, a term having a rich
philosophical history and significance.” <u></u><u></u></span><small><br>
</small> <small><br>
</small><span lang="EN-US">A phenomenological analysis of
movement given in The Phenomenology of Dance follows the
rigorous methodology set forth by Husserl. The methodology is
integral to understandings of phenomenology as well as to its
practice. Husserl distinguished two modes of the methodology.
One mode is termed “static,” the other is termed “genetic.”
The aim in static phenomenology is to uncover the essential
character of the phenomenon in question or under
investigation. The aim in genetic phenomenology is to uncover
the source and development of meanings and values we hold. <u></u><u></u></span><small><br>
</small> <small><br>
<span lang="EN-US"><big>The abbreviated
phenomenological analysis of movement set forth below
follows a static phenomenology. The abbreviated
phenomenological analysis of the origin of tool-making
follows a genetic phenomenology. The first analysis
elucidates the inherently dynamic character of movement,
and in ways quite contrary to the idea that movement is a
force in time and in space and quite contrary as well to
the dictionary definition of movement as a “change of
position.” The second analysis answers questions that
paleoanthropologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists
leave unanswered. The analyses present basic aspects of
animation that anchor the relationship between
phenomenology and the life sciences. In particular, the
point of departure for both phenomenology and the life
sciences is <i>animate</i>
being not just in the sense of <i>living</i> creatures,
but in the sense of <i>moving</i>
creatures, creatures who, in and through movement, are
sustaining their lives, mating and reproducing, and so on.
In short, movement is fundamental to animation, a
decidedly significant entrée to understanding basic
aspects anchoring a relationship between phenomenology and
the life sciences. Following these analyses is a final
section on the descriptive foundations of both
phenomenology and evolutionary biology and on their common
concern with origins... <br>
<br>
(cont., see attached file) </big></span><font face="Arial"><br>
</font><br>
<br>
</small>
<div align="justify"><b><span lang="EN-US">(</span></b><b><big><span lang="EN-US"></span></big></b><b><span lang="EN-US">4) Descriptive Foundations<u></u><u></u></span></b><small><br>
</small><b> </b><span lang="EN-US"></span><span lang="EN-US">While it is common to speak
laudingly of the keenness and scope of <u></u><u></u>Darwin<u></u><u></u>'s observations,
it is not commonly <span> </span>recognized,
certainly not explicitly, that his observations, as written,
describe his experiences. His written observations are in
fact equivalent to his experiences in the sense that they
detail what he saw, felt, heard, smelled, and even tasted.
Though focal attention is consistently--one might even say,
exclusively--riveted on <span> </span>his
<span> </span>theory <span> </span>of natural selection, <u></u><u></u>Darwin<u></u><u></u>'s
descriptive writings are of fundamental significance, for it
is these descriptive writings <span> </span>that ground <span> </span>his theory, that are its
foundation. More broadly, evolutionary understandings and
explanations of Nature are in the end tethered to an
experientially-derived descriptive literature. Reading this
literature, we learn a good <span> </span>deal
about <span></span>nonhuman
animals. We learn <span> </span>that
<span> </span>they are perceptive,
<span> </span>thoughtful, and <span> </span>affectively moved <span> </span>by creatures and <span> </span>things in their
environment, and <span> </span>we
learn further that their perceptive, affective, and
thoughtful ways are intimately related<span> </span>to our own. In short, <u></u><u></u>Darwin<u></u><u></u>'s
descriptive accounts of the natural living world reveal
something about the lives of others and in turn something
about our own lives.<u></u><u></u></span><small><br>
</small> <small><br>
</small><span lang="EN-US">I highlight the descriptive
foundations of evolutionary theory in part because these
descriptive foundations have fallen by the wayside,
particularly in the highly visible present-day writings on
evolution by neuroscientists and cognitive scientists.
“Darwinian bodies” are not automatons. Neither are they
robots lumbering <span> </span>about
<span> </span>on behalf <span> </span>of selfish genes nor are
they head-end neurological mechanisms, as per cognitivists
of all stripe who collapse bodies into brains. I highlight
the descriptive foundations of evolutionary theory equally
to call attention to experience, specifically to the fact
that descriptive foundations are grounded in experience.
Descriptive foundations do not come by way of reducing the
living world to genes, collapsing it into brains, or
modeling it along the lines of a computer. Descriptive
foundations are laid by way of direct experience of the
living world. Only by hewing to experiences of that world
have we the possibility of arriving at veridical descriptive
accounts of nature and in turn, at explanations of nature.</span><small><br>
</small><span lang="EN-US"><u></u><u></u></span><small><br>
</small> <span lang="EN-US">I follow up these aspects of
Darwinian evolutionary biology to show their confluence with
phenomenology. Phenomenology, like Darwinian evolutionary
biology, is methodologically essential to understandings of
human nature; like Darwinian evolutionary biology, it too is
tethered to experience and is basically a descriptive
project; and again, like Darwinian evolutionary biology, it
too is concerned with origins. What we think of and separate
academically as disparate fields of knowledge are
undergirded by descriptive foundations. The descriptive
challenge lies in languaging experience and being true to
the truths of experience, a challenge common to both fields
of study.<br>
<br>
</span></div>
<small>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
</small><font face="Arial"><u></u>
<small> </small>
<p style="text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph"><small><span lang="EN-US"><u></u> <u></u></span></small></p>
<u></u></font><u></u><u></u><font face="Arial"><u></u><u></u><br>
<br>
<big><u></u><u></u></big></font><br>
</div>
<pre cols="72"> </pre><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
</font></span></blockquote><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<pre cols="72">--
-------------------------------------------------
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. <a href="tel:%2B34%20976%2071%203526" value="+34976713526" target="_blank">+34 976 71 3526</a> (& 6818)
<a href="mailto:pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es" target="_blank">pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es</a>
<a href="http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/" target="_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/</a>
-------------------------------------------------
</pre></font></span></div><br>_______________________________________________<br>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div>Dr. Mark William Johnson<br>Institute of Learning and Teaching</div><div>Faculty of Health and Life Sciences</div><div>University of Liverpool</div><div><br>Visiting Professor<br>Far Eastern Federal University, Russia</div><div><br>Phone: 07786 064505<br>Email: <a href="mailto:johnsonmwj1@gmail.com" target="_blank">johnsonmwj1@gmail.com</a><br>Blog: <a href="http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com" target="_blank">http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com</a> </div></div></div>
</div>