<div dir="ltr">The language metaphor is so very seductive. I fear that our discussion is too easily ensnared by its ubiquity in our lives. From Günther's response I am also not clear whether he is defending using the language model as generic or as a special case (though we do not agree in our assessments of von Frisch or Tomasello). <div><br></div><div>To me, using language as the paradigm general case is like a biologist studying mammalian hair from the perspective of porcupine quills and defining all other forms of hair as simplified quills (quills minus some properties). </div><div><br></div><div>The problem is, of course, the way we define the distinctive properties of language (simple property lists vs more basic semiotic analysis). Language is the most developed form because its symbolic capacity depends on and grows out of complex lower-order iconic and indexical forms of reference. This is why one can also represent WHAT simpler forms represent in a language-like system (but not vice versa). But the difference matters. Saying that one is sad and sobbing may communicate the same content, but the difference is significant. These more basic modes of representing are presupposed in the concept of language (but typically bracketed from the analysis). As a result we can erroneously ignore the difference in HOW these other forms represent, as well as how language representation itself is constituted. </div><div><br></div><div>As is exemplified by coughs, smiles, music, and skunk odors (and thousands of other forms), I consider mapping all communication onto language (even in the form of e.g. language-minus-properties-X-and-Y) to be a truly procrustean enterprise— as is defining these non-linguistic modes of communication in terms of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. And so I am advocating that we not too hastily assume that an information theory made axiomatically isomorphic with natural language is the best most complete model for all uses. Such a model may be sufficient for analyzing many human linguistically-based communication systems, but that usefulness can blind us to what formal language models tacitly assume and leave unexplained about information in general.</div><div><div><br></div><div>— Terry<br></div><div><br></div></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 at 9:59 AM, Günther Witzany <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:witzany@sbg.at" target="_blank">witzany@sbg.at</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word">Yes, I agree with Terrance, that language of humans is a highly specialized form used in communicative actions of various forms, although in the beginning the difference between our ancestors – great apes – and early hominoids was not so dramatically different (see M. Tomasello. The origin of human communication, 2008). As we learned with the success of the pragmatic turn thinkers which refuted the linguistic turn thinkers in their attempt to construct an exact scientific language ( mathematical theory of language) and to delimit exact science from metaphysics is that a natural language we can term any sign system that functions according semantic, pragmatic and syntactic rules. <div><br></div><div>This means also body movements can express utterances, can be combined to serial content which has meanings according its pragmatic context. Interestingly decades before this, there was a controversy on the language of the bees between Karl von Frisch with several others in which they refuted v.Frischs termination of bee "language" just as being a metaphor not really a language. In an article v.Frisch proved the fact that it is a real language with all key features of real natural languages, including the fact of several dialects. 20 years later he was awarded with the nobelprize for his research results. The dialects he detected by mixing Austrian and Italian bees with the result, that the same sign sequences (dance movements) expressed different meanings according the original real lifeworld of the bees where they socialized. </div><div><br></div><div>If we follow Juergen Habermas, the most cited philosopher of the present we can term “communication” every sign-mediated rule-governed interaction, although he did not mean this outside humans. As I tried to demonstrate in my "biocommunication and natural genome editing" approach we can identify such sign-mediated interactions throughout all organismic kingdoms in coordination and organization processes between cells, tissues, organs and organisms. Interestingly on the very basics of life, viruses and sub-viral groups of RNAs the difference between signs and sign-users can change rather fast, which means the passive function as template for genetic replication or being active as catalyst using a colonized (former) catalyst as template may switch. But this is a dynamic process that drives evolution into a constantly continuing process since nearly 4 billion years. We can imagine how successful artificial genetic engineering will be to manage genetic parasites…</div><div><div class="h5"><div><br><div><div>Am 28.09.2015 um 07:13 schrieb Terrence W. Deacon:</div><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr">As exemplified in Guenther's auxin example, and Pedro's worries about the procrustean use of language metaphors in the discussion of inter- and intra-cellular communication, it is likely to be problematic to use language as the paradigm model for all communication, much less as the foundation upon which to build a general theory of information. From an evolutionary point of view, language is a highly derived human idiosyncratic form of communication that evolved only very recently in vertebrate phylogeny, in only one species, and is supported by a vast semiotic cognitive and social infrastructure. Communication in a more general sense is vastly older and far more generic. For this reason, it is wise to avoid talking in terms of the semantics of a cough, the meaning of a piece of music, or the syntax of a skunk's odor. The use of Carnap's approach to language semantics and various other uses of linguistic categories in information theoretic analyses needs to be understood as a special case, not the generic form. I would recommend that presentations and comments to them be framed with appropriate caveats, indicating whether they address such special cases of human information or are intended to be generic. </div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Sep 25, 2015 at 4:37 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es" target="_blank">pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000">
Dear FISers and all,<br>
<br>
I include below another response to Immanuel post (from Guenther). I
think he has penned an excellent response--my only addition is to
expostulate a doubt. Should our analysis of the human (or cellular!)
communication with the environment be related to linguistic practices?
In short, my argument is that biological self-production becomes "la
raison d'etre" of communication, both concerning its evolutionary
origins and the continuous opening towards the environment along the
different stages of the individual's life cycle<big><big><small><small>.
It is cogent that the same messenger plays quite different roles in
different specialized cells --we have to disentangle in each case how
the impinging "info" affects the ongoing life cycle (the impact upon
the transcriptome, proteome, metabolome, etc.) There is no shortcut to
the endless work necessary--wet lab & in silico. So I think that
Encode and other big projects are quite useful in the continuous
exploration of biological complexity and provide us valuable conceptual
stuff--but looking for hypothetical big formalisms (I quite agree) is
out sight. Molecular recognition which is the at the fundamentals of
biological organization can only provide modest guidelines about the
main informational architectures of life... beyond that, there is too
much complexity, endless complexity to contemplate, particularly when
we try to study multicellular organization. Anyhow, this topic of the
essential informational openness of the individual's life cycle appears
to me as the Gordian knot to be cut for the advancement of our field:
otherwise we will never connect meaningfully with the endless info
flows that interconnect our societies, generated from the life cycles
of individuals and addressed to the life cycles of other individuals.
Info sources, channels for info flows, and info receptors are not mere
Shannonian overtones, they symbolically refer to the very info skeleton
of our societies; or looking dynamically it is the engine of social
history and of social complexity. <br>
<br>
Well, sorry that I could not express myself better.<br>
<br>
all the best--Pedro </small></small><br>
</big></big><br>
Günther Witzany wrote:
<blockquote cite="http://mid0D34F6EF-19E6-4C9C-A9D3-ABA4F5F2E7C7@sbg.at/" type="cite">
Dear all!
<div><br>
</div>
<div>What is the opposite of a linguistic description? a
non-linguistic description? Please tell me one possible explanation of
a non-linguistic description. So Im not convinced of the sense of the
term "information". </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Concerning the "difference" of physical and semantic
information: What would you prefer in the case of plant communication.
Does the chemical Auxin represent a physical or a semantic
information? Auxin is used in hormonal, morphogenic, and transmitter
pathways. As an extracellular signal at the plant synapse, auxin serves
to react to light and gravity. It also serves as an extracellular
messenger substance to send electrical signals and functions as a
synchronization signal for cell division. At the intercellular,
whole plant level, it supports cell division in the cambium, and at the
tissue level, it promotes the maturation of vascular tissue during
embryonic development, organ growth as well as tropic responses and
apical dominance. In intracellular signaling, auxin serves in
organogenesis, cell development, and differentiation. Especially in the
organogenesis of roots, for example, auxin enables cells to determine
their position and their identity. These multiple functions of auxin
demonstrate that identifying the momentary usage (its semantics) is
extremely difficult because the context (investigation object of
pragmatics) of use can be very complex and highly diverse, although the
chemical property remains the same.</div>
<div>Yes, mathematics is an artificial language. Last century the
Pythagorean approach, mathematics represents material reality, (if we
use mathematics we reconstruct creators thoughts) was reactivated:
Exact science must represent observations as well as theories in
mathematical equations. Then it would be sure to represent reality,
because brain synapse logics then could express its own material
reality. But this was proven as error. Prior to all artificial
languages we learned how to interconnect linguistic utterances with
practical behavior in socialisation; therefore the ultimate
meta-language is everyday language with its visible superficial grammar
and its invisible deep grammar that transports the intended meaning.
How should computers extract deep grammar structures out of measurable
superficial syntax structures? In the case of ENCODE project (to find
the human genome primary data structures) this was the aim which got
financial support of 3 billion dollars with the result of detecting the
superficial grammar only, nothing else.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Best Wishes</div>
<div>Guenther</div><div><div>
<div>
<div>Am 24.09.2015 um 07:47 schrieb Emanuel Diamant:</div>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div link="#0563C1" vlink="#954F72" lang="EN-US">
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Dear
FIS colleagues,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">As a
newcomer to FIS, I feel myself very uncomfortable when I have to
interrupt the ongoing discourse with something that looks for me quite
natural but is lacking in our current public dialog. What I have in
mind is that in every discussion or argument exchange, first of all,
the grounding axioms and mutually agreed assumptions should be
established and declared as the basis for further debating and
reasoning. Maybe in our case, these things are implied by default, but
I am not a part of the dominant coalition. For this reason, I would
dare to formulate some grounding axioms that may be useful for those
who are not FIS insiders:<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">1. <b>Information
is a linguistic description of structures observable in a given data set</b><u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">2.
Two types of data structures could be distinguished in a data set:
primary and secondary data structures.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">3.
Primary data structures are data clusters or clumps arranged or
occurring due to the similarity in physical properties of adjacent data
elements. For this reason, the primary data structures could be called
physical data structures.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">4.
Secondary data structures are specific arrangements of primary data
structures. The grouping of primary data structures into secondary data
structures is a prerogative of an external observer and it is guided by
his subjective reasons, rules and habits. The secondary data structures
exist only in the observer’s head, in his mind. Therefore, they could
be called meaningful or semantic data structures. <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">5. As
it was said earlier, <b>Description of structures observable in a data
set should be called “Information”. </b>In this regard, two types of
information must be distinguished – <b>Physical Information and
Semantic Information</b>. <u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">6.
Both are language-based descriptions; however, physical information can
be described with a variety of languages (recall that mathematics is
also a language), while semantic information can be described only by
means of natural human language.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">This
is a concise set of axioms that should preface all our further
discussions. You can accept them. You can discard them and replace them
with better ones. But you can not proceed without basing your
discussion on a suitable and appropriate set of axioms.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif""><u></u> <u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">That
is what I have to say at this moment.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">My
best regards to all of you,<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif"">Emanuel.<u></u><u></u></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"> <u></u><u></u></p><p class="MsoNormal"><u></u> <u></u></p>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<br>
</div></div></blockquote><span><font color="#888888">
<br>
<br>
<pre cols="72">--
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Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. <a href="tel:%2B34%20976%2071%203526" value="+34976713526" target="_blank">+34 976 71 3526</a> (& 6818)
<a href="mailto:pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es" target="_blank">pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es</a>
<a href="http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/" target="_blank">http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/</a>
-------------------------------------------------
</pre>
</font></span></div>
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<br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div>Professor Terrence W. Deacon<br>University of California, Berkeley</div>
</div>
</blockquote></div><br>
<br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature">Professor Terrence W. Deacon<br>University of California, Berkeley</div>
</div>