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This is indeed important, and I think Frege was on the right track on a
number of issues.<br><br>
Peirce, however, did use the term 'information', but as far as I can see
he presupposed intentionality. This doesn't help, unless the world is
intentional "all the way don3e", which strongly doubt.<br><br>
I think that the pivotal point is how does intentionality arise (or the
weaker but still significant "ententionality" defined by Terry
Deacon) from information. Peirce did not solve that issue, but
presupposed itr. That is exactly what I am arguing is not
satisfactory.<br><br>
John<br><br>
<br>
At 05:35 PM 2014-10-29, Krassimir Markov wrote:<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Dear Pedro and FIS
Colleagues,<br>
<br>
For me it was amazing time to read exchanges about "The
travelers" !<br>
I was silent because for me is was stimulus brain storming
discussion.<br>
I received a plenty of influences.<br>
<br>
Only one aspect there was not commented and let me now to this.<br>
<br>
For this purpose I will use a remarkable text from:<br>
[<font size=4> Frege G. An extract from an undated letter, published in
Frege's Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence (ed.) Gottfried
Gabriel, Hans Hermes. Friedrich Kanbartel. Christian Thiel, and Albert
Veraart, Abridged for the English (edn.), by Brian MeGuinness, and Trans.
Hans Kaal (Oxford: Blackwell. 1980),
</font><a href="??"><font size=4 color="#0000FF">
http://mind.ucsd.edu/syllabi/00-01/phil235/a_readings/frege_jourdain.html</a>
</font><font face="Calibri" size=4> (accessed:
15.11.2012)</font><font face="Times New Roman, Times"> ].</font>:<br>
<br>
In a letter written to Philip Jourdain in 1914, Gottlob Frege had
written:<br>
<br>
"<br>
Let us suppose an explorer travelling in an unexplored country sees a
high snow-capped mountain on the northern horizon.<br>
By making inquiries among the natives he learns that its name is 'Aphla'.
By sighting it from different points he determines its position as
exactly as possible, enters it in a map, and writes in his diary: 'Aphla
is at least 5000 meters high'.<br>
Another explorer sees a snow-capped mountain on the southern horizon and
learns that it is called Ateb. He enters it in his map under this
name.<br>
Later comparison shows that both explorers saw the same mountain. Now the
content of the proposition 'Ateb is Aphla' is far from being a mere
consequence of the principle of identity, but contains a valuable piece
of geographical knowledge. What is stated in the proposition 'Ateb is
Aphla' is certainly not the same thing as the content of the proposition
'Ateb is Ateb'.<br>
Now if what corresponded to the name 'Aphla' as part of the thought was
the reference of the name and hence the mountain itself, then this would
be the same in both thoughts. The thought expressed in the proposition
'Ateb is Aphla' would have to coincide with the one in 'Ateb is Ateb',
which is far from being the case. What corresponds to the name 'Ateb' as
part of the thought must therefore be different from what corresponds to
the name 'Aphla' as part of the thought. This cannot therefore be the
reference which is the same for both names, but must be something which
is different in the two cases, and I say accordingly that the sense of
the name 'Ateb' is different from the sense of the name 'Aphla'.<br>
Accordingly, the sense of the proposition 'Ateb is at least 5000 meters
high' is also different from the sense of the proposition 'Aphla is at
least 5000 meters high'. Someone who takes the latter to be true need not
therefore take the former to be true. An object can be determined in
different ways, and every one of these ways of determining it can give
rise to a special name, and these different names then have different
senses; for it is not self-evident that it is the same object which is
being determined in different ways.<br>
We find this in astronomy in the case of planetoids and comets. Now if
the sense of a name was something subjective, then the sense of the
proposition in which the name occurs, and hence the thought, would also
be something subjective, and the thought one man connects with this
proposition would be different from the thought another man connects with
it; a common store of thoughts, a common science would be
impossible.<br>
It would be impossible for something one man said to contradict what
another man said, because the two would not express the same thought at
all, but each his owns.<br>
For these reasons I believe that the sense of a name is not something
subjective (crossed out: in one's mental life), that it does not
therefore belong to psychology, and that it is indispensable.<br>
“<br>
<br>
What is important in this example is :<br>
- The names Ateb and Aphla refer to different parts of
the same natural object (mountain);<br>
- The position of the referred object (mountain) is
fixed by any artificial system (geographical co-ordinates) which is
another knowledge about the same object;<br>
- The names correspond one to another and both to the
real object but without the explorers’ maps and diaries, it is impossible
to restore the correspondence.<br>
<br>
<font size=4>In conclusion, let me remark that we really need “knowledge
maps” to understand each other “travelling in an unexplored
reality”.<br>
Such knowledge maps usually are called “General Theories”.<br>
</font> <br>
<font size=4>Friendly regards<br>
Krassimir<br>
</font> <br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
-----Original Message----- <br>
From: Pedro C. Marijuan <br>
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 3:45 PM <br>
To: fis@listas.unizar.es <br>
Subject: Re: [Fis] "The Travellers" <br>
<br>
Dear FIS colleagues,<br>
<br>
Quite interesting exchanges, really. The discussion reminds me the times
<br>
when behaviorism and ethology were at odds on how to focus the study of
<br>
human/animal behavior. (Maybe I already talked about that some months
<br>
ago.) On the one side, a rigorous theory and a strongly reductionist
<br>
point of view were advanced --about learning, conditioned & <br>
unconditioned stimuli, responses, observation standards, laboratory <br>
exclusive scenario, etc. On the other side, it was observing behavior in
<br>
nature, approaching without preconceptions and tentatively <br>
characterizing the situations and results; it was the naturalistic <br>
strategy, apprehending from nature before forming any theoretical scheme
<br>
(of course, later on Tinbergen, Lorenz, Eibl-Eibestfeldt, etc. were to
<br>
develop ad hoc theoretical schemes).<br>
<br>
How can we develop a theory on signals without the previous naturalistic
<br>
approach to the involved phenomena? Particularly when the panorama has
<br>
dramatically changed after the information-biomolecular revolution. We
<br>
have a rich background of cellular signaling systems, both prokaryotic
<br>
and eukaryotic, to explore and cohere. We have important neuroscientific
<br>
ideas (although not so well developed). We have social physics and <br>
social networks approaches to the social dynamics of information. We
<br>
should travel to all of those camps, not to stay there, but to advance a
<br>
soft all-encompassing perspective, later on to be confronted with the
<br>
new ideas from physics too. The intertwining between self-production and
<br>
communication is a promising general aspect to explore, in my opinion...
<br>
socially and biologically it makes a lot of sense.<br>
<br>
Semiotics could be OK for the previous generation--something attuned to
<br>
our scientific times is needed now.<br>
<br>
best ---Pedro<br>
<br>
-------------------------------------------------<br>
Pedro C. Marijuán<br>
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group<br>
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud<br>
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)<br>
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X<br>
50009 Zaragoza, Spain<br>
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)<br>
pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.es<br>
<a href="http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/" eudora="autourl">
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/</a><br>
-------------------------------------------------<br>
<br>
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John
Collier
collierj@ukzn.ac.za<br>
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa<br>
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031<br>
<a href="http://web.ncf.ca/collier" eudora="autourl">
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier<br>
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